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3Introduction
This report analyzes the behavior of firms and managers in the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, and Hungary during their integration into the world economy.
The conclusions are based on 23 case studies conducted in 1995. We found
a rapidly transforming mosaic of managerial behavior which both changed
over time and varied from firm to firm in all three countries. We found no
one pattern of behavior that could be labeled as prototypical. This may
be intellectually inelegant, but we wished to avoid the media’s practice of
reporting on the initially successful entrepreneurial stars – and quite often
their subsequent failures – as possessing the recipe for success or failure. In-
deed, one can learn from the stars as well as from those who crave anonymity
at all cost. If we must draw a conclusion it is this: Success was determined,
to a large extent, by the managers’ flexibility to adapt to rapid – and al-
ways uncertain – changes. The obvious hypotheses that small companies
are likely to be more adaptable than large ones and that young managers
are necessarily more successful than middle-aged ones are not conclusively
borne out by the case analyses.
We also attempted to put the observed managerial experience of the
three countries into historical and comparative contexts. The experience
of companies in Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan sug-
gests that successful economic performances were largely determined by the
success with which the companies integrated themselves into the world econ-
omy. This was also true for Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia in the early
1970s and for Mexico, Argentina, and Chile in the mid-1980s. Conversely,
managers in countries that did not oversee this integration process well –
India (until recently), Pakistan, Brazil, and virtually all of Africa – were left
behind in terms of economic performance. A reminder: One of the great
impediments to managerial success is unrealistic expectations. Many, if not
most, entrepreneurs and managers in the target countries crave instant suc-
cess. The fact is that it took West European and Japanese managers 20 to
25 years after the Marshall Plan and the Korean War, respectively, to bring
their enterprises to prosperity.
In this paper we first sketch the macroeconomic and political environ-
ment for Central and East European (CEE) enterprises in mid-1995 and
analyze the financial sectors in the target countries. The marketing, oper-
ations, and financial challenges to these companies are illustrated in case
examples. Next, we characterize managerial behavior within various types
of enterprises and comment on the relationships between these behaviors
and success or failure.
4Table 1. Type of industry and ownership of Czech and Slovak companies
in the case examples.
Type of Privatized
industry companies Joint venture
Agricultural pro- Mlekarna Klatovy, a.s.
cessing (dairy) (Czech Republic)
Manufacturing Biotika, a.s. (Slovakia) Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne, a.s.
Botana, a.s. (Czech Republic) (Slovakia)
Solo, a.s. (Czech Republic)
Services Elektromontazˇn´ı za´vody, a.s.
(Czech Republic)
Metrostav, a.s. (Czech Republic)
Microeconomics, managerial behavior, and case studies that illustrate
them are keys to understanding how economics work. Macroeconomics, fis-
cal and monetary policies, and stabilization are indeed very important but,
by a long shot, they don’t tell the whole story. The transformation and in-
tegration literature is full of macro studies; far too few micro projects have
been undertaken because they are so labor intensive. We hope that there
will be many more micro studies, and we are pleased that we are among the
first.
The valuable case studies were made possible, to a large extent, by the
contacts of the National Member Organizations of the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), especially in Hungary. Managers in
the three target countries are usually reluctant to open up to outsiders for
a host of seemingly good reasons, originating in the uncertainty and rapid
changes in their situations. IIASA’s affiliates – and the skill of the case
writers – managed to assuage their apprehensions.
We attempted to produce four categories of case studies: new firms,
joint ventures, privatized companies, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Tables 1 and 2 present matrices of industries and ownership of companies
for which case analyses have been prepared.
The Macroeconomic and Political
Environment in Mid-1995
The credo in the target countries is that the guidance of the invisible hand of
the market will maximize economic welfare. This is an expression of “spirit”
and should not be taken literally, as the visible hand of the government
is still considerably more prevalent in CEE business than, say, in Western
Europe or North America. However, the grip of the government’s hand
5Table 2. Type of industry and ownership of Hungarian companies in the
case examples.
Type of Modified Privatized Joint New
industry SOEa companies venture enterprise
Utilities & Hungarian
associated Telecommuni-
companies cation Co.,
BHG Hirada´s-
technikai
Va´llalat
Engineering Ganz-
Ansaldo
Pharmaceuti- Senior Vaci Chinoin
cals, textiles, Ko¨to¨ttarugyar Grabo-
& home plast
improvement
Food Pick Szeged,
Zwack Unicom
Technology Duna Elektronika
Mu¨szertechnika
Services Budapest Stock
Exchange,
High-Tech
Consulting,
International
Management
Center,
New World
Publishing,
Price
Waterhouse,
SBG&K Patent
and Law Offices
aSOE = state-owned enterprise.
is, obviously, a great deal more relaxed today than it was prior to 1989.
This is just as well, as government policymakers and implementors also face
(and sometime create) uncertain situations in which they have neither the
experience nor the education to operate effectively. There has been a fair
amount of vacillation in the implementation of budgetary and monetary
policies that deal with rising unemployment in the absence of an established
safety net and cope with inflation, trade policy, and in the case of Hungary
and Slovakia devaluing currencies. In this respect CEE governments must
deal with the same sort of problems as private-sector organizations.
6The macroeconomic factors of life in Central and Eastern Europe may
be summarized as follows:
• Because of the unfavorable economic legacies left by the respective Com-
munist regimes, the post-Communist governments had to adopt restric-
tive economic policies which caused recessions in the domestic markets;
the recessions most unfavorably impacted companies such as those sell-
ing home improvement or other postponable consumer goods (Grabo-
plast in Hungary, for example).
• The collapse of the Communist regimes coincided somewhat with cyclical
recessions in Western Europe and North America.
• The Soviet bloc markets collapsed in 1991.
• In addition to the recessions in Western Europe, export possibilities were
harmed by the tariffs and quotas erected by the European Union (EU),
especially in industries where CEE countries had spare capacity such as
agricultural products, steel, and textiles.
• Successive devaluations of domestic currencies, vis-a`-vis US dollars or
Deutsche marks, raised the prices of imported inputs; for domestic pro-
ducers the degree and timing of the devaluations added to already exist-
ing uncertainty and for the foreign joint-venture partners devaluations
worsened their income statements.
• As the target countries reduced their tariffs and quotas – in an effort
to liberalize – foreign companies (many with deep pockets) entered the
markets causing domestic companies giant headaches.
In Hungary, Graboplast, Mu¨szertechnika (computers), Zwack (liquor
and beverages), and the strong domestic pharmaceutical industry were par-
ticularly hard hit. For instance, the share of foreign pharmaceuticals in-
creased from 26.3% in 1990 to 46.6% in 1993. Figure 1 gives the vari-
ables impacting on CEE companies’ efforts at integrating themselves into
the world economy.
Financial Sectors
A prerequisite to any smoothly functioning economic activity is an effectively
functioning financial sector. As of mid-1995, this was simply not available
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or Hungary. The balance sheets of most, if
not all, banks were burdened with nonperforming loans. Further, banks in
the Czech Republic and Slovakia were still managed by former Communist
Party officials, not exactly banker types! In Hungary, the situation has
improved in recent years. This has not been the case in the Czech Republic
where in the summer 1996 the sixth largest bank collapsed and several of its
7Management Entrepreneurship
Macroenvironment
GNP growth and stability
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Stable - Unstable
Small size of
CR, SL, and H
"Integrate or die''
Action of economic partners
Ex-Soviet bloc, European Union
trade, investment, aid
Integrating
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into the world
economy
Barriers to entry
Global competition
Producers, customers, suppliers
Rapid change in environment
Privatizations
Foreign direct investment
Comparative advantages
Financial infrastructure
Capital markets
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Figure 1. Variables determining integration into the world economy.
executives were arrested and charged with fraud (Financial Times, 1996).
These managers were accustomed to lending to governments or government-
owned businesses; they had little experience in lending to the private sector,
which did not exist until recently. The new business scene, combined with the
state of the banks’ balance sheets, made the already risk-averse loan officers
even more reluctant to lend – especially to mid-size or small companies where
most of the growth occurred. The exceptions were companies featured in
the media. The banks continued to lend to state-owned enterprises on the
assumption that firms can and do go bankrupt but countries do not. These
banks were no different from the multinational banks that threw plenty of
good money after bad money in the developing world during the 1970s and
1980s.
By avoiding lending to mid-size and small firms, many of them with
manager/owners, banks were likely to miss profitable opportunities. They
did not consider the example of the overseas Chinese, primarily in Southeast
Asia. Their firms started small, and as their enterprises grew into multi-
national, multibillion-dollar entities, the owners stayed loyal to the banks
that helped them at the start. In CEE countries, which are much smaller
in several ways than the countries in Southeast Asia, such lending is still
possible.
Stock exchanges are not filling the gap left by banks. Founded in the
early 1990s, they list only a few companies; a dozen or so companies on each
exchange account for the bulk of the trading volume and equity prices have
8been volatile as trading is thin, in line with the behavior of the stock markets
in most emerging countries. Generally, banks proved to be uninterested
in equity investing or in creating mutual funds. There is evidence that
foreign banks lend directly to Hungarian enterprises; for instance, in the
first three months of 1995, the influx of foreign credit amounted to $1.5
billion (Csermely, 1996).
As the banks were holding nonperforming loans in SOEs, many of them
exchanged these loans for equities in the respective SOEs. These equities
were not a source of wealth as, by default, banks became investors in a
string of losers. This arrangement created a web of bank-SOE cross-holdings
along the lines of Japanese keiretsu and German-type bank-industrial com-
plexes. The difference between the Japanese and German models and the
CEE companies is that the keiretsu banks and the German banks take an
active managerial interest in the companies in which they hold significant
shares. Similarly, it is up to the CEE banks to check on the management of
companies of which they are part owners. In mid-1995, they were not doing
that. It is difficult to determine whether they lack the ability to take a more
active stance or, as they are themselves in deep trouble, they are preoccupied
with their own problems. Also, the behavior of the banks reflects the un-
certainty of the macroeconomic environment in which they operate. Banks
had difficulties in calculating returns on investments or cash flows because
of inconsistent economic policies, high inflation, and devaluing currencies.
They consistently advised clients to “stay liquid and short term.” This is
the recipe that they themselves followed.
As indicated earlier, the Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian stock markets are
not yet providing liquidity to the respective business sectors. The market
solution to this problem has been the Global and American Depository Re-
ceipts (GDRs and ADRs) on Western stock exchanges. In 1985, 390 ADRs
were traded on US stock exchanges; by mid-1995 the number had risen to
1,300 (Fidelity Focus, 1995). A GDR is a US dollar-denominated certifi-
cate issued by a multinational bank, stating that the issuing company has
deposited shares with the bank. GDRs and ADRs can be traded, and clear-
ance is via Cedel or Euroclear and only in convertible currencies. GDRs and
ADRs widen the base of investors that may be attracted to a company’s eq-
uities, and this is likely to reduce the cost of capital to the issuer. FOTEX,
a diversified retail company in Hungary, had two GDR issues in 1992 and
1994 for a total of $70 million; Pick Szeged, a meat-processing company in
Hungary, also had two issues in 1992 and 1994 for a total of $22 million;
and Pharmavit, Hungary’s third largest drug company, received a 1994 issue
for $24 million. Richter Gedeon, the largest pharmaceutical firm in Hun-
gary, issued an Austrian DR in 1994 for $50 million arranged by Schroders
and Creditanstalt Investment Bank. Other investment houses active with
9GDRs in CEE countries are CS First Boston, Samuel Montague, and James
Capel. Of the target countries only Hungary had companies that where
issued GDRs and ADRs as of 1995.
Some of the Hungarian companies in our sample are listed on the Bu-
dapest Stock Exchange (BSE): Chinoin, Graboplast, Pick Szeged, and Zwack
Unicom. One precondition of BSE listing is that the company adheres to
international accounting standards and has one of the Big Six American
accounting firms as an auditor.
Among the companies in our sample there has been some budding merger
and acquisition activity, such as Pick Szeged purchase of competing Herz in
1994. The purchase was financed by retained earnings and bank loans. A
further role in the financial sector has been played by foreign institutions
such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
which invested in Microsystems, and the US Congress, which appropriated
funds to the Hungarian American Enterprise Fund, and invested in Duna
Elektronika and Microsystems. Finally, a secondary market appears to be
emerging. For instance, Creditanstalt resold 25% of its Graboplast stake to
other investors.
A viable financial sector is also needed for restructuring domestic debt.
Foreign debts have been held by multinational banks in US dollars, Deutsche
marks, and other convertible currencies. Repayment of foreign debt has been
made increasingly difficult by the devaluations of domestic currencies. Some-
times domestic banks have provided loans to prime customers in domestic
currencies to service foreign debt. However, the role of domestic banks has
been more crucial in the restructuring of domestic debt than in that of for-
eign debt.
The restructuring of domestic debt owed by SOEs has proved to be easier
than the restructuring of debts owed by private enterprises because banks
correctly believed that governments would meet their financial obligations.
The restructuring of private debts has been cumbersome to banks. These
debts were primarily owed to private vendor/suppliers who wanted to get
paid either by SOEs or by the privatized successor. In a few cases, banks
were successful in trading short-term losses, i.e., settle on X% of the debt for
the sake of the long-term viability of the enterprise and that of the vendor’s
business.
Marketing
Prior to 1989 virtually all foreign trade was conducted by means of special-
ized foreign trade organizations (FTOs). Individual companies, with a few
exceptions, had no foreign market intelligence, conducted no foreign market
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research, had no distribution channels, and, indeed, did no foreign market-
ing. This situation represented a significant barrier to CEE firms trying to
enter the world market. There is no substitute for doing one’s own market-
ing, learning the market and trading practices, familiarizing foreign vendors
with the company, its products or services, and so on. Selling in the Soviet
bloc market was not marketing. Firms were told which goods to produce
and sold their goods in markets for which their production was intended.
After 1989 marketing became a new game not only because the
economies moved from producer orientation to consumer orientation but
because, domestically, the economic transformation altered the channels of
distribution. Much of the retail sector was privatized, and this called for
frequent deliveries of small quantities to the retail outlets. Smaller retailers
had neither the space to carry inventories nor the capital for financing them.
New vendors appeared to fill the need, and old channels of distribution had
to adjust or go out of business.
As the economies in the Soviet bloc collapsed, exports had to be reori-
ented with regard to destinations, commodity compositions, quality, after-
delivery service, reliability of delivery, terms of delivery, and so on. These are
major adjustments. Botana, a.s., a Czech company, exported 600,000 pairs
of shoes to the Soviet Union in 1989 and not a single pair in the following
year.
Foreign investors viewed CEE countries as export bases because of their
low labor costs. These costs, of course, will rise in the future, but by that
time CEE companies may have gained market shares in international mar-
kets. CEE companies regarded many joint ventures as vehicles for entering
these markets, including reentering those in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union.
Of the Hungarian companies in our sample, at least three major enter-
prises adopted, as of 1995, a “look East” strategy. These include Zwack Uni-
com (a liquor producer and distributor), Chinoin (a pharmaceutical firm),
and Graboplast (a textile firm); sales of this last company to East European
countries rose from 9% in 1992 to 26% in 1994 partly owing to sales offices
in Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and Bratislava. Chinoin’s exports accounted
for 54% of its total sales in 1994, and 35% of the total went to the former
Soviet bloc. The French firm Sanofi, owner of 51% of Chinoin, stated at
the start of the joint venture that it considered Chinoin a vehicle for ex-
pansion into “Eastern markets.” Richter Gedeon, exported 57% of its total
exports to “Eastern markets” in 1994. Ganz-Ansaldo, a Hungarian-Italian
joint venture in the engineering industry, lost most of its traditional Eastern
markets (and Western ones) as well. In 1995, Ganz-Ansaldo attempted to
reenter the markets in the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe: “The
company is actively developing export structure in the East, especially in
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the former CIS” (Taking Stock, 1995). Gyori Keksz, bought by the English
United Biscuits in 1990, exported the bulk of its snack-type products to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), especially after recovery began
in 1993.
In Slovakia, Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne (PS) developed a marketing strategy
that, true to Slovakia’s vision, bridges the gap between East and West. Its
products range from aircraft engines for the Russian Air Force to moped
engines for Puch of Italy. The company’s widely varying customer base
serves to exacerbate the problem of a large number of disparate products in
PS.
A number of other marketing issues have surfaced. Franchising, for
instance, was unknown in CEE countries. One franchisee, Duna Elektronika,
found it difficult to get off the ground. Also, many CEE products have the
deserved reputation of being inferior. Quality became a major issue after
imports became available, and products had to be improved to meet export
standards. In our sample Chinoin, Pick Szeged, and Zwack Unicom, as well
as Ganz-Ansaldo, all in Hungary, went to great efforts to earn ISO-9001
classification.
Since the collapse of the closed, centrally planned system, adjusting to
the supply of exports has proved to be a formidable task. To illustrate,
Pick Szeged found that salami tastes differ from country to country and
product/market adjustments had to be made. At Chinoin, staff training
for the export and domestic markets was mainly undertaken by the French
joint-venture partner, Sanofi. Sanofi trainees first lived in Hungary before
the educational process began.
Duna Elektronika had two marketing surprises. One was that, while US
consumers liked brand names, Hungarian consumers preferred low-priced
clones. The second was that the sales-incentive system introduced by
Duna was not well received. The American owners of Duna, including the
Hungarian-born majority owner and the CEO who lived in the United States
all his adult life, discovered that the sales staff preferred job security and
structure and were not particularly motivated by the incentive system.
Operations Management
One function of management is to oversee the resources required to provide
a product or a service. Based on our case analyses we tentatively conclude
that in the 1989–1995 period there was relatively little fundamental change
in management behavior. Specific instances of change can be found, but
they are more the exception than the rule. Many managers still act as
the corporate bureaucrats that most of them previously were. They tend
12
Table 3. Number of employees in selected companies in the Czech Republic
and Hungary in 1990 and 1994.
1990 1994
Chinoin, Hungary 4,500 2,842
Elektromontazˇn´ı za´vody, Czech Rep. 2,500 (at peak) 1,400
Ganz-Ansaldo, Hungary 3,150 1,425
Graboplast, Hungary 2,284 1,383
Metrostav, Czech Rep. 5,300 (1989) 3,500
Richter Gedeon, Hungary 5,654 (1991) 4,623
Zwack, Hungary 1,400 740
to speak good English or German and have a repertoire of management
buzzwords, but seem unable to develop a medium-term business plan, to
design a system for coordination and implementation, to manage people, or
to keep to budgets and schedules. There is a general aversion to taking risks,
to assuming responsibility, and to making decisions. The French finance
director of Chinoin, Philippe Vergnaud, remarked: “People here [in Hungary]
tend to hide problems, hoping that they would go away” (Private interview,
Budapest, Summer, 1995).
One factor prevalent in our sample of companies was the drastic reduc-
tions in employment. Table 3 provides some examples. Despite reductions in
personnel and direct labor costs, CEE companies were still not in a position
to compete in the world economy. They were now in striking distance, and
the addition of a combination of good management, better products, and
improved marketing could bring them to the level of world competitiveness.
The decline in economic activity in the 1989–1994 period in the target
countries introduced a new anxiety to managers: the fear of losing one’s job.
This possibility made managers even more cautious. Behavioral modifica-
tion, if at all possible, is a long-term process and six years in a turbulent
economic, political, and social environment is too short for a major behav-
ioral change.
There are other attributes. Managers and workers alike showed little
loyalty to their firms. Nonconstructive criticism of one’s firm is a much-
enjoyed pastime. In addition, the producers’ logic has not given way to the
consumers’ logic. One manager complained about high overhead costs and
then announced the solution: increase production, without seemingly having
considered whether there is a demand for his increased production. This
strategy if pursued by every company in a sector can result in disastrous
overcapacity. For example, Mlekarna Klatovy, a West Bohemian dairy, is
one of 100 dairies in the Czech Republic, where an economically reasonable
number is closer to 25.
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There are more hypotheses for the relatively little change in managerial
behavior. Many managers asked why make changes as long as the enterprise
is not bankrupt? The new players on the scene – investors, employers, the
media, and government entities that are changing at the top, but not much
elsewhere – are not used to change. Managers are also reluctant to change
as they, obviously, value their economic and social power; with change they
risk losing their positions. But what is most important, managers frequently
do not know what to do, and who can blame them. They are in a new ball
game; the rules of the game keep changing, and rapidly at that.
There are exceptions, of course, a prime example being Graboplast. A
consultant working at one of the Big Six American accounting firms said:
The most important element which made this company turn around is the
attitude of the CEO, Mr. Pe´ter Jancso´. It was the fact that he admitted
that he had a problem, and that he did not know everything about running
a company and looked for outside help. This is contrary to other companies
where they “don’t have any problems.” Without the manager’s support to
bring in outside consultants to cut the fat around the company, Graboplast
would not be where they are today. This attitude is contrary to managers
at other companies, where they do not ask for help and they are not willing
to change since they know everything and they can solve any problems on
their own. [Private interview, Budapest, Summer, 1995]
Financial Management
Financing a firm is a new task for CEE managers. In one Czech company,
the managers bought the company on a 90-day note in January 1993. When
the note came due it was renewed for another 90 days. In June it came
due again, but this time the bank that made the loan did not renew it, and
attempted to take over the company with its own management. With less
than a week to come up with the financing or risk losing the company to
known rivals, the owners had not yet developed a plan to raise the needed
capital. During the emergency discussions an outsider from the USA asked
about the value of the company’s assets, including real estate. The company
was using its own expensive real estate in the center of Prague for its major
operations, even though it had about three times the property it needed in
the outskirts. So why not sell the city plant and move operations outside
the city? Through this action the company would secure more than enough
to pay off the note. While not particularly innovative to those living in
free financial markets, this approach never entered the minds of this Czech
company’s managers.
14
Many firms are underfinanced, particularly in the long term. This is
exacerbated by the fact that the need for funds for working capital are ig-
nored or grossly underestimated (cf., for example, Biotika, a Czech com-
pany). Mlekarna Klatovy needed to raise between Kcˇ150 and Kcˇ200 million
in working capital for purposes beyond its vast receivables, which were al-
most of the same magnitude. This predicament is not just part of the legacy
of the centrally planned regimes, but it is a common situation in the emerging
countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, areas where capital is scarce
and real interest rates are high.
Given the large amount of secondary insolvency, the bane of CEE
economies, financial soundness is even less frequent than one might think
from the numbers in the financial statements. The underfinancing issue is
exacerbated by forecasts of cash flows that are overestimated or costs that
are underestimated.
A group of managers that knows how to work in strong financial markets
is as sorely needed as an effectively functioning financial sector in CEE coun-
tries. The financial sector imposes a sorely needed discipline on businesses,
and managers are not fully ready to conform to this discipline.
Strategy
Many of the firms in our sample have clearly pursued new strategies since
1989. For instance, in Hungary, Graboplast shed a number of its product
lines and concentrated on home improvements. Mu¨szertechnika diversified
its line to respond to market changes and to take advantage of opportunities
to form as many joint ventures as its resources could support. Pick Szeged
discovered that, while it could increase its salami production (including ex-
ports), it was seriously hampered by insufficient supplies of pork. So, Pick is
now heavily involved in pig farming – a new activity. In Slovakia, Povazˇske´
Stroja´rne has outpaced some businesses, yet it must still consolidate a di-
verse product line and disparate market groups. The Czech Botana has
been placed in a position where it must reduce its wide product line and
concentrate on the production of winter shoes, where it has a competitive
advantage.
Some companies are being forced to use new strategies but have not
fully determined what these strategies should be. Metrostav, a.s., the Czech
tunnel construction company, seemingly faces the end of its tunnel work
with the completion of Prague’s metro system. It must alter its strategy
to survive, probably moving into environmental and industrial construction.
Solo, a.s., a 159-year-old Czech match company, is busy finding ways to
expand its product line beyond matches, a shrinking industry, focusing on
products such as hardwood panels and I-joists.
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A number of the firms in our sample do not yet have a cogent strategy.
Some companies are reluctant to think about a strategy, and even more
reluctant to actually execute a carefully developed one. Perhaps the lucky
ones are those firms that were forced to create new business strategies from
whole cloth.
Managerial Behavior
Having examined the challenges in various areas of business – marketing,
finance, operations, and strategy – in this section we explore how managerial
behavior has developed in CEE countries since 1989. Problem areas relate
both to bad habits developed in the previous environment and to newly
acquired nonproductive behavior.
The inertia of state-owned enterprises
SOEs will continue to play an important role in CEE economies for the
following reasons, among others:
• They tend to have a large number of employees.
• They have huge, fixed, single-purpose assets and are capital and energy
intensive.
• The environmental cleanup costs are likely to be sizable.
• They generally employ out-of-date technology and equipment that gov-
ernments cannot afford to replace.
The exit strategy that the governments may have regarding SOEs is
certainly limited.
Just as they have done over the past 45 years, managers of SOEs must
continue to extract as many government concessions and as much support
as possible. These efforts are perhaps more important than ever in this
age of fiscal stringency. Important managerial skills are the maintenance
of contacts in the right places and fostering relationships to acquire import
licenses, to obtain foreign exchange or bank credit, and sometimes to get
a license to obtain a license for yet something else. These skills have some
importance in the private sector also, but their significance in the SOEs is
paramount. In this respect the managerial behavior in CEE countries is
similar to those in the economically emerging countries of Latin America,
Asia, and Africa.
In a discussion of SOE managerial behavior two issues must be kept in
mind: the state still plays a significant role in running large companies, even
after they have been privatized; and the government acting as owner behaves
differently than a set of private shareholders acting as owner.
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SOE managerial practices carry over into foreign direct investment (FDI)
practices. Most privatized firms preferred foreign partners for their needed
capital, markets and marketing, technology, and management. After the
capital was provided, many of these firms were not particularly aggressive
about obtaining other items. However, an even greater motivation for pick-
ing a foreign investor was the stipulation that the existing management be
maintained. In virtually all cases, the foreign investor knew no other local
management. Keeping the existing management suited the foreign investor
because it frequently meant that the terms of purchase were more favorable
than the “market” would have suggested. Such investors may pay the price
of their sweet deal with stodgy management later.
Under the guise of restructuring, managers acted as one might expect en-
trepreneurs to act; they transferred their companies’ good assets to separate
firms and then either bought out the new company or entered into a joint
venture with foreign investors. Even under these favorable conditions, vir-
tually all enterprises were seriously underfinanced. These firms needed (and
still need) substantial investments to make them internationally competitive.
Joint ventures took a number of forms. In Hungary, Graboplast had
an agreement with an Austrian bank that was a financial – not strategic –
investor. Ganz has an Italian state-owned company as a strategic partner,
and a French private pharmaceutical company is Chinoin’s strategic partner.
Mu¨szertechnika had four different joint-venture partners – with the expec-
tation that the arrangements would not last longer than five years. Zwack’s
joint venture with German and British companies covered only export mar-
keting. The largest Hungarian joint venture was between the state-owned
telephone monopoly, MATA´V, (70%) and a German (Deutsche Telecom)
company and an American (Ameritech) company as strategic investors. In
Slovakia, Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne’s approach was to own a number of subsidiaries
that were joint ventures with partners in France and Germany.
The legacy of the SOEs is not only their endurance but the longevity
and intensity of the counter-productive behavior that they have fostered in
companies in Central and Eastern Europe, even when the SOEs have been
transformed into different kinds of enterprise.
Dysfunctional entrepreneurship
We now turn to entrepreneurial management activity that can best be de-
scribed as dysfunctional entrepreneurship. Part of the origin of this activity
was established under the regime of central planning. Under this system –
and its producers’ logic – it was economically advantageous for firms to be
involved in as many activities, industries, and sectors as possible. This is
how opportunities were created by the SOEs, resources attracted from the
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state, and control exercised. Frequently head offices and their sizable ad-
ministration staffs functioned as a holding company; they reviewed reports
but were not involved in the day-to-day running of the firms. Since 1989,
deteriorating economic conditions have necessitated that managers – who
wished to maintain their standard of living – have multiple positions, of-
ten in multiple enterprises. Exclusive full-time employment does exist, but
it has become rather uncommon. This is another similarity between CEE
countries and many emerging countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America;
managers in the latter countries are also often involved in multiple enter-
prises. Further, in CEE and other emerging countries, some entrepreneurs
lose interest in running businesses and prefer to make deals and pyramiding
deals.
This environment produced a group of young urban entrepreneurs, char-
acteristically in their 30s, energetic, generally well educated, and well trav-
eled. This group emerged from the SOEs or, in Hungary, from a private
sector that had begun by the 1980s. Its motivation was simple: money and
the independence that money can and does buy. This philosophy was derived
from Darwin’s theory of survival of the fittest, and lacks a social conscience.
The credo was growth and not necessarily profitability. Hence, even in the
absence of smoothly functioning capital markets, merger and acquisition ac-
tivity occurred financed primarily through bank loans to the enterprises’
various affiliates. The growth in size (even without profitability) attracted
favorable media attention. This, in turn, induced banks to continue lending
and, consequently, resulted in high indebtedness of these firms.
The predictable end came between 1994 and 1995 when a series of high-
flying firms went bankrupt. These included Microsystem, Control, and Kon-
trax in Hungary. All of these firms were established in the early 1980s under
central planning by smart, young entrepreneurs. For a decade, they experi-
enced phenomenal growth but beginning in 1990 they encountered consid-
erable diversification financed by banks and many conflicts between found-
ing partners. Microsystem’s investors, for instance, included the EBRD,
the Hungarian American Enterprise Fund (HAEF), and Data General; Mi-
crosystem filed for bankruptcy in 1994. The EBRD and the HAEF received
investment advice from Salomon Brothers and Arthur Andersen. Microsys-
tem’s fate is rather typical of the companies in this group. Rapid expansion,
extreme diversification, and insufficient adjustment to the changed market
situation after 1989 were all present. These conditions included the emer-
gence of foreign competition and, therefore, the fight for market share when,
until 1989, expansion was a major objective. The other issue, which was
noticeable in all these examples, was that personal conflicts developed be-
tween the founding partners. In the case of Microsystem the conflict involved
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Peter Maros and Peter Vadasz: Vadasz quit, and Maros admitted to “in-
sufficient management skills.” Personality conflicts are difficult to avoid in
entrepreneurial situations; in this situation, however, the problem was exac-
erbated by the rapidly changing business culture and corporate governance
issues that have arisen since 1989.
FOTEX in Hungary has become a celebrated case. Founded in the mid-
1980s by Gabor Varszegi, 45, reported to be the richest person in all of the
CEE countries, FOTEX is a diversified retail company that started as a one-
hour photo-developing shop. By mid-1995, FOTEX had a string of shops,
some of which also sold contact lenses, cosmetics, household goods, furniture,
consumer electronics, and appliances. In today’s considerably open business
scene, compared with that of five years ago, FOTEX faces competition in
a number of these markets. Institutional investors (including George Soros)
hold 76% of the stock and Varszegi, the largest single shareholder, holds 24%.
Between 1994 and 1995 FOTEX share prices declined. In a dramatic move
in May 1995, Varszegi bought back 4 million shares and the price jumped
nearly 50% in one day.
Some analysts believe that the buy backs are due to unrest among share-
holders amid reports of [Varszegi’s] dealings with Blackburn International
[Varszegi’s private, fully owned Panama-registered company]. Mr. Varszegi
insists that the shares were bought because they were undervalued. [The
Wall Street Journal, 1995]
Personality conflicts also arose between partners – including foreign in-
vestors – on diversification and expansion. Some founding partners were
distrustful or weary of “being taken”; others less so. Obviously, taking on a
new partner meant giving up control and some partners were more hesitant
than others to swallow this pill. This is a problem that exists everywhere;
however, the reluctance to share control is more prevalent in Latin American,
South and Southeast Asian, and African countries, as well as CEE countries,
than it is in Western Europe, North America, or Japan.
Table 4 summarizes some of the managerial challenges presented in ear-
lier sections and captures some of the dysfunctional entrepreneurial behavior
described in this section. Viewing the challenges and the new behavior in the
same frame, one might become discouraged and conclude that CEE countries
have inherited only the problems and bad habits of a free-market system.
Our assessment would be that these characteristics are growing pains in the
early stages of a long developmental process.
Managerial transfer
A major motivation for CEE companies to participate in joint ventures is
the acquisition of managerial know-how from foreign partners. For a host
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Table 4. Managerial challenges and dysfunctional entrepreneurial behavior.
Managerial challenges Dysfunctional entrepreneurial behavior
Marketing Short-term perspective
Undifferentiated products Trade away what you have
Unclear product niche Quick action
Unsettled target markets No long-term development
Threat of new entrants Deal-making
Evaporating Eastern markets Manipulation of immature markets
Financial Acceptance of huge bank debt
Huge debt Emphasis on growth
Secondary insolvency Profitability not a consideration
Circle of debt Culture
Undercapitalized Yuppie
Lack of working capital Money, greed, power, consumption
Human resources Media conscious
Old values Style
Former skills Personality conflicts
Mixed motivations Question of control
Former organization structure
Relationships with SOE managers
Overstaffing of industries
Operations
Producers’ logic
Poor (improving) production quality
Availability of qualified labor
Low productivity
Strategy
Widely disparate products/businesses
Ill-defined core competencies
Inadequate competitor analysis
Joint ventures
Transfer of managerial know-how
of reasons, such managerial transfer was accomplished only in a limited
number of cases in our analysis. In some instances, the foreign investor
bought the privatized enterprise and basically shut it down. For example,
Siemens purchased Telefongyar (Hungary), a manufacturer of telecommuni-
cation equipment, and essentially shut down manufacturing, kept a fraction
of the original labor force, and turned the heavily scaled-down facility into a
sales organization for Siemens products. Another reason why managerial ex-
pertise has not been transferred involves the interaction between government
shareholders and foreign investors. The successful Chinoin-Sanofi (Hungary-
France) pharmaceutical joint venture experienced a withdrawal of 100% of
the firm’s profits by the Hungarian government (then 60% owner) in 1993
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to improve the country’s budgetary situation. Chinoin’s CEO resigned over
this action, citing that without R&D expenditures the future of the company
was in jeopardy. As the departing CEO remarked: “The state, by its nature,
is a bad owner” (Voszkva, 1995).
For Ganz, a Hungarian firm manufacturing power-generating equipment
founded in 1844, a joint venture was a must. Ganz’s plant, equipment, and
technology were obsolete and the government owner had no capital to in-
vest. In 1991, Ansaldo of Italy acquired 51% of Ganz and in the next four
years sales increased 50%, export sales rose from 40% to 66% of total sales,
the work force was reduced from 3,000 employees to 1,500, yet losses in-
creased from Ft600 million to Ft2 billion by 1994. The company recorded
losses every year. Transfer pricing by Ansaldo may well have been the ex-
planation to this problem; at the corporate level Ansaldo was profitable. As
Ganz-Ansaldo’s losses mounted, Ansaldo made them up and in the process
acquired, as of mid-1995, 82% of the joint venture with the government hold-
ing the rest. All the top executives are from Ansaldo: the general manager
and the commercial, production, and financial managers. The president is
a Hungarian, but the position is a part-time and representational one – and
he views it as such. In an interview he said: “While president sounds very
nice, this is not my main job. I kept my own enterprises – trade in Russia,
the Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Baltic states. At Ganz-Ansaldo the man-
agement is Italian, I am ‘the Hungarian’ ” (Heti Vila´gazdasa´g, 1995). There
has been little management transfer at this company.
A large joint-venture project that seems to be a commercial success,
though it went through a rough period, is Volkswagen’s investment in Skoda
in the Czech Republic. In 1991 Volkswagen acquired 31% of Skoda from
the Czech government, the owner; by mid-1995 Volkswagen had acquired a
70% majority holding. The joint venture was essential for Skoda, as it had
large debts and its profit was not sufficient to cover debt payments, let alone
needed productivity enhancement. Skoda’s labor force was reduced from
about 20,000 employees in 1991 to less than 16,000 in 1995. Skoda expects
to further reduce its work force by 500–1,000 employees per year between
1995 and 2000. In late 1995, Skoda announced that it plans to assemble
cars under license in Russia and Belarus and also increase production in its
Polish factory. In Russia, Skoda expects to assemble 100,000 cars annually as
a start. Further, Skoda plans to build up a network of component suppliers
to its various operations in Russia and in Belarus.
In the 1993–1994 period Volkswagen and the Czech government had a
series of disagreements over Skoda. Volkswagen started scaling back its am-
bitious plans to modernize Skoda; earlier these plans had helped Volkswagen
win a stake in the Czech car manufacturer over Renault of France. In 1993,
Volkswagen’s CEO pulled out of the nearly $1 billion project designed to
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raise productivity and capacity at Skoda, including the underwriting of loans
from International Finance Corporation and the EBRD. These actions were
done without prior notification to the Czech government, then the majority
owner. A passage in the renegotiated agreement of December 1994 stipulates
that the minority shareholder (the Czech government) will have veto rights
until 2000 in all key decisions, including production and modernization.
A much more satisfactory outcome was observed in the Graboplast
(Hungary)-Creditanstalt (Austria) joint venture; in 1991 Creditanstalt con-
trolled 30% of the company. Graboplast, a producer of home improvement
materials, transformed itself from a money loser into a competitive enter-
prise. Creditanstalt, though only a financial and not a strategic investor,
undertook to teach management skills, and it brought in productivity con-
sultants; the entire Hungarian management accepted this guidance. Grabo-
plast has since become internationally competitive.
Many companies without joint-venture partners have made strides to-
ward improving management. Elektromontazˇn´ı za´vody, a Czech contractor
of electrical projects, for example, has implemented new management meth-
ods utilizing weekend retreats and training.
Summary and Conclusions
There are many different methods for successfully integrating into the world
economy. Managerial transfer, adoption of world-class technology, penetra-
tion of world customer markets, and acceptance in world capital markets
are just a few ways. Clearly, some CEE companies have integrated into the
world economy using one or more of these methods. However, many more
have not integrated and fewer still have integrated on more than one front.
Between 1989 and 1995 the private sector grew dramatically in the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. In appraising the impact of this change on
managerial behavior, analysis should distinguish between new private enter-
prises and privatized SOEs. Our evidence suggests that the new enterprises
– in terms of managerial behavior – tend to behave like their counterparts in
the market economies. The same cannot be said for the privatized SOEs, at
least, not to the extent that this can be attributed to the post-1989 estab-
lished firms. Those privatized SOEs that have foreign joint-venture partners
have, not surprisingly, adopted their managerial practices to market stan-
dards better than those that are without such partners. This was the case in
many, but not all, joint ventures. Overcoming inherited managerial practices
is a task that still lies ahead for many privatized CEE companies.
An effectively functioning financial sector is key to the further develop-
ment of companies in CEE countries. Healthy banks that lend money and
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Foreign companies moving in
(virtually all)
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Franchising (virtually all)
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Integrating
CEE companies
into the world
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Figure 2. Company factors affecting integration into the world economy.
financial markets that provide long-term capital based on actual risks and
returns are sorely needed. A smooth and stable financial sector provides
both the foundation for growth and the discipline that management and
companies need.
From discussions about wanting to trade with the European Union and
wanting to be admitted to the EU, one might conclude that CEE companies
should look to Western Europe for trade. Instead, it appears that several
companies have successfully refocused on East European markets. Other
companies have approached both the East and the West, looking for different
things from each, which, on reflection, makes a great deal of sense (Figure 2 ).
The financial sectors in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are
still far from being efficient. We observed that it was easier to liberalize
and deregulate product markets (by removing price controls, subsidies, im-
port restrictions, barriers to foreign companies, and so on) than to liberalize
the financial markets. This seems counterintuitive given the global nature
of financial markets coupled with the telecommunications revolution which
introduced flexibility in this market. The reason for the lag in making the
financial markets not as rapidly efficient as was the case in many product
markets was political reluctance to opening up the financial sector to for-
eign investors. To be sure, branches of foreign banks have been established
and joint ventures in financial institutions have been formed. Still the pace
of opening up this sector was slower than the liberalization of products and
services. However, steps taken toward liberalizations and deregulations, cou-
pled with privatizations and foreign direct investments in this sector, and
23
international finance corporation assistance all point to improvements in the
functioning of the capital markets in these countries.
In our opening paragraph we stated that managerial behavior during the
integration of CEE firms into the world economy largely depends on the man-
agers’ flexibility to adapt to rapid and uncertain changes. The managerial
group that learns the fastest is the one that comprises what we call dysfunc-
tional entrepreneurs. They are not managers as the term is understood in
Western Europe, North America, and Japan, as they are not particularly
interested in running a business. They trade (rather than “make”), taking
advantage of macroeconomic instability and market imperfections caused by
partial liberalizations and deregulations. Considering how much money has
been made by some of the dysfunctional entrepreneurs, their flexibility to
adapt must be judged a huge success.
Surprisingly we found few fundamental changes in what we call opera-
tions management. We observed a perception gap in what looked like change
and what was actual change. The former includes managers’ foreign language
ability and the competent use of business jargon. When we examined actual
performance, and certainly there were exceptions, we found that business
plans and systems for managing budgets, people, schedules, and financial,
operational, or marketing targets were lacking. Nor was taking responsibil-
ity for decision-making or risk-taking high on the managers’ agenda. We
conclude that flexibility to adapt to change was somewhat a function of the
degree of competition in the particular product or service market. This is
hardly surprising. We were most interested to find out that, based on our
case analyses, middle-aged managers were not likely to be more flexible than
older ones. A Slovak manager told us “dinosaurs” can be found in all age
groups. Further, some of the larger companies in our sample proved to be
more adaptable than smaller ones. Managerial transfer was characterized by
start-up difficulties; subsequently it was unsuccessful at Ganz (Hungary) but
successful at Skoda (Czech Republic) – both large companies. The purpose
of operations management is to keep the long-term objectives of the firm in
mind, while optimizing available resources. Management over the long term
will likely require modifications in managerial behavior that have not yet
been identified in the six years that have elapsed since the collapse of the
centrally planned regimes. Our comments suggest that managerial behavior
has a way to go before CEE companies become internationally competitive.
The 1989–1995 years may be characterized for the CEE companies and
managers as a period of survival and transformation. We conclude that,
in the post-1995 years, managerial behavior must change in many ways to
make CEE companies internationally competitive. There are considerable
opportunities available to CEE companies. Those companies that recognize
these opportunities and make the requisite changes will be rewarded.
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Part II
Case Studies
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Biotika, A.S., Slovakia
In the years since the revolutions of 1989, the pharmaceuticals market in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia has changed beyond recognition. Where once
the state controlled imports and organized approved drugs lists, these are
now more or less left to the market. Insurance-based compensation for drugs
makers is the norm, replacing a system of set prices to hospitals and con-
sumers. The acceptance of international standards in intellectual property
law has meant that Czech and Slovak manufacturers now rely less on “copy-
cat” versions of patented, branded drugs and more on licensing. To compete,
domestic producers are finding or entrenching their niches. One such com-
pany is Biotika, a human and veterinary pharmaceuticals manufacturer in
Central Slovakia.
At the end of 1994, Biotika produced goods in four main product groups:
penicillin (prepared as various salts for treatment of infections in humans and
animals); chlortetracycline (for therapeutically medicated animal feeds); pre-
mix (animal feeds); and antibiotics (dry injections and veterinary powders).
Biotika has no domestic or Czech competitor in these products.
Under the former Czechoslovak regime, pharmaceuticals manufacture
was dominated by Leciva (Czech), Slovakofarma (Slovak), and Galena
(Czech). The first two specialized principally in solid preparations, the last
in liquid pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals. In turnover terms, Biotika is
a second-tier manufacturer. Annual sales were Sk1.47 billion in 1994, versus
Kcˇ3.85 billion for Leciva. (For financial information see Biotika Exhibit 1
and Exhibit 2.) But, whereas the larger pharmaceutical makers are oriented
toward domestic sales, Biotika is seeking its fortunes outside its borders. In
1994, exports as a percentage of total sales stood at 57% (compared with 20
to 25% for its larger competitors).
The majority of Biotika’s domestic customers are farmers. Biotika sells
through Polnonakup, an agricultural trade company whose principal cus-
tomers are cooperative farmers. On the health care side, where domestic
sales account for less than 10% of total health-related sales, Biotika works
with a group of trade representatives, each responsible for sales to clinics
and hospitals in various regions of Slovakia.
Unfortunately for Biotika, farmers and clinics/hospitals are two of the
country’s most financially forbidding sectors. Slovak farmers operate at a
collective loss, despite generous subsidies and price intervention by the state.
Privatizing agriculture has proved devilishly difficult, and the sector as a
whole remains bloated and less efficient than competitors to the West.
This case was written from public sources with some cooperation with Biotika executives
who wish to remain anonymous. It does not have the official approval of the company.
28
Health care presents an even greater challenge. There are nine health
insurance companies licensed in Slovakia, but one main company, majority
owned by the state. Across the industry, premium income is not covering
costs, a fact which threatens the solvency of all the players. “The sector has
a shortage of money,” says Krchnavy, Biotika’s Vice-President of Finance
and a member of its board of Directors, noting that “during the first quarter
of 1995, the state health insurance company spent half of its annual budget.”
Although the majority of drugs prescribed by doctors are reimbursable
by health insurance companies, many doctors prescribe the most expensive
(imported) drugs, according to Krchnavy. “Doctors get ‘presents’ from the
international drug companies,” he says. They are under no pressure from
insurance companies to prescribe less-expensive alternatives, although this
is slowly changing as insurers band together. Domestic producers are fight-
ing back and are asking the Ministry of Health to draw up a new list of
reimbursable drugs – without many of the more expensive imports.
The firm’s business strategy calls for an increase in the production of
drugs in final – that is, non-bulk – form. This will be an uphill battle, since
Leciva, Slovakofarma, and Galena hold the dominant positions in this mar-
ket. Biotika has begun to produce final-form penicillin and, in cooperation
with Galena, dry antibiotic syrups. Krchnavy recognizes that cracking this
market will be difficult, mainly due to history and geography: the big pro-
ducers already have good contacts with local distributors, and Leciva, the
largest manufacturer, is located in the largest market, Prague.
According to Krchnavy, there is a gentleman’s agreement among Euro-
pean penicillin producers on the amount of penicillin to be produced. Biotika
commands a comfortable one-third share of the European market, a statis-
tic which is perhaps deceptive. “Penicillin is the antibiotic of poor people,”
says Krchnavy, implying that a substantial share of, say, a large Asian mar-
ket would be much more beneficial. Exports to non-European markets are
growing, says Krchnavy. Trade is handled through Biochem, a London-based
joint venture.
In agricultural trade, Biotika is in the process of registering its products
for sale in Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine. Krchnavy is optimistic about
sales of the company’s products within the region.
Biotika was privatized in the first wave of voucher privatization. At the
end of 1994, the National Property Fund (NPF) owned 15% of shares; the
remaining shares were held by funds and individual shareholders. Krchnavy
complains that the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board are “bu-
reaucratic”; fund representatives “are not so ready to take on new ideas,”
he says.
Raw materials make up about 50% of Biotika’s costs, leaving it suscep-
tible to price swings, good and bad. In 1994 and the first half of 1995, the
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firm came out on the short end: raw-materials prices were up between 25
and 30% on average. Dry weather in Europe contributed to a poor beet har-
vest, and sugar prices (a principal penicillin ingredient) shot up 40 to 50%.
Wages and salaries constitute 12 to 13% of costs and are growing about 12%
annually.
Biotika has managed to slowly get a handle on a receivables problem
that threatened the company in the early 1990s. The average receivable is
now 50–60 days, down from 82 days in 1992.
Earnings were down dramatically in 1994 to Sk30 million from Sk118
million in 1993. But Sk79 million in 1993 earnings came from extraordinary
(nonoperating) items. The firm’s operating profit actually rose 9.6%. Return
on equity has increased from 2.4% in 1992 to 9.9% in 1994.
Biotika has two production joint ventures. The first, with Germany’s
Hoechst, produces glass ampoules, tablets, ointments, and creams. Hoechst,
another large European producer of penicillin, brought expertise in tablets
production to the joint venture, while Biotika supplied experience with so-
lution preparations. Management announced its intention to invest up to
Sk100 million in 1995 to modernize glass-ampoule production. Hoechst-
Biotika was founded in 1992 and showed an immediate profit. The firm paid
dividends in 1994, and forecasts earnings of around Sk45 million in 1995, on
turnover of Sk500 million.
The second joint venture will take longer to show similar results. Fermas,
a venture with the German firm Degussa for the production of amino acids,
was hurt by low sales prices of Threonine, its principal product, and high raw-
materials prices (again, sugar). Too, Fermas has been dogged by inadequate
capital. Krchnavy says the firm is getting ready to borrow to shore up its
working capital. “We knew from the beginning [Fermas’s] capital wouldn’t
be enough,” he says. The company will likely not break even until 1996.
Biotika itself suffers from the same low-capital problem, according to
Krchnavy. The firm issued Sk250 million in convertible bonds in 1994, which
were held by the National Property Fund. Along with the Fund’s 15%
shareholding of common stock, the tender winner was to have received a
48% share of Biotika, worth Sk415 million. After postponing a decision
from April to July, the Fund declared the tender unsuccessful and, as of
1995, said that the holding will be sold via direct sale. Three parties bid
for the stake; one included a group of managers and a foreign partner. In
explaining its decision, the NPF said that all the bids were unsuitable and
that no consensus on the winner could be found among Fund representatives.
Short of working capital, the firm has reluctantly turned to the banks.
Krchnavy says that the problem is not in obtaining loans – a traditional
lament for Slovak companies – but “in using the loans more efficiently.”
Biotika’s investment priorities are in energy efficiency (switching from coal
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to natural gas); the introduction of new custom-premix technologies (com-
pleted in 1994); and environmental protection (investment on anaerobic pro-
cessing of organic waste could top Sk200 million in 1995 and make Biotika
a “wasteless” producer). Most of these investments have been financed by
cash flow and the convertible-bond issue. Bank debt decreased in 1994 by
15%.
Biotika Exhibit 1. Income statements (in thousand Slovak korunas).
1994 1993
Net sales of products 1,230,997 1,141,204
Sales of secondary products 31,398 21,433
Total net sales 1,262,395 1,162,637
Change inventory (1,660) (6,243)
Materials consumed 632,194 517,839
Wages and salaries 185,117 164,512
Utilities 93,879 99,317
Depreciation and amortization 85,792 67,610
Other miscellaneous expenses 114,587 180,503
1,109,907 1,023,538
Net income from operations 152,488 139,099
Other income deductions
Gain from disposal of equipment 4,188 8,506
Financial income 70,257 68,334
Financial expenses (150,916) (109,197)
(76,471) (32,357)
Income before income taxes and extraordinary items 76,017 106,742
Income taxes (41,567) (67,574)
Income before extraordinary items 34,450 39,168
Extraordinary items (4,200) 79,542
Net income 30,250 118,710
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Biotika Exhibit 2. Balance sheets (in thousand Slovak korunas).
1994 1993
Assets
Current assets
Cash 39,371 59,270
Trade accounts receivable 201,640 238,998
Inventories, net 208,634 166,488
Due from associated companies 63,000
Other current assets 1,429 208
Due from the state 61,796 8,097
Total current assets 575,870 437,061
Fixed assets
Tangible fixed assets 916,290 737,760
Intangible fixed assets 13,781 18,604
Investments 554,295 586,963
Total noncurrent assets 1,484,366 1,343,327
Total assets 2,060,236 1,816,388
Liabilities
Current liabilities
Accounts payable and accruals 159,808 123,715
Bank debt, including short-term portion of long-term debt 153,304 6,251
Current portion of long-term research 6,224 6,674
Current portion of capital lease obligation 4,873 10,631
Payable to associated companies 7 494
Accrued wages and other amounts due to employees 22,145 11,281
Unrealized foreign exchange gains 1,921 7,285
Due to the state 5,928 49,895
Total current liabilities 354,211 386,226
Long-term liabilities
Bonds 250,181 235
Deferred taxes 127,744 127,554
Long-term debt, excluding current installments 76,631 74,757
Long-term R&D, excluding current portion 9,413 13,347
Obligations under capital leases, excluding current portion 909 3,468
Total long-term liabilities 464,878 219,361
Total liabilities 819,089 605,587
Capital
Capital 770,950 770,950
Statutory reserve fund 104,088 97,156
Revaluation reserve 191,614 191,330
Other reserves 54,915 37,344
Retained earnings 119,580 114,021
Total capital 1,241,147 1,210,801
Total liabilities 2,060,236 1,816,388
32
Botana, A.S., Czech Republic
Nineteen eighty-nine was a good year for Botana, Czechoslovakia’s best-
known manufacturer of sports shoes. Production and sales were up, and the
company exported 600,000 pairs of shoes – one-third of production – to the
Soviet Union. In a now-familiar story, Botana watched its biggest account
dry up the next year: in 1990, the company did not sell a single pair of shoes
to the USSR. In the same year, international shoe baron Tomas Bata began
his quest to recover his family’s Czech shoe empire. AndWestern shoemakers
began shipping their higher-priced, higher-quality shoes to Czechoslovakia
en masse.
Reaction at the company’s Skutecˇ, East Bohemia, headquarters was
swift. Management immediately considered two possibilities: licensed pro-
duction or a joint venture, with either option to be undertaken with a famous
Western name. Botana opted for the licensed production. Puma and Sa-
lomon, two of Europe’s top brands in sports shoes and sports equipment,
were chosen, and Botana began production of Puma tennis and basketball
shoes for the local market. In 1991, Botana production made its way into
Puma’s sales network. In 1992, the firm expanded its Puma production
to include football (soccer) shoes; these shoes were also sold internationally
through Puma’s existing distribution system. Impressed with Botana’s qual-
ity (and its low wages) Puma eventually closed its Herzogenaurach, Germany,
factory and moved the factory’s entire sports shoe production to Botana. In
1993 Botana produced 350,000 pairs of top-of-the-line football shoes; most
were exported.
Canstar, a Canadian manufacturer of sports equipment and shoes, was
interested in establishing a joint venture, but the deal fell apart. Botana’s
director, Miroslav Posp´ısˇil, jumped ship in 1993 and arranged for Canstar to
invest in a new green field site in Zˇda´r nad Sa´zavou, not far from Botana’s
home in Skutecˇ. Like Botana, the new factory produces the upper part of
ice hockey skates. There is one rub: Botana also operates an ice hockey
manufacturing line in Zˇda´r nad Sa´zavou: the two factories sit a mere 50
meters from one another.
Proving that Botana could manufacture to Puma’s quality standards was
an important step, according to Jaromir Pecina, the company’s Trade Direc-
tor: “The first six months were difficult, but after confirming that Botana
was able to produce good quality shoes, Puma trusted us more.” Gaining
access to the Puma network was also critical. Like other Czech and Slovak
shoemakers, Botana’s reliance on only two wholesalers (Velkoobchod Obuvy
This case was written from public sources with some cooperation with Botana executives
who wish to remain anonymous. It does not have the official approval of the company.
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Zl´ın in the Czech Republic and Partizanske´ Obuvy in Slovakia) proved dis-
astrous. “Our wholesale network was completely bankrupted,” said Pecina.
“We had to build our own warehouse in Herˇmanu˙v Meˇstec [about 25 kilo-
meters from Skutecˇ]. On the export side, two foreign trade organizations,
Exico and Prago export, just left us.”
But while Botana was producing and exporting ever greater numbers of
increasingly high-quality shoes, it was also importing shoes from Puma, Sa-
lomon, and Kneissl-Dachstein. “We were a sales agent for our own country,”
said Pecina. Imports soared. “The situation got worse and worse. [Manage-
ment] wasn’t watching what they bought; they weren’t paying attention. It
was a time when everyone wanted to be an ‘entrepreneur,’ everyone wanted
to be ‘in business.’ ” The firm ran into severe cash-flow problems, and insol-
vency loomed. The domestic market shrank in 1992 (sales fell about 15%),
and secondary insolvency, the never-ending bane of the Czech economy, be-
gan to bite.
Botana’s line of products was extensive – too extensive, according to ex-
ecutives. The firm’s showroom was regularly packed with every conceivable
variety of football shoe, cross-country ski boot, and hockey skate. Even so,
Pecina feels in the “winter shoe” market, Botana has no rivals. “Summer
shoes” are a different story. Competition from cheaper East Asian producers
became fierce in 1993. Pecina acknowledges this fact: “There is big compe-
tition now from the Far East. Their quality is low, but so is their price.”
Pecina estimates that Botana has perhaps a 10% share of the “summer”
sports shoe market, good enough for first place among name brands. Adi-
das, which moved into Czechoslovakia early, occupies second place. Pecina
states, “We are the most well-known brand; Adidas is second.” Heavy hit-
ters like Nike and Reebok have increasing market shares, but their prices are
still high for the average Czech.
The company’s turnaround year was 1994. The firm’s privatization was
finally completed, and with a new director in place, shareholders approved
a three-year development plan. After evaluating competitors’ production
costs, Botana took a look at its own. The firm then worked on rationalizing
production in the specific product groups where it felt it had a competitive
advantage. Cost of goods sold and production expenses fell 30% from 1993.
According to executives, this helped Botana concentrate resources in product
development and further innovation. Production cooperation with private
workshops in Slovakia – uppers are sown in Slovakia with elastic sown on in
the Czech Republic – has proved profitable. Following its gains in produc-
tivity and implementation of higher quality standards, Botana garnered an
ISO-9000 certificate.
Turnover fell 18% in 1994, but costs dropped further, by 22%. Value
added increased substantially, up 23%. By the end of the year, Botana had
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reduced its copious inventories and short-term receivables by more than a
factor of two, from Kcˇ104 million, to Kcˇ48 million. Cash and other mar-
ketable securities increased as well, from Kcˇ4.7 million to Kcˇ52.5 million (see
financial statements inBotana Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 ). Although bank debt
increased 15% from 1993 to 1994, Botana managed a restructuring at lower
interest rates. Short-term payables were cut in half.
Has Botana turned things around? Pecina thinks so, but with one or two
reservations. The firm has capacity problems now, and must choose carefully
in which product groups it will concentrate. Executives say innovation and
subsequent investment will be limited to areas where Botana can be price
competitive. This rules out the cutthroat summer sports shoe market; new
designs can be expected in skates and field athletic shoes, where the firm
already has high quality standards.
Botana has concentrated on recovering lost markets to the East, partly
in response to seasonal sales fluctuations in Western markets, but also be-
cause of its still-intact reputation and contacts. This is not without dangers,
however. The firm still has trouble with payment from Central and East
European markets, but hopes to get a handle on these foreign receivables
problems with its new financial plan. Investment privatization funds own
75.8% of Botana equity. Individual voucher holders own 9.8% and employees
another 1.0%. Another 13.6% has been distributed to restitutees (individ-
uals whose property was taken from them following the takeover by the
Communists in February 1948).
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Botana Exhibit 1. Balance sheets (in thousand Czech korunas).
1994 1993
Assets 538,292 598,507
Fixed assets 185,974 188,952
Intangible fixed assets 631 731
Tangible assets 184,143 186,621
Financial investments 1,200 1,600
Current assets 352,318 384,374
Inventories 130,947 172,588
Short-term receivables 145,830 207,024
Cash and marketable
securities 52,554 4,762
Other assets 22,987 25,181
Liabilities 538,292 598,507
Basic capital 205,387 205,387
Capital funds 7,747 10,313
Funds from profit 12,773 9,738
Profit/loss of
previous period (40,914) 0
Profit/loss of
current period 1,616 (37,879)
Reserves 3,325 3,132
Short-term payables 106,815 214,908
Bank loans and grant-in-aid 228,894 184,471
Other liabilities 12,649 8,437
Botana Exhibit 2. Income statements (in thousand Czech korunas).
1994 1993
Sales 720,421 874,380
Total costs and expenses 718,805 912,259
Cost of goods sold 479,087 622,850
Personal expenses 146,315 143,176
Depreciation, taxes, and fees 13,924 13,680
Interest and other financial costs 44,968 82,384
Value added 191,142 148,503
Profit (loss) 1,616 (37,879)
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Elektromontazˇn´ı Za´vody, A.S., Czech Republic
During the recent bear run on the Prague Stock Exchange, Elektromontazˇn´ı
za´vody’s shares defied the market’s collective gravity. On December 16, the
year’s last day of trading, the firm’s share price stood at Kcˇ4,290, only 3.1%
off its 52-week high, and fully eight times above its year low of Kcˇ500. During
the final quarter, the broad market lost 24% of its value. In fact, only one
listed share – Skla´rny Kavalier – managed to increase in price during the last
quarter. Elektromontazˇn´ı za´vody (EZ), a soup-to-nuts purveyor of electrical
installation services, came in second. Why?
EZ is a contractor for projects of process-related electrical installations
that include delivery, erection, assembly on site, trial runs, and commission-
ing. The firm was formed in 1951 from divisions of several local and foreign
firms operating in Czechoslovakia, including Asea Brown Boveri, Siemens,
Skoda Plzenˇ, and CˇKD Praha (all heavy industrial enterprises engaged in
electrical assembly parts and equipment). After years as part of the ELEK-
TROMONT Praha concern, EZ became independent as part of the Federal
Ministry of Industry’s transformation process. Reorganized as an indepen-
dent joint-stock company in 1992, EZ quickly took the initiative and built
on contracts already under way.
The size of EZ contracts ran the gamut from large heavy current electri-
cal systems for nuclear power and hydropower stations to small low-voltage
systems for neighborhood stores. The firm’s fortunes were quite obviously
tied to construction investment, particularly in infrastructure-related sectors
such as civil engineering (transport, water treatment plants) and power and
heat generation. Other industries, such as chemicals, foodstuffs, paper and
wood processing, metallurgy, building materials, and office developments,
were major contract sources as well.
At the end of 1994, the firm was the market leader in the Czech Repub-
lic, with excellent domestic prospects. At that time, EZ was delivering heavy
current electric systems to Temel´ın Power Station, a nuclear plant in South
Bohemia slated to go on line in 1997, and was simultaneously completing
the reconstruction of safety systems at the Dukovany nuclear power station.
The company was delivering desulfurization devices to coal power stations
throughout the country, but especially to hard-pressed, coal-choked North
Bohemia. Cable systems, low- and high-voltage distribution halls, and trans-
former stations have been delivered to such well-known firms as Avia, Skoda
Plzenˇ, Tesla Lankroun, and CˇKD Praha. The firm’s long-held contacts and
loyal customer base also contributed to its strong market presence.
Management identified several basic strategic principles with which to
guide EZ, including the following: a stabilization of the work force; estab-
lishment of a quality-control system; intense utilization of internal resources
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for improving efficiency of managerial and professional teams; expansion into
new market sectors, utilizing active market operations (in terms of prospect-
hunting, canvassing, and bidding); full employment of marketing tools for
the benefit of the overall business policy; fostering of goodwill, especially in
business and public relations; careful selection of suppliers of equipment and
electro-installation components.
At the end of 1994, EZ showed an net profit of Kcˇ68 million on turnover
of Kcˇ1.19 billion. Total assets stood at Kcˇ2.23 billion. For a firm of its size,
EZ’s equity base – Kcˇ143 million – was small. As of summer 1995 the com-
pany planned an equity increase, probably through a rights issue, although
a firm date had not been set. Unlike most large firms in the Czech Republic,
EZ had few problems with secondary insolvency, and bank debt was low.
Long-term bank loans were Kcˇ171 million, down substantially from previous
years. Milan Hlinovsky, the General Director and Chairman, described the
firm’s debt position as “manageable,” and noted that EZ intended to pay
off its loans and be “completely self-sufficient.” Short-term loans and debt
totaled only Kcˇ3.5 million. EZ expected to finance growth from cash flow.
Net cash increased by Kcˇ82 million in 1994.
In 1994 the firm employed 1,400 people, down from a high of 2,500,
with an 8:5 worker–administrator ratio. The paring of employees was not
difficult. EZ easily saw that the “self-privatization” of nonessential activities
like reprographics and transportation was to its advantage.
Between 1991 and 1992, the company instituted rules “which allowed
staff to act as ‘entrepreneurs’ within the company. We gave them the freedom
they needed. These were not artificial rules: each unit, however small, had
to answer for itself. In this way, we learned to economize.” Productivity
increased by 50% in 1993 and 25% in 1994.
If management expertise translates directly into an improved bottom
line and confidence among shareholders, then much of the credit for EZ’s
success can be attributed to the team that Hlinovsky assembled. Executive
management averaged 45 years of age, and two board members were only
30. (These two were representatives of privatization funds.) Hlinovsky,
54, started his career with EZ in electrical engineering and worked up the
management ladder.
At a time when it was fashionable for Czech executives to chant the
latest mantras from Western management gurus, Hlinovsky’s group was a
breath of fresh air. Training weekends at the company’s recreational facilities
were common and included frank discussions about how to motivate staff
and increase productivity. Language lessons at these weekend sessions were
de rigueur – the better to conquer foreign markets and deal with hard-
bargaining Western customers. Total Quality Management, in many Czech
firms little more than a cliche´, was integrated as part of the firm’s overall
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strategy. Hlinovsky described it simply: “We wanted to have real quality
in all our work.” The firm has won its quality wings with an ISO-9002
certificate.
EZ’s strategic objectives went through three iterations, as Hlinovsky
recognized that the “power of some individuals was getting out of control.”
An important innovation required that all major projects entered into first
be in line with an overall trade strategy, and only then devolved down to
various divisions. “We have a certain set volume of risk that any particular
division can take on itself,” said Hlinovsky. “Anything above that must be
sent up the chain for a review and a decision.”
EZ also began to evaluate suppliers on price and market availability.
In line with the overall devolution of responsibility, divisional management
received considerable authority in making supplier decisions – the days of
contracting for services from within the organization at higher prices were
over. The majority of suppliers, however, remained domestic.
The company currently faces changing local and international markets.
As domestic privatization winds down and investment revives, construction-
related spending will increase. The investment market will become more
polarized: small and medium-size projects (which constitute the bulk of
current revenues) will give way (again) to large projects. Although EZ enjoys
an excellent position for these projects, more competitors can be expected
to arise.
Internationally, EZ faces the drying-up of its traditional Eastern mar-
kets, which were a major source of income for large-scale projects. In its
former incarnation as Elektromont Praha, EZ participated in dozens of ma-
jor export projects – hydroelectric plants to Albania, oxygen plants in Yu-
goslavia, refineries in Syria, power stations in Ethiopia. But moving away
from such Soviet-aligned contracts is a challenge. In 1989 the firm com-
pleted installations at power stations in West Germany and Denmark. But
according to Hlinovsky, “Western markets are too closed.” One of EZ’s do-
mestic competitors is ABB-EGF, a subsidiary of internationally connected
Asea Brown Boveri. Although smaller, ABB-EGF has obvious advantages
on foreign markets: by working with its parent company, it can exploit new
opportunities quickly and cheaply.
Most of EZ’s contracts for the next five or six years are local, and al-
though order books are full from 1995 to the end of the century, EZ would
clearly like more work in the advanced markets of the West.
In 1994, exports accounted for only 5% of turnover, and the majority of
that was to neighboring Slovakia. (By comparison, in the late 1980s about
25% of turnover was in exports.) To help, Hlinovsky would like to see some
state support for major industries in the Czech Republic, especially those
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that are big exporters and hard currency earners. “There is a big difference
between exporting power stations and yogurt,” he notes.
Like many companies, EZ looks longingly to lost markets to the East.
But these once-faithful clients can no longer pay outright, and EZ is not
in a position to extend favorable credit terms on its own account. External
financing mechanisms are not in place to assist EZ either. The Czech Export
Bank is only now getting on its feet, and political risk coverage, through
the Export Guarantee Bank, is expensive. By the same token, countries like
Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine have their own domestic electrical engineering
firms to maintain. International growth prospects, then, are limited. “That
doesn’t mean we aren’t trying,” says Hlinovsky. Bids are out for water-
related projects in several Arab and Central Asian states.
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Elektromontazˇn´ı Za´vody Exhibit 1. Balance sheets (in thousand Czech
korunas).
1993 1994
Assets
Subscriptions receivable 0 0
Called-up share capital not paid 0 0
Total fixed assets 184,697 194,247
Intangibles 4,206 2,230
Tangible fixed assets 176,911 190,213
Long-term fin. investments, of which: 3,580 1,804
Shares in group and related companies 2,100 324
Other long-term investments 1,480 1,480
Total current assets 1,970,114 2,035,876
Inventories 1,195,741 1,116,314
Long-term account receivable 347,283 1,714
Short-term account receivable 284,468 608,652
Cash and cash equivalents 142,622 309,196
Payments and accruals 16,041 6,401
Total assets 2,170,852 2,236,524
Liabilities and owners’ equity
Capital stock 143,569 143,569
Equity funds – additional paid-in capital 0 4
Obligatory reserve fund and statutory reserve funds 22,031 25,789
Past retained earnings 0 1,698
Current retained earnings 21,793 68,746
Obligatory allowances for estimated liabilities 5,136 7,404
Other allowances for estimated liabilities 11 0
Long-term accounts payable 877,157 0
Short-term account payable 794,528 1,464,169
Short-term bank loans 3,539
Long-term bank loans 294,835 171,971
Accruals and deferred income 11,762 349,635
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity 2,170,852 2,236,524
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Elektromontazˇn´ı Za´vody Exhibit 2. Income statements (in thousand
Czech korunas).
1993 1994
Revenues from goods for resale 596,205 1,071,907
Cost of goods for resale 534,489 1,040,743
Gross margin on goods for resale 61,716 31,164
Goods manufactured 986,829 1,191,157
Revenues from goods manufactured 1,044,146 1,282,274
Increase in inventories and
work-in process (66,767) (100,840)
Manufactured goods capitalized 9,450 9,723
Cost of goods manufactured 609,446 761,215
Gross margin on goods manufactured 377,383 461,107
Value added (gross margin on goods
for resale and goods manufactured) 439,099
Payroll expense 243,811 249,388
Taxes and duties other
than income taxes 2,001 1,625
Depreciation and amortization expenses 24,091 36,308
Other operating revenues 19,770 19,367
Other operating expenses 24,276 39,041
Decrease in allowances, unearned
revenues and accrued payables 32,356 10,526
Change in allowances, prepaid
expenses and accrued payables 47,884 22,889
Operating income 149,162 141,749
Revenues from financial activities 2,784 41,568
Expenses on financial activities 103,054 63,445
Increase in allowances for estimated financial expenses 11 10
Net gain from financial activities (100,281) (21,867)
Extraordinary revenues 17,381 1,294
Extraordinary expenses 44,469 4,614
Tax on extraordinary activities (1,395)
Net gain from extraordinary activities (27,088) (1,925)
Net income 21,793 68,746
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Metrostav, A.S., Czech Republic
For Metrostav, the Czech Republic’s leading tunnel construction company,
an end to Prague’s metro system might at first glance seem to be the end of
the line. Once part of Vodni stavby, now another large independent construc-
tion firm, Metrostav is actively seeking new construction work that has little
to do with tunnels – and in some cases, nothing to do with transportation.
Even so, it will still likely garner most of its revenues from transportation-
based construction projects. If the country’s transportation networks de-
velop in the way Metrostav hopes they will, the firm should be busy indeed.
Metrostav is best known as the general contractor for Prague’s metro
system. Between 1989 and 1992, Metro and other underground construction
(Prague’s massive Strahov Tunnel) accounted for between 90 and 95% of
the firm’s revenues. Beginning in 1993, however, that share fell to 40%, as
the firm branched out into other phases of construction: reconstruction of
historical monuments; a residential building complex in suburban Prague; a
series of gasoline stations; the Zelivka waterworks; and a wastewater treat-
ment plant in Cesky´ Brod, among others. In 1994, Metrostav completed
the Western end of Prague’s metro line B on schedule. Five new stations
were added to the existing 41. The Eastern end of the same line will be
completed in 1997. “This line was very difficult to finance,” according to a
company official. “During the Communist years, our government allocated
Kcˇ1.5–2.0 billion for metro construction. In 1991, the government said it
will only pay Kcˇ1.1 billion.” An international $250 million bond issue by
the city of Prague helped Metrostav make up the shortfall: the city allo-
cated about Kcˇ1 billion to metro construction. Other projects included the
reconstruction of a printing works, refurbishment of a large soccer stadium,
a solid waste landfill, and a water supply system for a small South Moravian
city. At year’s end, revenues from Prague-related construction had increased
by 35% versus 1993.
“Branching out” is a Metrostav watchword. Since 1992 a principal goal
in Metrostav’s basic business strategy has been to cast its geographical net
wider: in 1994 offices were opened in Plzenˇ (West Bohemia), Brno (South
Moravia), and Liberec (North Bohemia). Activities outside the capital city
are forecast to grow by 30% annually, but that figure will not be reached eas-
ily. Metrostav faces stiff competition in South Bohemia and North Moravia,
and it is not very active in those regions. This is a disadvantage, since
North Moravia offers huge potential in heavy industrial and environmental
construction, the very sectors which Metrostav is trying to branch into.
The next priority for the metro system will be the extension of line C
(IVC) north from Holesˇovice. Construction plans to serve Prague’s 150,000-
strong North Town community await final approval by city hall. (North
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Town is currently linked to the metro system only through buses and “one
very bad tram.”) A Metrostav official appears sanguine about completing
the line by 2000, even though financing has not been lined up: “Financing
is a question for the government, not for us.” Perhaps.
In anticipation of winning any prospective tender from the Ministry of
Transportation, Metrostav founded a 10-firm consortium for the reconstruc-
tion of the Czech portion of the Berlin-Prague-Vienna railway corridor in
1993. (The consortium, called Koridor, includes Sudop Praha, Sudop Brno,
ZˇPSV Uherskv Ostroh, Trˇineske´ zˇeleza´rny, ZˇS Brno, Zˇeleznia˜nıı stavitelstv´ı
Praha, Elektrizace zˇeleznic Praha, AZˇD Praha, and Posemstav Brno – an
illustrious collection.) The cost for reconstructing the line will top Kcˇ25
billion, making it one of the largest construction projects in the country.
Metrostav’s prescience was rewarded. In 1994, talks on refurbishing the
line began in earnest, and financing from the EBRD and Japan’s ExImbank
was secured. On behalf of state-owned Czech Rail, government guarantees
were obtained as well. Although no tender has been announced yet, terms
should soon be made public.
Metrostav got a boost from the government in late 1994 when parlia-
ment passed a new law giving domestic companies an edge in bidding for
government-financed projects. The law says, ceteris paribus, a domestic firm
can bid up to 10% more for, say, a construction project than a foreign com-
pany and still win the tender. (This is, however, sauce for the goose: other
domestic construction firms will have the same advantage.)
Like haircuts (the classic example of a non-tradable good), construction
services often do not travel well across borders. In the case of construction,
however, the reason is due mostly to politics, not the sedentary nature of
the company. Metrostav is very price competitive, and has bid aggressively
on projects in Germany and Austria. But the firm simply cannot obtain ap-
proval from government authorities to participate in their countries. Unable
to obtain work permits in Germany, the firm watched the koruna volume of
foreign work in 1993 drop by 50%, to only Kcˇ42 million. Prospects for 1994
looked better: Metrostav bid on 29 new foreign projects, 18 in Germany
alone. But only a small delivery of steel halls were made to Vietnam; the
remaining bids were lost.
Rejection, particularly in EU countries, can take the form of refusing
to grant a permit for construction work, keeping out construction workers
based on artificially low labor quotas, or not allowing the firm to bid at all.
The result is the same: at a time when they have a distinct competitive
advantage on price due to low labor costs, Metrostav (and most other Czech
and Slovak construction companies) must bide their time, waiting until the
Czech Republic joins the EU or their bids become less aggressive.
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Metrostav is one of the five largest construction companies in the Czech
Republic, and third in terms of turnover. In 1994, the firm had sales of
Kcˇ4.213 billion. Metrostav forecasts sales of construction work of Kcˇ5 billion
in 1995; Kcˇ1 billion fromMetro construction, Kcˇ500 million from the Strahov
Tunnel, and the remainder from other construction work. Analysts are more
circumspect, forecasting sales of Kcˇ4.668 billion. But despite an increase in
materials costs of 35% and contracted services of 30%, the firm will squeeze
more profits out of every koruna of construction work: earnings should grow
37% from 1995 to 1997. Increases in materials costs are forecast to fall to
15% between 1995 and 1997; subcontracting costs should increase 30% in
1995, before falling to 5% per year in 1996 and 1997. Metrostav wants to
use subcontractors as sparingly as possible. Once these high increases in
variable costs are pared, operating profits should improve.
The construction market in the Czech Republic is growing by 7% per
year, about twice as fast as GDP growth. Several market trends are iden-
tifiable: increasing competition among large construction firms will squeeze
margins; low margin work will be subcontracted out to smaller firms; financ-
ing terms are becoming an increasingly important part of project work; and
the industry will experience some consolidation through mergers and acqui-
sitions. Metrostav is well placed to successfully navigate these changes. The
firm’s low level of debt (debt/equity ratio of 25% in 1994) allows it flexibility
to increase debt when needed, either to finance new acquisitions (for a push
into new regional markets) or to fund other current activities. Metrostav
has proved that it can bid aggressively, particularly in non-transportation-
related projects.
The firm employs 3,500 people, down from 5,300 in 1989. About 70%
are employed in the field. Metrostav has 10 divisions, all of which operate
around a central headquarters based in Prague. Personnel expenses and
related costs are growing about 5% per year. Privatization funds own almost
60% of Metrostav shares. Individual and corporate shareholders (domestic
and foreign) hold about 32%. Other shareholders include the city of Prague,
the National Property Fund, and employee shareholders. The firm was one
of the most sought-after shares in the second wave of voucher privatization,
and given its performance and future prospects, all brokerages and analysts
rate the share a “buy.”
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Metrostav Exhibit 1. Balance sheets (in thousand Czech korunas).
1994 1993
Total Assets 1,876,296 1,566,989
Fixed assets 555,335 513,900
Intangible fixed assets 5,581 11,084
Tangible fixed assets 461,769 429,121
Financial investments 87,985 73,695
Intercompany shares and group ownership interests 32,860 18,570
Other financial investments 55,125 55,125
Current assets 1,312,585 1,050,213
Inventory 79,417 112,866
Past due receivables 27,319 19,900
Receivables 705,640 741,078
Financial assets 500,209 176,369
Other assets 8,376 2,876
Total liabilities 1,876,296 1,566,989
Equity 635,973 604,898
Registered capital 475,589 475,589
Own shares (7,171)
Capital funds
Funds created from net profit 53,902 50,559
Profit (loss) from previous years 61,160 11,905
Profit (loss) from current period 52,493 66,845
Liabilities 1,220,826 934,010
Legal reserves 40,625 13,826
Other reserves 20,810 1,100
Overdue payables
Current payables 1,001,406 636,661
Bank loans and other debt 157,985 282,423
Long-term loans 157,985 107,423
Short-term loans 175,000
Other liabilities 19,497 28,081
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Metrostav Exhibit 2. Income sheets (in thousand Czech korunas).
1994 1993
Revenues from merchandise 2,183 1,907
Cost of goods sold 2,102 327
Margin 81 1,580
Production 4,102,421 3,227,353
Revenues from products and services 3,972,448 2,532,673
Change in inventory 96,552 643,233
Capitalization 33,421 51,447
Production consumption 3,271,621 2,487,412
Added value 830,881 741,521
Personnel expenses 558,075 530,285
Taxes and fees 13,028 8,770
Other operating revenues 53,193 88,961
Other operating expense 49,200 104,163
Depreciation of fixed assets 89,453 69,961
Reserves, adjustments, and accruals 9,481 25,884
Additions to reserves, adjustments, and accruals 56,216 1,100
Transfer of operating revenues
Transfer of operating expenses
Operating profit (loss) 127,583 142,087
Financial revenues 43,642 100,340
Financial expenses 62,404 120,734
Adjustments to financial revenues
Adjustments to financial expenses
Transfer of financial expenses 3,270
Profit (loss) from financial operations (22,032) (20,392)
Income tax on ordinary income 45,604 50,622
Deferred income tax on ordinary income 6,836 5,122
Ordinary income 53,111 65,951
Extraordinary revenues 943 2,692
Extraordinary expenses 2,012 1,067
Income tax on extraordinary income (451) 731
Deferred income tax on extraordinary income
Extraordinary income (618) 894
Net income 52,493 66,845
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Mlekarna Klatovy, A.S., Czech Republic
On October 31, 1994, Jaroslav Lizner, the head of the Czech Republic’s
Coupon Privatization Center, was arrested after accepting a briefcase con-
taining Kcˇ8.33 million in cash. The money, 166,000 50-koruna notes, was
allegedly a bribe for making sure that shares of Mlekarna Klatovy, a West
Bohemian dairy, went to TWI, a local privatization fund interested in pur-
chasing the stake from another fund. TWI had won the right in a tender
to purchase 34% of Klatovy for Kcˇ220 million. Several competing investors
wondered why TWI was willing to pay so much.
In the summer of 1994, Klatovy’s management had filed a complaint
with its owner – the National Property Fund – saying that the terms of the
tender were not being met. In the dairy’s estimation, TWI’s liquidity was
questionable, and its commitment to helping the dairy tackle its own liquid-
ity problems was suspect as well. TWI, it seemed, had proved unable to come
up with the Kcˇ65 million required as a down payment, causing speculation
that the buyer was less than whole. After looking into the complaint, the
Fund judged the claim unfounded. Later, a rehearing reversed the decision
after the Fund Supervisory Board focused “on whether or not the company
really needed the money to be gained through the sale of shares. We found
that they didn’t,” said Fund Director Roman Ceska, “and that’s why we
allowed the tender to be dissolved.”
The dairy desperately needed the money. In 1990, Klatovy had pur-
chased modern milk-processing equipment worth Kcˇ500 million. By the
summer of 1994, Kcˇ100 million on the loan remained to be paid. In addi-
tion, the firm’s equity, at Kcˇ263 million, was and is inadequate. More new
equipment – particularly for saving energy – is needed. Now that the dairy
has offered 96% of its shares – the maximum amount permissible – through
coupon privatization, its more than 8,000 shareholders will decide what hap-
pens next. General Manager Sekyrka says the firm hopes to increase equity
next spring, probably through a rights issue of Kcˇ150 to 200 million.
When Klatovy was still available during the tender, however, the dairy
did not lack suitors, either domestic or foreign. Karel Pech, a local investor
heavily involved in the food-processing industry, showed interest in the firm
last August, but when the Fund announced a competitive tender for the
34%, Pech backed off. He did not even participate in the tender held later.
France’s Lescure Bougon was to purchase that same 34%; the firm withdrew
its interest in October, before the Lizner affair began.
What was it about Klatovy – the fifth largest producer in an over-
crowded, contracting market – that was so appealing? Some thought the
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answer lay in the products which the dairy manufactures, its relatively mod-
ern assets, and the structure of the firm’s – and the country’s – milk-product
exports.
Dairy processing, like several sectors in the food-processing industry, in-
volves slim margins and stiff competition. There are more than 100 dairies
operating in the Czech Republic. According to executives at Klatovy an
“economically reasonable” number of dairies is nearer 25 than 100. “There
is too much capacity,” says the General Director, “and [the dairies] are them-
selves too small.” Overcapacity is reckoned by the local dairy association to
be as much as 40% countrywide. A typical West European dairy can process
500,000 liters of raw milk daily. Klatovy has the the same capacity, thanks
to modern equipment. But the typical Czech dairy is far smaller, able to
process only 50,000 liters daily. In late 1994, Klatovy was profitable – just
– at a throughput of 100,000 liters per day. The firm was trying to process
about 130,000 liters a day.
Klatovy employs 450 people at its complex, more than other dairies,
according to the General Director. The firm’s main products are processed
cheese and milk powder. The soft, spreadable white cheese which crowds
local grocery shelves (and comes in a bewildering variety of fat contents and
flavors) is big business both at home and abroad. Czechs consume more
of the stuff per capita than any other country in the world. And a special
type of processed cheese called Akavy is a major export to countries of the
Middle East. Czech dairies have been producing and exporting Akavy cheese
for 30 years, and according to the director, the Czech Republic produces
more Akavy cheese than any other country (smaller amounts are produced
in Bulgaria, Lebanon, and Syria). Customers in the Levant and Middle
East consume from 6,000 to 8,000 tons every year. There, the cheese figures
prominently as an ingredient in sweet delicacies. Customs figures show that
Czech dairies export more cheese to Lebanon (40% of their total) than any
other country.
Skimmed milk powder is an even bigger export product. In late 1994,
world market prices were around $1,600 per ton, and the firm produced
roughly 3,000 tons of skimmed milk powder annually. Klatovy’s 1993 rev-
enues totaled Kcˇ600 million, meaning that exports of skimmed milk powder
accounted for nearly one-quarter of all revenues. The dairy’s 1993 profit
was Kcˇ5.6 million. According to officials, Klatovy earns a 5–7% margin on
exports of skimmed milk powder or about Kcˇ7.2 million.
There are more advantages to dried milk production. Skimmed milk
powder can earn generous subsidies from the Ministry of Agriculture’s mar-
ket regulation fund (the agricultural fund established to prop up farm prices).
In the second quarter of this year, only 200 tons of processed cheese exports
were subsidized by the fund. In comparison, 5,400 tons of dried milk were
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subsidized – and those subsidies are increasing by about 25% per quarter.
Akavy cheese is not subsidized.
Following the shares-for-favors scandal, one respected local paper fixed
on processed cheese as the real impetus for interest in the dairy, weaving a
plausible but ill-substantiated tale hinting at shadowy Middle East connec-
tions. But the numbers don’t add up. Klatovy wants to produce five times
more skimmed milk powder over the next three years – a sensible policy,
given current world market prices for dried milk. Although Klatovy officials
say “too much” milk powder is being exported, this is a reflection on the
firm’s market share, not the profits to be had in the market. On a unit
basis, producers can expect a margin of from 5 to 7%. The General Director
says he would like to increase production of milk powder by as much as five
times.
Selling skimmed milk powder may not be as easy as it at first appears.
When asked exactly who his customers for skimmed milk powders are, the
General Director laughs. “We don’t know,” he says, describing an intricate
sales system which begins in Klatovy and flows from Prague to Hamburg
to Senegal and then – maybe – to other markets. “Once something gets
to Hamburg, you can never tell where it’s going,” he says. The Director
also notes that German exporters receive generous government assistance
for exporting such products to less developed countries. (So do Czechs.)
Klatovy exports 15% of its production to two markets: the Middle East and
North Africa.
Processed cheese poses an even riskier bet. Imported cheeses will soon
make up about 30% of the domestic market, and a typical Western dairy can
produce up to 150,000 tons per year. Even if Klatovy can increase target
production to 25 tons a day (about 7,500 tons per year), it will remain well
behind the potential of foreign producers, not to mention rival local dairies
such as Jihoceske Mleka´rny and Plzenske Mleka´rny. Moreover, the Gen-
eral Director expects domestic consumption of processed cheese to decrease.
“Consumption is relatively high right now,” he says. “I suppose it can’t get
any higher and will slowly decline.”
Other Klatovy products, such as white (hard) cheese, are being
rethought. The firm commands a market share of 10%, but according to
the General Director, it produces white cheese at a loss. Klatovy’s hard
cheese line operates at only 45% of capacity. A surplus of white cheese on
international markets means prices are low. Too, foreign governments are
protecting their own producers. (Asked about trade relations between the
United States and the Czech Republic, officials at the Ministry of Industry
and Trade immediately complained of high tariffs on Czech white cheese.)
Executives worry about a lack of working capital. They would like to
increase equity by between Kcˇ150 and 200 million but the shares would be a
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tough sell to a public skeptical of the food-processing industry. Management
may decide on a rights issue. Nor is debt an answer: the Director says his
firm cannot qualify for favorable interest rates, and without a restructuring
of existing debt, new payments could break the company’s financial back.
Klatovy’s early 1990s purchase of new equipment through high-interest bank
loans now seems suspect: the equipment is idle far too often, and the firm
is having trouble carrying the interest expense.
Klatovy suffers from a severe receivables problem. Two-thirds of all
receivables, about Kcˇ125 million, are past due. To combat the problem,
Klatovy has restructured its sales force and has focused on working only
with reliable (i.e., paying) suppliers.
Several large dairies are now splashing out expensive marketing and
promotion campaigns. Klatovy has not yet, and at the end of 1994, mar-
keting accounted for between only 1 and 2% of total costs. This matters in
a market crowded with local and foreign products, many of which possess
better packaging and smarter positioning than Klatovy’s offerings. Klatovy
brought bar coding to some of its products in 1994 and introduced technolo-
gies to improve shelf life. On the whole, however, the products do not have
a progressive, modern image.
Wholesale milk prices increased slowly during the first half of 1994, be-
fore a rapid rise in fall 1995. Countrywide, prices are up about 5%. But the
firm has little room to increase prices to consumers, which are being pres-
sured from decreasing demand and cheap imports. Domestic consumption
of milk and milk products fell from 256 kg per capita in 1990 to 190 kg in
1993. Cheap milk products from heavily subsidized EU countries are staples
on Czech grocery shelves, and competition from the West will not abate.
As the firm decides on its production strategy for the near future, it will
have to face the unpleasant fact that consumption of its products will in all
likelihood decrease over the next several years.
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Mlekarna Klatovy Exhibit 1. Balance sheet in 1994 (in thousand Czech
korunas).
Total assets 676,542
Fixed assets 390,010
Intangible fixed assets 122
Tangible fixed assets 389,868
Areas 6,916
Buildings, halls, houses 207,395
Machinery 157,492
Unfinished tangible investments 18,005
Deposits on tangible fixed assets 60
Financial investments 20
Current assets 287,582
Inventory 80,612
Material 38,271
Unfinished products 35,591
Production 19,513
Other goods 2,570
Deposits on inventory (15,333)
Receivables 199,831
Trade-contact receivables 199,812
Other receivables 19
Financial Assets 7,139
Cash 724
Other bank accounts 6,108
Short-term financial assets 307
Other assets, prepayments, and deferred income (1,050)
Total liabilities 676,542
Equity 282,240
Registered capital 263,251
Funds created from profit 17,721
Statutory reserve funds 16,996
Other funds 725
Profit of previous years 1,169
Profit of current period 99
Current liabilities 392,405
Reserves 3,675
Short-term payables 177,183
Taxes payable (4,216)
Other payables 792
Bank loans 211,547
Long-term bank loans 91,547
Short-term bank loans 120,000
Other liabilities 1,897
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Mlekarna Klatovy Exhibit 2. Income statement in 1994 (in thousand
Czech korunas).
Sales of purchased goods 56,831
Cost of goods sold 52,980
Gross margin from trade 3,851
Sales of own products and services 564,560
Revenues from own products and services 493,022
Changes in inventory and work in progress 14,180
Own work capitalized 57,358
Production costs total 476,901
Raw materials and energy costs 439,084
Services 37,817
Value added 91,510
Personnel expenses 31,457
Wage expenses 23,193
Social security expenses 7,918
Other social expenses 346
Taxes and fees 1,103
Depreciations of intangible and tangible fixed assets 26,021
Revenues from the sale of fixed assets 1,463
Remaining revenue from previously sold fixed assets 863
Addition to reserves 1,575
Corrections to operating expenses 10,500
Other operating revenues 50
Other operating expenses 614
Operating profit 20,890
Revenues from the sale of securities and deposits 38
Revenues from interest 103
Interest expense 20,538
Other financial revenues 318
Other financial costs 1,451
Profit from financial operations (21,530)
Income tax from the ordinary income – due (270)
Profit of the ordinary income – due (370)
Extraordinary revenues 989
Extraordinary costs 180
Income tax from the extraordinary income – due 340
Extraordinary profit 469
Profit of current period 99
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Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne, A.S., Slovakia
It is often tempting to judge a Czech or Slovak company by its annual re-
port. Some are splashy, with little information; others are five or six pages
long, and simple photocopies. Povazˇske´ stroja´rne’s (PS’s) annual report is
aggressively detailed: this is a company that wants you to know it is serious
about turning itself around. Bar charts for implementation of total quality
management are included, with target dates for ISO-9000 certification for
each product group. The report explains why several managers were turned
out, and how the firm settled on its strategic direction. Where most com-
panies would publish an annual report in one or two languages, PS manages
four. English is one of those languages (no surprise) and so is German.
Importantly, the other is Russian.
True to Slovakia’s vision as a bridge between East and West, Povazˇske´
stroja´rne has not stopped looking East for sales. Bearings are sold to Bul-
garia and India and copper tubes and castings to Ukraine and Slovenia.
After winning a tender issued by the Russian government, PS signed an
agreement in February 1995 to provide aircraft engines to the Russian Air
Force. Terms of financing are still being negotiated, and although first deliv-
eries are expected in early 1997, PS may need government export guarantees
to carry off the deal.
PS is a truly comprehensive engineering firm. The company also pro-
duces small tractors for farming, machine tools and die casts, plastic injection
molds, surface grinding machinery, gearboxes, and more. Its research insti-
tute is active in the development of food- and wood-processing technologies
and machine-testing devices.
Aircraft engine production has been a mixed blessing for PS. Its DV-2
engines are produced primarily for Aero Vodochody. But the Czech aircraft
manufacturers’ troubles have hit PS hard: Aero will purchase only five en-
gines this year, compared with the 20 originally expected in the contract.
(Aero purchased 18 engines in 1994: 6 were for Egyptian aircraft, 10 for
Tunisia, and 2 for parts.) PS is unhappy about the cutback, but is bound
to honor the parts and service requirements in the contract until 2020.
After a 10-year layoff, PS is returning to small motorcycle production. In
the 1950s PS began producing several types of motorbikes. Babetta mopeds,
now firmly entrenched in the Slovak market, were once part of PS’s product
line. Central planners decided to remove Babetta from PS in 1984, and the
firm watched helplessly as its “child” was transferred to another company.
After intense negotiations with Italy’s Piaggio, Povazˇske´ stroja´rne Manet
was formed last year for the production of Korado mopeds. PS produces
Piaggio’s Puch engines under license. PS produced 2,000 mopeds in 1994
and sold 6,900 engines to Piaggio. The firm estimates 1995 sales at 12,000
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mopeds; capacity is between 40,000 and 50,000. PS is capable of manu-
facturing 50,000 to 80,000 Puch engines as well. The firm is targeting the
Czech Republic as a key market; it plans to sell 54% of Korados to its north-
ern neighbor. Other foreign markets include the USA, Brazil, Finland, and
perhaps some Asian states.
In former times, PS was also a well-known manufacturer of weapons.
(The firm was founded in 1929 as weapons maker.) Its FARMET division,
which produces brass and copper tubes, wires, and specialist castings like
thermo-regulators, made high-caliber shells for the armed forces. It has
managed to find a new use for its artillery shell casings: fire extinguishers.
The firm remains a manufacturer of small-arms ammunition.
Sales fell 12% in 1994 from Sk2.67 billion to Sk2.35 billion, although
the firm managed a profit of Sk47.6 million. The profit came not from
operations, however, but from extraordinary gains in the form of sales of
outside shareholdings. After three consecutive loss-making years, the firm
wanted for investment, and shareholders have opted to reinvest all profits.
The most important investments in 1994 were for the start-up of Korado
production, reconstruction of a production hall for the Sauer (of Germany)
JV gearboxes, and new machinery for a pressing shop.
PS has a long-term liability in the form of the Piaggio license (Sk17.3
million) and bank credits totaling Sk117.3 million. Short-term liabilities
include payables totaling Sk716 million and bank loans of Sk657 million.
Total bank debt (including unpaid interest) is Sk862 million.
The company improved its cash position dramatically in 1994, up Sk126
million to Sk164 million. But PS is circumspect about overall liquidity: a
more aggressive collection policy helped reduce receivables 5.6%, but past
due receivables still represent fully 75% of the Sk935 million total. Clearly,
the firm needs to prod its customers. Inventories were reduced 10%, to Sk782
million. Fixed assets fell marginally, from Sk4.27 billion to Sk4.14 billion.
Assets in the form of controlling shareholdings in other firms (including its
German JVs) roughly doubled, to Sk201 million.
The numbers perhaps belie the real state of affairs at Povazˇske´ stroja´rne.
Taking advantage of the EU’s PHARE program (an aid fund for former
socialist countries), PS hired a British consultant, March, to help sort out
its various divisions and product groups. Management was shaken up in
1995, and the Head of the Supervisory Board, Alfre´d Richter, took over as
the General Director. The company got a new Director of Strategy as well.
In fact, the top three positions in the company are held by long-time PS
employees with recent experience in trade, strategy, or finance. Each has a
technical education with expertise in engineering.
The firm’s strategic plan calls for continuing consolidation within the
parent company. PS will focus on sales of its copper and brass fittings and
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tubes, bearings, and (after a pause) aircraft engines. The firm recognizes in
its strategy statement that inexpensive labor is an asset it must use to the
fullest. Contracting out spare capacity is not a foreign concept here.
Where possible, PS wants to spin off divisions into independent firms,
and have these companies form joint ventures with Western firms. This helps
guarantee continuing production while providing ready sales outlets. Inde-
pendent subsidiaries also have cleaner balance sheets than the still top-heavy
parent company. Clean balance sheets can help them get better access to
financing. Already individual divisions and sections have been rationalized
with an eye to best use of employees, capital assets, and the financial struc-
ture. The VALOZˇ division, a producer of heavy-duty bearings, has been
spun off into a separate joint-stock company called PS Lozˇiska´. Povazˇske´
stroja´rne MANET, the daughter company producing mopeds, was formed
by detaching 48 employees from the Strategy Section. The POL´NOTECH
division, which produces farm machinery, will also make spare parts for a
new joint venture with Germany’s Sauer (see below). In 1995 the firm was
expected to continue to lay off employees (901 left in 1994).
At the end of 1994, exports accounted for 54.8% of sales (up from 53.4%
in 1993 and 46.9% in 1992), and the figure should increase as moped and
bearings sales rise. Looking at the firm’s range of exports, it is clear that
PS is banking on foreign sales to help it recover. At present PS exports to
all major West European markets; the majority of its bearings go to France
and Germany. In March 1995, a joint venture was formed with Germany’s
Sauer to produce large gearboxes for concrete mixers. PS holds a minority
35% stake. Its presence in central European markets is also strong: Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are customers for most of the company’s
products. It is tempting to say there is an overreliance on the Czech market:
fully 60% of all exports in 1994 went to the Czech Republic, but aircraft
engines accounted for the bulk of sales.
PS forecasts a slight fall in sales for 1995, to Sk2.3 billion, but this does
not include sales of its subsidiaries (wholly and partially owned). These com-
panies, which include the profitable bearings and gearbox ventures, should
contribute another Sk470 million in sales. One year of profit does not mean
the corner has been turned. But if mid-year 1995 show better-than-expected
sales in its target products – the ones which contribute the highest percent-
age of profit, copper tubes, and specialty tools – and if the firm can manage
to successfully wind up its aircraft engine deal with Russia, PS may well
have good short- to medium-term potential.
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Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne Exhibit 1. Balance sheets (in thousand Slovak
korunas).
1993 1994
Assets 6,779,291 6,726,720
Fixed assets 4,426,646 4,372,883
Intangible fixed assets 16,426 4,286
Depreciable tangible fixed assets 4,271,579 4,141,935
Financial investments 138,641 226,662
Shares and ownership interests with
controlling influence in enterprise 110,324 201,662
Other securities and ownership interests 28,317 18,500
Other financial investments 0 6,500
Current assets 2,332,590 2,277,441
Inventory 871,213 782,672
Paid-in-advance inventory 74,572 60,608
Long-term debts 38,828 25,798
Short-term debts 1,309,350 1,243,970
Cash and bond 38,627 164,393
Other assets 20,055 76,396
Liabilities 6,779,291 6,726,720
Registered capital and capital funds 4,542,167 4,587,660
Registered capital 3,994,018 3,994,018
Capital funds 253,986 152,538
Profit funds 454,501 399,402
Previous year’s financial results –5,888 –5,888
Net profit –154,450 47,590
External sources 2,116,292 2,016,366
Legal reserves 32,201 32,610
Long-term credits 22,308 17,628
Short-term credits 1,307,373 1,181,001
Bank loans 754,410 785,127
Long-term loans 754,410 774,507
Short-term loans 0 10,620
Other liabilities 120,832 122,694
57
Povazˇske´ Stroja´rne Exhibit 2. Profit and loss statements (in thousand
Slovak korunas).
1993 1994
Sales and factored goods 110,749 66,941
Costs of factored goods 81,709 55,978
Production 3,941,476 3,499,517
Production costs 3,088,186 2,763,623
Value added 882,330 746,857
Personnel costs 517,673 499,434
Taxes and duties 13,755 12,263
Depreciations of tangible and intangible assets 224,302 216,176
Other operating revenues 434,314 454,548
Other operating costs 474,233 422,720
Operating financial result (1) 86,681 50,812
Financial revenue 45,890 91,443
Financial costs 223,718 189,152
Result of financial operations (2) –177,828 –97,709
Gross profit before taxes (1+2) –91,147 –46,897
Income tax 30,005 24,439
Payable 0 0
Deferred 30,005 24,439
Net profit (3) –12,152 –71,336
Extraordinary revenues 14,727 141,587
Extraordinary costs 48,025 22,661
Net extraordinary profit (4) –33,298 118,926
Total net profit (3+4) –45,450 47,590
Ratio indexes
Net profit per share (Sk) –38.67 11.92
Return on sales (%) –3.40 1.12
Return on capital employed (%) –3.87 1.19
Credit indebtedness (%) 16.61 17.11
Overall indebtedness (%) 33.00 31.80
Overall liquidity (%) 121.8 119.39
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Solo, A.S., Czech Republic
Reach for a match in the Czech Republic, and chances are you will be lighting
a match with a 159-year-old tradition. Solo, a match manufacturer located
in Susˇice, South Bohemia, has been exporting its matches for more than
a century. The match company was established in 1836 by a Susˇice (then
Fu¨rth) carpenter. The business grew and eventually boomed when it re-
ceived financing from a rich local investor. By the end of the century, Solo
matches were sold throughout the world, thanks in part to a strong presence
in Great Britain. The match museum in Susˇice sports wooden matchboxes
with trade names in English, Hindi, Chinese, German, French, Italian and
Spanish. Some of its best-known trademarks from a century ago – The Key
and Scissors – are still produced.
By the end of the 1980s, management had recognized that survival de-
pended on expanding the product line. Demand for matches – even quality
wooden matches like Solo’s – had dropped steadily with the advent and
popularity of disposable lighters. (According to Pavel Probst, Solo’s Sales
Director, about 70 to 80% of all smokers use lighters.) The firm had, how-
ever, begun to make hardboard panels in the 1950s. Faced with a changing
market, in the early 1990s executives decided to concentrate their efforts
on manufacturing hardboard and to pare production of the firm’s hallmark
wooden matches. A product-profitability study was conducted in early 1994,
and by the June annual meeting top management and divisional Directors
had formulated a four-year production and financial strategy.
Production restructuring followed swiftly. As late as 1990, 75% of Solo’s
match production was exported to Great Britain. (Since 1969, the firm
has sold its products through a trade partner in Britain.) Domestically,
it exported matches through Lignaexport (now simply Ligna). In 1991,
matches accounted for 60% of sales. But by 1994, as a share of total sales,
the firm’s hardboard products occupied first place, with a share of 59%.
Production of matches dropped by half in the four years to 1994, and matches
now represent 25% of all sales. Pruning match production has resulted in
spare capacity: the company sells about 20 million matches a month, but
could produce three times more.
Solo maintains a domestic market share (in matches) of about 60%,
although competition from cheap foreign producers continues to eat away at
that figure. “Even with transportation costs,” says Probst, “matches from
Poland and Russia are 20% cheaper.” (In fairness, however, Solo’s matches
are of a much higher quality. The Polish matches which Probst eagerly
showed broke easily. The match heads also tended to fall off, flaming as
they landed inevitably on one’s trousers.)
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There are no match manufacturers in Germany or Austria, and Britain’s
last match manufacturer folded in 1994. Even so, overcapacity haunts the
European match market. SwedishMatch and ItalMatch are two large West
European producers and have a substantial market share throughout Europe.
The influx of matches from the East has meant that Solo must constantly
seek out developing country markets (where matches are still used more than
lighters).
Fixed assets increased in 1994, as Solo purchased new equipment to ex-
pand hardboard and I-joist production. The firm reduced inventories slightly
in 1994. Long-term suppliers’ credit more than doubled; short-term receiv-
ables, however, were reduced by almost 45%, reflecting a general concern
with shortening collection periods. Bank debt increased by 33%.
With assets still working toward match production, Solo lost Kcˇ1.17
million in 1994, on top of a Kcˇ7.93 million loss in 1993. Even so, the firm
showed a slim operating profit in both years. Cost of goods sold was reduced
by 23% in 1994, and the firm trimmed its personnel costs slightly. Solo uses
the same type of material – pulpwood – that is used in the production
of paper. Like the paper industry, Solo faced rising raw-materials costs
throughout 1994. In early 1995, pulpwood prices increased another 20%.
Combined with a seasonal dip in supply, which often occurs in winter, the
firm had to stop production because it simply could not get raw materials.
Still, total costs and expenses have fallen from Kcˇ550 million in 1992 to
Kcˇ400 million in 1994. The firm employs 800 people, down from a high of
1,500. Each division (organized by product) has its own sales force. About
25% of all staff are employed in sales and administration.
Probst is firm about Solo’s strategic direction: “Our future is in
hardwood-based panels and I-joists,” he says. Sales of I-joists took off in
1994, increasing 10-fold from 1993, to Kcˇ70 million. At present, the firm’s
I-joists are sold to Elk-Haus, an Austrian construction company specializing
in residential building. The I-joists are basically a hardboard panel wedged
into two softwood beams marked with flanges (hence the name). They are
extremely sturdy and can be manufactured in lengths up to 12 meters. The
joists are used in ceilings and floors in wood-construction houses and allow
space for insulation. Wood housing is still rare in the Czech Republic and is
catching on only slowly. The rest of Europe is perhaps 5 to 10 years ahead
of the Czechs in acceptance of wood frame housing.
The firm has several ideas about how to expand its market for I-joists.
Solo wants to build single-floor additions on top of panelaks, the coun-
try’s ubiquitous, but ugly, panel apartment blocks. The firm has prepared
blueprints for the additions and proposals have been made to the city of
Liberec, where it has an eye on two or three buildings as prototypes. Several
buildings in Susˇice are suitable candidates as well. The idea has won kudos
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for helping to solve a housing shortage in provincial towns, but wood-based
housing is uncommon in the Czech Republic, and financing will be a prob-
lem. Panelaks are often owned by municipalities themselves, which cannot
afford the upgrade. Moreover, buildings are changing owners constantly:
Solo does not always know who it should be negotiating with.
Solo hardboards are priced lower than those made in Western Europe,
but their quality is lower, too. The firm’s hardboards are suitable for indus-
trial uses, such as construction; furniture requires a higher-quality product.
Although Solo wants to compete principally on price, it obviously cannot
continue to absorb constant price increases in its inputs. The firm raised its
prices on exports of hardboards – sold to Germany and the Benelux countries
– 10%.
Hardboard panels are produced by soaking wood chips with steam and
heat. The result is a fibrous mass which is similar to a clump of very rough
paper. The mass is then pressed into panels, which may be smooth on both
sides, webbed on one side (for better adherence), or formed into a single
board made of two, three, or four panels. Panels may be laminated to use
in making cabinets or doors. Solo has recently purchased a cut-to-size saw
and sanding machine, which will help with custom orders. A new painting
line, supplied by a German customer, will enable Solo to produce painted
hardboard panels.
Other wood products account for 5% of sales. Included in this share are
sales of punched hardboard for the automobile industry. Backed with PVC
(from Fatra), these hardboard panels make their way into the back seats of
every Skoda Felicia, Favorit, and Forman sold by Mlada´ Boleslav. Solo has
the contract to supply the panels for the new Combi as well. Obviously, Solo
is eager to see Skoda increase production.
Solo’s machine division, in former times occupied solely with repairs and
production of the firm’s own equipment, now contracts to supply domestic
and foreign toolmakers and engineering firms. The majority of contracts are
with Germany. This engineering production accounts for just under 5% of
sales.
The process is efficient: three cubic meters of hardwood (poplar) yields
one ton of hardboard. About 20% of the hardboard that is not immediately
pressed may be recycled. Only 2% of wood is eventually unused and burned
as waste.
Surprisingly, Solo has few environmental problems. It has switched from
coal- to oil-burning boilers, and it complies with new clean-air regulations.
The chemicals used in its match heads are benign, and unless a customer
wants extraordinary strength in hardboard panels, the pressure and steam
process by which Solo forms its boards uses no chemicals. The firm’s waste-
water treatment plant is modern, and its once-spare capacity is now used to
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treat other industrial wastewater along with portions of the city’s sewage.
Water treatment and sales of energy to the town of Susˇice account for 5%
of sales. Solo’s sales mix is the following:
Matches 25.6%
Laminated hardboards 58.8%
Hardboards 4.9%
Energy production 2.9%
Machinery/engineering production 4.8%
Other 3.0%
Solo Exhibit 1. Balance sheets (in thousand Czech korunas).
1993 1994
Assets
Fixed Assets 354,751 381,168
Intangible assets 0 69
Tangible assets 354,015 380,162
Financial assets 736 937
Current assets 270,063 240,659
Inventory 110,237 101,818
Long-term receivables 24,361 52,146
Short-term receivables 131,452 72,454
Marketable securities 0 0
Cash and cash equivalents 3,022 13,168
Prepayments and accrued income 991 1,073
Liabilities
Capital and reserves 436,045 436,481
Common stock 363,214 363,214
Surplus funds 70,823 73,173
Cumulative profits 2,008 94
Payables 188,769 185,346
Provisions 25 10,615
Bank credits 48,044 63,834
Other liabilities 133,867 108,291
Accruals and deferred income 6,833 2,606
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Solo Exhibit 2. Income statements (in thousand Czech korunas).
1993 1994
Sales 433,076 398,034
Other operating income 80,666 17,049
Material charges 357,591 278,436
Wages and salary expense 75,804 74,144
Depreciation of fixed assets 30,434 27,629
Other expenses 44,847 27,365
Operating profit/loss 5,066 7,509
Financial income 302 1,770
Other financial expenses 2,498 2,427
Interest payable 6,446 7,619
Financial profit/loss (8,642) (8,726)
Profit/loss on ordinary activities (3,756) (767)
Extraordinary income 5,357 (39)
Extraordinary expenses 9,716 367
Extraordinary profit/loss (4,359) (406)
Total profit/loss before tax (7,935) (1,173)
Income tax 0 0
Profit/loss (7,935) (1,173)
Other use of profit 0 0
Net profit/loss (7,935) (1,173)
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BHG Hirada´stechnikai Va´llalat, Hungary
Eva Kiss was appointed Marketing Manager of BHG in the summer of 1995.
She is a graduate of the University of Economics in Budapest, and had been
working for BHG as a Product Manager for five years. The company has
been struggling over the past five years to stay in business. After several
restructurings, 1994 finally proved to be a successful year: the company had
revenues of Ft5.2 billion, which led to a Ft45 million profit. BHG executives
believed that the solution to keeping the company on a profitable path was
to strengthen the marketing and sales activities. In 1995 Kiss was among the
officers who believed that marketing could solve the company’s problems, so
she was anxious to put her ideas into action.
Until 1990 BHG was one of the biggest telecommunications equipment
producers, employing 7,700 persons in its main plant in Budapest and sev-
eral smaller plants in the countryside. All the telephone exchanges in the
Hungarian telecommunications network were produced by BHG, and it had
80% of the market share of smaller telephone switches (PABX). The com-
pany also produced auxiliary telecommunications equipment and tools and
parts for the maintenance of its products.
During the centrally planned economic regime, BHG was a major vendor
of the Hungarian Telecommunications Company (MATA´V). MATA´V was
the state-owned telephone monopoly that provided telephone service for the
whole country and also developed and owned the network. BHG’s capacity
was able to serve more than the Hungarian market, so the company exported
about two-thirds of its products. Its major customers were the Soviet Union,
the countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and
some developing countries friendly with the Soviet Union (Algeria, Syria,
and Iraq). Of these trading partners the Soviet Union was the biggest: 2.5
million Soviet telephone lines were connected to BHG switches annually,
compared with 180,000 lines in Hungary.
By the late 1980s it was clear that the Hungarian government intended
to change the central-planning economy to a market system. It was expected
that other CMEA countries would soon change as well. In 1989 the Hun-
garian market began opening to outside competition: import restrictions
were lifted, and new companies mushroomed. The government started to
channel the exports of Hungarian companies toward the Western markets
by imposing a 26% tax on exports going to the socialist countries. These
two steps and the economic collapse of the former Soviet bloc markets had
several major effects on BHG.
BHG’s management had anticipated these changes and started to take
steps to compete in the new situation. Some of the company’s exports to
the socialist countries were still profitable despite export taxes. However,
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the company started to look to the West and decided to invest in new dig-
ital technology developed by Northern Telecom of Canada. BHG signed a
licensing agreement with Northern Telecom for the production of digital ex-
changes. The investment in new production and technology left BHG with
a Ft900 million debt. However, management was encouraged by MATA´V’s
development plans, which included the development of a digital backbone
network connected through state-of-the-art digital switches. A contract for
these switches would have more than paid off the investment.
The 1990–1991 period turned out to be the start of a new era for the
company. During this period CMEA markets collapsed, leaving BHG with
40% excess capacity. The worst situation developed on the Soviet market:
the company already had contracts signed for exchanges, production had
started, but the Soviet partners declared that they were unable to pay, so
the products stayed in BHG’s warehouses.
BHG tried to sell these products in other markets. However, it faced
difficulties, as all the other former socialist countries started focusing on
imports from the West, discriminating against products from their former
economic allies and favoring Western-made products. This resulted in a
further general decrease of possible exports to former CMEA countries.
BHG’s expectations regarding the Hungarian market failed to material-
ize, as Western products were increasingly preferred over Hungarian-made
products. The new companies entering Hungary, most of which were dealers
for Western equipment, aggressively marketed their products. BHG was not
used to competing on these terms; therefore, it started to lose its market
share. Moreover, when MATA´V put out the tender for the new digital ex-
changes of the national grid in 1991, BHG lost against Siemens and Ericsson.
With this loss, the company’s market share of exchanges shrank overnight
from 100 to 20%.
The company took another hit from the financial field. BHG took out
a loan to finance the investment in the Northern Telecom digital technology
in the late 1980s at a 6% annual interest rate. After 1990 this interest rate
increased to 30%, placing a tremendous strain on the company. Under these
circumstances management had to face two questions: Will BHG be able to
stay in existence? What steps could be taken to save the company?
With its 7,700 employees, BHG was one of the biggest employers in
Hungary. Management hoped it might be able to find some sympathetic
politicians and receive some help from the state, which was the owner of
the company. The pleas were answered; BHG was included in the group of
companies that were considered important and allowed to participate in the
crisis management program of the government providing assistance during
restructuring.
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The company’s debt was eliminated in two steps. BHG sold its sub-
sidiaries (three plants in the countryside). These sales totaled Ft450 million,
which was used to pay off half of BHG’s debt. The other half was covered
by a Ft450 million capital increase, which was provided by the state owner.
In the course of the crisis management program the company applied
for technical assistance grants from the World Bank and PHARE. (PHARE
is the European Union’s aid fund for former socialist countries. The fund
can be used for reconstruction and investments in new technology.) As part
of these grants consultants visited BHG and prepared an asset evaluation
and a restructuring plan. The consultants’ report and the restructuring plan
were accepted by the state owner in 1994.
The restructuring plan called for the closing of all plants in the country-
side, limiting the company to its main plant in Budapest. BHG converted
its rural plants into subsidiaries and sold most of them. The remaining few
plants were maintained at a minimum level until buyers could be found for
them.
The Budapest operation was also restructured. Before the changes BHG
was a product-based company. The new structure focused on four new divi-
sions: main exchanges, PABXes, parts and tools, and maintenance. The re-
structuring plan required that each division remains largely independent, so
that each could be privatized separately if necessary. Management expected
that this new structure would improve the company’s flexibility. However,
this structure also required that each division have its own administrative
staff, leaving the company with relatively high administrative costs.
The elimination of the rural operations and the restructuring of the
Budapest operations decreased the work force from 7,700 to 1,200. Laying
off employees was a difficult action to take, but management had no choice.
Management retrained a number of workers, but the remaining employees
were laid off and received six-month severance pay, on average.
BHG also sought new areas to enter into. The company developed new
products to bridge the gap between telecommunications technology that was
in operation and the new digital technology that was to be installed grad-
ually. These products had good market potential not only in Hungary, but
also in the neighboring countries. The company also started developing its
connection to Western markets more aggressively than before. BHG digital
products had initial success in Germany. This was an encouraging sign, and
it was thought that with further marketing efforts sales could be increased
in that country. BHG also formed a joint venture with Antenna Hungaria,
the Hungarian Broadcasting Company, for transmission-related production
and services.
As a result of these efforts the company realized a small profit in 1994.
However, management knew that the company was still a long way from
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being a market-oriented company. The strengthening of the marketing area
was a top priority. The sales staff needed to be trained to be more aggres-
sive, and new markets and products had to be developed both in Hungary
and abroad. Management was especially worried about the local market.
Management decided to start negotiations with the state owner to try to
obtain a government decision that would oblige MATA´V to buy 5% of its
annual purchases from BHG. Management believed that this would be a
solid basis to help the company stay profitable.
When Kiss took on the position of Marketing Manager, she knew that
she had to show positive results immediately in order to strengthen the
company’s market position. This strategy was important not only for the
survival of the company, but also to support management’s long-term plans.
Management and the state owners were planning to privatize the company
through a sale to a strategic investor within three years. The company
needed to build up its income statement and balance sheet to attract serious
potential investors.
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Budapest Stock Exchange, Hungary
Krisztina Reichart, Head of External and Public Relations at the Budapest
Stock Exchange (BSE), sat in her office and gazed out the window at the
shops on Budapest’s famous Vaci Street, where capitalism had comfortably
settled in. As she watched the people below carrying their purchases of com-
pact discs, tennis racquets, and McDonald’s hamburgers, she wondered how
to draw more investors to the BSE. After five years it seemed that capitalism
was establishing itself in Hungary among both domestic and international
investors. But while the BSE had taken a number of significant steps toward
integrating into the world economy, it was still not a major area of finance
in Hungary.
An emerging market is commonly defined as a securities market belong-
ing to a developing country. (A developing country, as defined by the World
Bank, is one whose per capita gross national product in 1990 was less than
$7,620.) Generally, certain characteristics can be found in emerging markets.
Often liquidity is poor, and there are gaping discrepancies between the de-
mand for and supply of a particular stock. Trading in these markets is often
heavily concentrated in a few stocks, research into companies is generally
inadequate, and supervision is lax. Consequently, emerging markets tend to
be volatile, often with drastic price fluctuations.
Equity markets are evolving in developing countries as well as in more
developed countries whose economies are in transition from central plan-
ning to a market orientation. As the governments of these countries insti-
tute macroeconomic and institutional reforms, international investors are
slowly gaining confidence and directing capital flows toward the new mar-
kets. These equity markets, most of which evolved in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, have emerged as part of the development process of many coun-
tries and have only just begun to be accepted in the global financial mar-
ketplace. Markets provide alternative sources of capital for entrepreneurs
and for government-owned companies attempting to privatize. The great-
est demand for capital has been generated by fast-growing, export-oriented
companies operating with low-cost resources and technology transfers.
Equity markets in emerging countries generally go through four stages of
development and tend to develop only after a country has achieved a certain
degree of economic and political stability and after its government has begun
to implement growth-oriented policies. Periods of global economic expan-
sion tend to accelerate the development of equity markets by shortening the
duration of each phase.
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In the first stage, equity prices tend to rise. As they do, the market gains
the confidence of domestic investors and becomes widely accepted as an in-
vestment alternative to traditional bank deposits and short-term government
bonds.
In the second phase, because the equity market has attained some degree
of credibility, foreign pressure for increased accessibility and local pressure for
cheap capital funding leads to a loosening of regulations. As market liquidity
increases, risk-adjusted returns rise, and international investors begin to
realize the diversification benefits of investing in such markets.
In the third, or expansion phase, the market offers the prospect of higher
and less volatile returns than before. The volume of issues increases rapidly
as firms strive to reduce debt, and private or newly privatized companies
make their initial public offerings; investors easily absorb these new issues
of stocks and bonds. Trading activity increases, producing effective inter-
mediation, while the growing need for risk-transfer mechanisms spurs the
development of equity-and-currency-hedging instruments such as derivatives
and index products
In the final, or mature phase, equity-risk premiums fall to internationally
competitive levels and the equity markets begin to achieve stable growth.
In the summer of 1995, Hungary’s economy was experiencing moder-
ate growth (2% in 1994). This level of growth was expected to continue
throughout 1995 (1% forecast) and 1996 (2%). Much of the macroeconomic
stabilization was contingent on the success of the Hungarian parliament’s
austerity program, which was passed in March, 1995. The goals of the pro-
gram were to reduce Hungary’s budget deficit and to end the country’s per-
sistent balance of current account deficit. Some aspects of the plan included
devaluation of the forint, liberalization of currency-conversion regulation for
corporations, and an 8% import surcharge. In 1995, the impacts of the plan
were not yet clear. Although inflationary expectations had begun to decrease
by midsummer, the trade deficit endured, possibly due to the dependency
of Hungarian exports on raw-material imports.
By 1995 Hungary’s current account deficit was chronic and high, and
was perhaps the largest macroeconomic problem the nation faced. During
1994 Hungary’s current account deficit totaled $3.9 billion. The net external
position of all sectors of the economy worsened, particularly the banking
sector. Despite continued devaluations, imports did not slow, although in
1995 exports showed considerable growth.
By 1995 Hungary had a relatively large amount of foreign investment
– about $7.8 billion, compared with Hungary’s GDP of about $40 billion.
In contrast to other East European countries, the Hungarian government
had positioned the country well prior to the 1990s by opening up many
markets to foreign investors and private enterprises. Companies were allowed
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to establish joint ventures and subsidiaries in Hungary in the 1980s, and
many controls and guarantees were in place to assure companies that their
investments would not be expropriated.
The structure of this foreign investment developed largely independent
of the BSE. Most foreign investment was direct – i.e., it was by strategic
investors, not via the BSE with multiple shareholders. Of the almost $8
billion invested in Hungary by foreigners, only about $1.5 billion was in the
BSE, i.e., less than 20%.
This structure had both positive and negative effects on the country’s
development. Strategic investors generally exert considerable influence over
their investment interests, compared with ordinary shareholders, who give
management independence. Since the majority of the foreign investment
in Hungary was via strategic investors, the parent companies tended to in-
fluence much of the management of the companies, and tended to favor
productivity and trade promotion investments.
Hungarian companies benefited from this type of arrangement in that
their managers were directly exposed to Western business practices and stan-
dards and were able to establish contacts in Western countries. Furthermore,
strategic investors tended to look out for the company’s long-termwell-being.
This meant that they generally assured that the company had sufficient re-
sources, good management, and reasonable technology.
The principal drawback for Hungarian firms in a joint venture was that
ultimately the primary interest of the parent company was for the affiliate
or subsidiary to prosper within the overall prosperity of the parent. Since
the affiliate was motivated to satisfy the investors of the parent company,
the latter could be inclined to transfer profits from the subsidiary in the
developing country to the parent, in the form of transfer pricing. The chal-
lenge in 1995 was to find the equilibrium point, at which there were enough
investment opportunities in the country such that the foreign parent was
motivated to make long-term investments in Hungary.
Another important macroeconomic issue was the privatization of util-
ities and other formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The public sale
of companies in Hungary was less than smooth during the early 1990s. In-
vestors’ attention was drawn toward the privatization of a few large com-
panies, as compared with a potentially wider and more diverse offering of
investment opportunities available in other developing markets. Further-
more the Hungarian government put considerable emphasis on stabilization
of the economy between 1990 and 1995, particularly in 1995, which drew at-
tention away from privatization. Therefore, privatization lagged behind. In
1994, the only, albeit quite significant, privatization occurred in the Richter
Gedeon Company, a large pharmaceutical firm. In 1995 privatization was
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brought to the forefront again as part of the macroeconomic stabilization
package.
The BSE was founded in 1867, but was closed when the Communists
took over in 1948. In 1987, 41 banks and financial institutions signed an
agreement on trading securities; this agreement was the initial legal step
toward reestablishing the BSE. The BSE officially reopened on June 21,
1990, as a self-governing, autonomous, nonprofit organization, owned by 44
broker and dealer firms (“members”) and supervised by the State Securities
and Exchange Supervision Board or Commission.
The members of the stock exchange were licensed broker or broker-dealer
companies. Banks and financial institutions were not permitted to trade in
securities so they conducted business on the market through subsidiaries.
Broker and dealer firms fell into two categories. One comprised companies
with share capitalization of Ft5 million or more. These firms could carry out
clients’ orders, but were not allowed to trade their own accounts. The second
category encompassed firms with Ft50 million or more that were permitted
to make transactions for their own accounts.
Three different groups supervised operations of the exchange:
• The General Meeting of Members was the supreme governing body and
dealt exclusively with major issues.
• The Council managed the exchange.
• The Secretariat carried out decisions made by the General Meeting and
the Council.
Three committees were also established: the Trading, Listing, and Set-
tlement Committee acted as an advisory committee to Stock Exchange
Council; the Ethics Committee; and the Arbitration Court settled disputes.
Trading on the exchange was computerized, occurred on the floor, and
was supervised by the Speaker. Its free-auction market system meant that
prices could change with every trade. The BSE securities were divided into
two markets: listed and traded securities. Those that met the more strin-
gent requirements were traded as “listed” securities, while those which met
the basic requirements were designated as “traded.” The rules for trading
and settlement were the same for both categories, but the requirements dif-
fered for minimum capital, public ownership, and investor and information
requirements.
Transactions by foreign investors were limited to registered Hungarian
securities. Joint approval by the Securities Supervision Board and the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary was required for foreign securities to be listed on
the BSE. Foreigners could own 100% of the issued shares of a company
but required joint regulatory approval for ownership of over 50%. Foreign
participants in a Hungarian company enjoyed tax concessions. Listing a
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Hungarian security on a foreign stock exchange was allowed only if it was
already listed on the BSE.
Since reopening in 1990, the BSE has focused on developing the ex-
change. The first two years were spent developing basic systems, regula-
tions, and procedures to ensure that the BSE could provide the services and
functions expected from a stock exchange. This was a formidable challenge
because foreign investors were accustomed to certain services in the devel-
oped markets and demanded similar amenities in Hungary. Meanwhile, the
BSE had to work to accommodate the needs of less financially sophisticated
domestic investors.
To satisfy these varying needs and to bring the BSE in line with the
global equity markets, the management at BSE identified three major areas
on which to focus:
• Computerized trading system.
• Settlement and depository system.
• Derivatives market.
When the exchange reopened in 1990, the trading floor operated entirely
in an open-outcry system. However, this system severely limited the number
of foreign investors that could invest in the exchange since brokers had to
be present to participate. Therefore, the BSE has slowly been shifting to an
entirely computerized trading method. Two milestones in this effort were
the implementation of the Central Market Support System (CMSS) in 1993,
and the Fully Automated Execution System (FAES) in 1994. By 1995, most
active securities were traded on the FAES. The trading floor, which was open
daily from 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., operated on the open-outcry system from
10:30 to 11:40, at which time it shifted to fully automated trading. The
BSE would like a gradual transition from open-outcry system to automated
trading; it plans to be completely automated by 1997.
This trading infrastructure not only provided a flexible trading environ-
ment where the BSE could accommodate the needs of the market partici-
pants relatively easily, but also served as a system where no technical break-
down could prevent continuous trading. The computer system was also used
as the basis of disseminating real-time market information through Reuters
monitors all over the world.
One of the most important areas of change for attracting new investors
to the exchange was the implementation of an effective settlement and de-
pository system. As of 1995, the exchange still operated with a T(rade)+5
(days) rolling settlement system. Securities were printed out and only some
of them were kept in the central depository. Until 1993, clearing and settle-
ment systems were operated by the BSE, at which time they were transferred
to the newly created Central Clearinghouse and Depository (KELER).
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KELER served as a central depository and a clearinghouse for cash-
and exchange-traded derivatives, and administered cash accounts for the
intermediaries. Risks related to the complexity of KELER were expected to
be balanced for reducing settlement risks, costs, and time and achieving true
delivery versus payment. As of 1995 the BSE had not made improvements
in reducing settlement times, but it expects to reduce the settlement time
to T+4 or T+3 days in the near future.
Another major development was the organization and establishment of
derivatives markets, which occurred in early 1995. Hedging instruments to
protect against fluctuations in the equity market, interest rates, and cur-
rency exchanges were considered an important risk-management tool among
foreign investors. The value of these tools rapidly became clear to domestic
investors as well, given the huge, unhedged interest rate and currency risks
to which domestic institutions and investors were exposed. The derivatives
markets initiated in 1995 included standardized futures trading for several
contracts:
• Share index (BUX) of the Budapest Stock Exchange to manage market
risk on the equity market.
• Yield of three-month discount T-bill contract to mitigate interest rate
risk on money market funds.
• Deutsche mark and US dollar contracts to eliminate foreign exchange
risk.
The BSE made other significant improvements to the exchange in the
first five years of its existence.
• An equity index was unofficially calculated starting in 1991, and became
official in 1995. This stock index is calculated on a daily basis, and
represents the weighted average of the 17 most active shares on the
exchange; the content of this basket is reviewed semi-annually by the
BSE Council. The objective of the index is to reflect the current state
of the market. The BUX depicts changes in the value of the securities
package compared with the base date (January 1991=1,000). The BSE
plans to institute an index that is calculated on a continuous basis to
satisfy increased demands from investors for information.
• To address issues of disclosure by brokerage firms the BSE set up a new
department – the Membership and Control Department – in January
1995. The objective of this department is to follow the activities of bro-
kerage firms operating on the BSE. In the past brokerage firms were
required to report all of their activities to the BSE, but this function
was not regulated carefully. With the establishment of the new depart-
ment, brokerage firms are required to show figures on all trades, and are
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also required to keep their accounts separate from client accounts. This
new department is also allowed to go to brokerage houses to research
transactions.
• An information center was established in 1994. The center allows visitors
and investors access to all annual reports.
• In 1995 the BSE began requiring that all brokerage houses provide
weekly reports on all over-the-counter transactions. The BSE tracks
these data and publishes a weekly official securities and exchange publi-
cation, which is edited by both the BSE and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the regulatory agency of public equity markets.
• In late 1994 real-time data dissemination (teletex) and a Reuters connec-
tion became available on the trading floor, allowing domestic investors
to view real-time trading on Hungarian television.
By the summer of 1995, the exchange had 54 members. Thirty-six com-
panies were listed on the exchange, with total market capitalization at about
Ft950 billion (about $7.8 billion). Over-the-counter transactions accounted
for between 50 and 60% of all securities traded on the exchange.
In 1995 the BSE was considered one of the most sophisticated ex-
change trading systems in Eastern Europe. At that time it was the only
exchange in the region that had continuous trading sessions every day since
its foundation.
Despite these major achievements, the BSE has continued to slip behind
its counterparts in Prague and Warsaw in attracting investors. Several key
areas of development were targeted for improvement, and will be critical to
improving the BSE’s efficiency in terms of liquidity, transparency, and cost.
• Systems, regulations, and procedures in the clearing at settlement of se-
curities must be improved; KELER should be enhanced to make it an in-
ternationally recognized and central depository for Hungarian securities.
• The next step in building up a full-fledged derivatives market is to im-
plement trading and settlement systems for option trading. Continuous
product development on the basis of the existing futures market will
help the BSE to accommodate the needs of market participants.
• The third development area involves the trading system, where the phys-
ical decentralization of computerized trading is on the agenda. Decisions
on issues such as the form of decentralization, the combination of floor
trading, and decentralized computer trading will be taken at a later
stage. This will remove the physical constraints on the current trading
environment.
• Finally, and most critical, are marketing issues. The BSE must promote
its services to the international financial community so that investors de-
cide to trade on the BSE rather than on nearby markets such as those in
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Frankfurt or London. Furthermore, as domestic investors become more
aﬄuent, they must be educated on ways to invest in capital markets and
the benefits of doing so. Most importantly, more Hungarian companies
must be persuaded to list themselves on the BSE. The advantages of a
BSE listing include an enlarged investor base, lower capital costs, mem-
bership in an “exclusive” club, and the free publicity that accrues to
companies whose equities are traded.
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Chinoin Rt., Hungary
Chinoin, the first Hungarian pharmaceutical company to be privatized and
the only one in which a foreign corporation has majority ownership, has suc-
cessfully integrated itself into a market economy. Having Sanofi of France as
strategic investor was key to Chinoin’s integration, because the joint venture
gave Chinoin, among many things, much needed support in both research
and development and marketing, the two most expensive and most impor-
tant investments for a pharmaceutical company. Sanofi’s investment brought
about a restructuring of the company’s system to reflect modern practices.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that despite all the efforts to “West-
ernize” its internal system, Chinoin maintains its Hungarian identity.
The Hungarian pharmaceutical industry traces its roots back to 1867,
when it was one of the first countries to start mass production of pharmaceu-
tical goods. After World War II, all pharmaceutical companies in Hungary
were nationalized, giving the state the authority to dictate all aspects of
business. Although sales were limited to the CMEA market, the industry
continued to excel, because Hungary’s emphasis on scientific education pro-
duced many good chemists. In the CMEA market, the Soviet bloc trading
group, Hungary, and Poland were the major pharmaceutical suppliers to the
former Soviet Union and the bloc countries. In fact, the majority of the
Hungarian pharmaceutical companies’ sales were to the Soviet Union. How-
ever, as drastic political and economic changes took place in Eastern Europe
in the early 1990s, many Hungarian pharmaceutical companies realized that
they were no longer protected, and had to quickly learn a new concept –
market competition – in order to survive.
Hungary’s pharmaceutical market today exceeds Ft63 billion ($500 mil-
lion). The six largest Hungarian pharmaceutical companies are EGIS,
Richter Gedeon, Alkaloida, Biogal, Chinoin, and Human, and their sales,
in volume, are responsible for over 90% of the country’s pharmaceutical pro-
duction. Chinoin is the second biggest in terms of revenue after Richter
Gedeon, yet it is the most profitable among the Hungarian pharmaceutical
companies. All of these companies hold license agreements with interna-
tional companies such as Syntex, Sandoz, Bayer, and Eli Lilly to produce
various products, and all are on their way to being privatized.
Chinoin was founded by Emil Wolf in 1910. In the 1950s, Chinoin was
the first company to produce penicillin in Central Europe. In 1995, Chinoin
produced over 148 products in human pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals.
Animal treatment activity, which used to be part of Chinoin’s activities,
was spun off as a separate joint venture with Sanofi in 1994. Some of Chi-
noin’s human pharmaceutical products include Selegiline, an effective drug to
treat Parkinson’s disease, and Jumex, which was introduced in 1980 against
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Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases. Products designed for nonhuman use
include pesticides used on fruits and vegetables and insecticides for cock-
roaches, flies, mosquitos, and other public-health pests. Chinoin has been
granted 567 patents, the most of any Hungarian pharmaceutical company.
In 1994, the total sales revenue and net profit for Chinoin were Ft18.1
billion and Ft4.0 billion, respectively. Sales revenue increased 15% from
1993 in nominal terms. Human drugs accounted for 85% of Chinoin’s sales
revenues. Exports dominated Chinoin’s sales, and exports to the CIS were
becoming increasingly important. Chinoin Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 present
regional and product breakdowns of Chinoin’s sales.
Chinoin’s market share in the domestic market fell considerably from
10.9% in 1993 to 8.9% in 1994, mostly due to the growth of pharmaceutical
imports in Hungary. However, Miklo´s Gyo¨rgy, Managing Director at Chi-
noin, explains that “this is not Chinoin’s problem alone; it’s [the] same for
all domestic companies.” Since the early 1990s, when Hungary liberalized
imports, foreign competitors have entered the Hungarian pharmaceutical
markets. Between 1989 and 1990, 800 new pharmaceutical products were
introduced in Hungary, 88% of them by foreign firms (Girocredit Analyst
Report, 1994). Chinoin Exhibit 3 indicates that domestic companies have
been losing their market shares to foreign competition. However, the mar-
ket share indicator is based on the value of products sold, not on volume.
It does not give a complete picture of market penetration, because foreign
products are about four times as expensive as domestic products. Although
imported pharmaceutical goods are more expensive than domestic products,
they are also partially reimbursed by the Social Security program, described
in Chinoin Exhibit 4.
In 1990, Sanofi, a French pharmaceutical company, purchased 42% of
Chinoin after one and a half years of negotiations. The rest of Chinoin re-
mained under state ownership. Sanofi’s acquisition marked the first time
a Hungarian pharmaceutical company gained a strategic foreign partner.
When Chinoin approached Sanofi in 1989, it was looking into expanding its
activities in Eastern Europe. Sanofi wanted to gain access to the former So-
viet Union market through Hungary, since it could not sell directly in Russia
at the time. The Hungarian government was interested in finding a West-
ern company that could provide Chinoin with capital, Western management
knowledge, and access to Western markets. The high costs of research and
development, Chinoin hoped, could be split between the partners.
The two companies saw a perfect strategic fit, but this would not have
been enough to make Sanofi purchase Chinoin. “Psychological fit was very
important for our consideration,” said Sanofi’s Vergnaud. Gyo¨rgy stated
that one reason Chinoin is successful is that it remained a Hungarian
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company. It was important to Sanofi that Chinoin be run by local managers
and employees. Out of 2,842 employees at Chinoin only six are foreigners.
The Chinoin-Sanofi joint venture received a five-year tax holiday and
60% tax holiday for the following five years. In 1994, the ownership structure
was as follows: 51.0%, Sanofi-Winthrop; 32.5%, AV Rt., the state holding
company; 5.4%, employees; 2.1%, Chinoin; 9.0%, free floating. Sanofi has
reportedly been considering increasing its share to 60%.
As the Hungarian market opened up and competition increased, all phar-
maceutical companies, including Chinoin, had to find their places in the mar-
ket. Having a strategic investor was the key to Chinoin’s successful integra-
tion into the market economy. Sanofi brought in the assistance, knowledge,
and expertise to set up a new system and train people in a manner that is
suitable to the new market environment. Chinoin streamlined production
to increase efficiency, implemented marketing and sales activities – a new
concept to former state-owned companies – and took cost-cutting measures.
It also started to rejuvenate its product line with the introduction of Sanofi
products.
Even when Sanofi was not a majority shareholder, it was able to have
a great deal of influence on management decisions at Chinoin, because AV
Rt., the state holding company, “left [them] alone as long as the company
was profitable,” Vergnaud stated.
Some of the steps Chinoin took to increase efficiency included reducing
consumption of energy and water, using rolling sales forecasts, enhancing
process control and inventory management with forecasts based on material
and time-demands analysis, and introducing a computer-aided material flow
and material requirements planning (MRP) system. Such steps paid off, as
Chinoin was the first Central European pharmaceutical company to receive
the ISO-9001 quality certificate in 1994.
Contrary to its old marketing approach – if you produce they will come”
– Chinoin quickly adapted more modern marketing methods. Realizing the
importance of information flow, Chinoin set up a big sales force to visit
physicians and pharmacies to inform them about Chinoin products. Of
course other companies tried to do the same, but one advantage that Chinoin
had over others was that it was the first one to implement an aggressive
marketing effort, since it was the first one to be privatized.
Chinoin has taken a long-term approach to training people in marketing.
Rather than spoon-feeding the marketing concepts that work in France to
the Hungarian trainees, foreign trainers learn about the local environment
to help Chinoin employees respond to the specific needs of Hungarian con-
sumers. “You can’t just send people for a few weeks to train others. It is
important that people build up local knowledge by working and living in
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foreign countries. Many people make the mistake of thinking that the meth-
ods that you use in France or England are transferable, but they are not,”
stated Gyo¨rgy.
By adopting a Western approach to accounting, Chinoin has achieved
tight financial control. It has implemented a financial system to closely
monitor budgets. Investment return analysis ensures proper expenditures.
Under the old system there was no control on how much and for what purpose
money was spent. “In the old supply-short days, people just purchased
whatever was available, not because it was needed, but because whatever
was out there today may not be there tomorrow. You would not believe how
many machines which were purchased then are still sitting in our warehouse
unused,” states Vergnaud. Today every major investment has to be approved
by Sanofi.
Research and development (R&D) is perhaps the most expensive, yet the
most important, investment for pharmaceutical companies. Traditionally,
Hungarian companies only spent about 5-8% of sales on R&D, too low to be
able to compete against large international firms that spent an average of 12–
15%. While Chinoin spends the highest percentage of sales on R&D among
the Hungarian pharmaceutical companies, it needs Sanofi’s expertise and
financial support. Chinoin Exhibit 5 shows R&D expenditure by selected
Hungarian companies in 1993. In 1994, Chinoin spent Ft1.2 billion on R&D.
Chinoin carries out research in conjunction with Sanofi to avoid duplicate
efforts. Three main areas of expertise are pharmaceuticals for the central
nervous system, respiratory diseases and disorders, and osteoporosis. “There
are two ways of discovering a new drug: the random and the scientific. One
cannot depend on random discoveries; it’s too expensive to count on luck,”
Vergnaud stated.
Chinoin has taken steps to “Westernize” its personnel management, fo-
cusing on the well-being of its employees and making them more productive.
When Chinoin was first privatized, it went through a painful process of lay-
ing off employees to slim down the company. In 1991, there were 4,500
employees at Chinoin, compared with 2,842 in 1994. As one way of reducing
the work force, Chinoin established an early retirement program for older
workers.
The company has initiated programs to enhance its employees’ attitudes
toward work. Workers monthly base wages increased by 32% in 1994 (unad-
justed for inflation) and performance-related bonuses totaled Ft466 million
in 1994. In addition, 5.4% of Chinoin’s stock is owned by employees. Chi-
noin introduced this concept in 1991 to give employees a sense of ownership
of the company. Vergnaud indicated, however, that he personally does not
see any difference in people’s attitude toward work.
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As the only foreign manager at Chinoin, Vergnaud feels that it is natural
to face problems resulting from cultural differences: “Things do not go as
fast as I am used to. You must know how people work here and you have to
realize that sometimes you cannot impose on everyone else your way of doing
something.” Certain cultural differences have to be addressed, however,
such as the ways employees deal with problems. “People here tend to hide
problems, hoping or thinking they will go away.” Vergnaud has tried to teach
people that problems do not just go away and that it is better to confront a
problem in the beginning rather than later.
Chinoin’s integration into world economy shows the necessity of upgrad-
ing production and financial systems and of investing in R&D and aggressive
marketing approaches. Perhaps more important, it shows the necessity of
having good managers who can implement these decisions. The managers
at Chinoin, especially Managing Director Miklo´s Gyo¨rgy, help to explain
Chinoin’s success.
Gyo¨rgy, 51 years of age, was born in Hungary and studied in Switzerland.
He joined Sandoz, a Swiss pharmaceutical company, 27 years ago. He worked
in Europe, then Korea for eight years, setting up and operating Sandoz
subsidiaries, and Japan for two years in different positions. He then joined
Sanofi and returned to Hungary five years ago when Chinoin was privatized.
He sees himself as a product of both West and East European cultures.
His expertise has helped in intercultural exchanges, and his role now is that
of liaison between Sanofi and Chinoin. As Gyo¨rgy stated, “If Sanofi people
tell me that I am like a Chinoin guy, I am doing my job well and if Chinoin
people tell me I am too Sanofi, I have done my job very well. It’s very difficult
to have two heads but very important. You have to be sensitive to differences
in cultures. Even within a country, when two French companies are merged
they can have the same problems. I do not consider myself a foreign or a local
manager, I am in between.” Gyo¨rgy further believes that success requires a
match between a manager’s and the company’s philosophies. “Since Sanofi’s
philosophy was to keep Chinoin local and that is my belief, it is easy for me
to work for them.”
As Chinoin Exhibit 6 indicates, most Chinoin managers are Hungarians.
It is important to both Chinoin and Sanofi to keep the management and em-
ployees as local as possible, because no one else understands the Hungarian
market better than Hungarians. Most of the managers have been working
with Chinoin for a long time. In fact, for some, Chinoin has been their only
employer. Gyo¨rgy said he believes that Hungarians in general are bright,
motivated, and loyal to the companies for which they work; they just need
the right environment.
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Chinoin Exhibit 1. Sales breakdown (in million Hungarian forints).
1993 % of total 1994 % of total
Sales type
Domestic 6,106 38.7 6,432 35.4
Export 7,839 49.7 9,713 53.5
Royalty income 1,636 10.4 1,766 9.7
Human pharmaceutical products 13,387 84.9 15,302 84.3
Agrochemical products 2,012 12.8 2,311 12.7
Veterinary products and other 373 2.4 534 2.9
Other 191 1.2 236 1.3
Total net sales 15,772 100.0 18,147 100.0
Source: Chinoin Annual General Meeting, 1994.
Chinoin Exhibit 2. Exports by country in
1993 (in percent).
CIS 32.93
Finland 5.53
Italy 2.11
Japan 4.29
Turkey 4.62
USA 6.79
Austria 3.19
Czech Republic 2.05
Poland 2.29
Other 36.20
Source: Girocredit Investment Bank.
Chinoin Exhibit 3. Market share of Hungarian pharmaceutical producers
at factory prices.
1990 1991 1992 1993
Chinoin 16.1 14.6 13.2 10.4
EGIS 17.7 18.5 15.2 13.1
Biogal 18.0 17.4 14.1 11.2
Alkaloida 18.0 17.4 14.1 11.2
Richter 14.5 13.1 11.0 9.1
Pharmavit 2.1 2.0 2.8 1.8
Foreign producers 26.3 29.3 38.0 46.6
Source: CS First Boston.
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Chinoin Exhibit 4. Drug consumption and the Hungarian social security
system.
Hungarians are the number two consumers of medicines in Europe (Girocre-
dit Analyst Report, 1994). Until 1989 consumption in Hungary had been
heavily subsidized by the state social security system, and medicines were
provided free of charge. More than 400,000 so-called exemption certificates
were given out to pensioners or very poor people to enable them to get free
medicine. About 48% of prescriptions were for pensioners in Hungary in
1994. Since 1989 Hungarians have had to pay 100% of the price for nonessen-
tial drugs and between 5 and 40% of the costs for other selected drugs, but
they still enjoy generous reimbursements from the health insurance system.
Consumers are reimbursed for prescription pharmaceuticals on a per-
centage basis. In 1993 the Hungarian government incurred a reimbursement
bill of Ft51 billion, a threefold increase from Ft17 billion just four years
earlier. Most of the increase is due to more expensive imported products.
Beginning in January 1995 most imported drugs were assessed a value-added
tax of 12%. Prices for pharmaceuticals did not increase with inflation over
the past five years. The low prices were maintained by low, regulated do-
mestic producer costs, which forced the domestic companies to keep R&D,
marketing, and promotional costs low.
There are great efforts to change the drug reimbursement programs to
include lowering subsidy levels for consumers and encouraging doctors to
prescribe cheaper drugs. The government hopes to shift demand toward
Hungarian generics which are cheaper than imports.
Chinoin Exhibit 5. Comparison of main Hungarian pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers in 1993.
Sales Profit Export R&D
revenue gross Market sales cost
(mill.Ft) (mill.Ft) share (mill.$) (%) Employees
Chinoin 15,772 3,169 10.4 108 8.0 3,066
Richter 18,264 2,322 9.1 136 6.8 4,639
EGIS 12,872 1,657 13.1 62 7.2 3,605
Biogal 9,877 860 11.2 33 5.5 2,168
Alkaloida 8,197 95 3.8 46 5.0 2,000
Pharmavit 2,388 533 1.9 2 0.9 104
Rank of Chinoin 2 1 3 2 1 3
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Chinoin Exhibit 6. Management profile.
Miklo´s Gyo¨rgy, Managing Director, 51.
Education: University of Economics, Basel.
Pe´ter Ara´nyi, Director of Research and Development, 47.
Education: University of Chemicals, Budapest.
E´va Csa´kva´ri, Director of Human Resources, 48.
Education: High School.
Peter Hajnal, Commercial Director, 48.
Istva´n Jelinek, Production & Development Director, 52.
Gyo¨rgy Miha´ly, Administrative Director, age unavailable.
Istva´n Sze´kely, Director of Production of Plant Protection, age unavailable.
Gyula Szu¨k, Technical Director, 63.
Zolta´n Vargay, Director of Quality Assurance, 54.
Philippe Vergnaud, Financial Director, 49.
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Duna Elektronika, Hungary
Peter Freed, a Hungarian-American entrepreneur, came to Hungary in 1990,
bringing a new business concept with him. As a franchisee of three major
computer retailers in the United States, he was as well-suited to do the
same business in Hungary as anyone was, if not better. Market opportunity
was new and big, he had much industry knowledge, and he was fluent in
Hungarian. However, Freed found international business much more difficult
than he anticipated. It brought him a whole new basket of challenges –
devaluations, local taste, import duties, to name a few, which he later learned
at the expense of his business. By 1995 Duna Elektronika was in a recovering
phase after a financial restructuring.
Duna Elektronika was founded in 1991 as an importer of personal com-
puters from the United States. The company was set up to franchise the
computers in Hungary and, then, in Central Europe. “Franchise was not a
known concept here when I was thinking about coming to Hungary, except
for maybe McDonald’s or the big hotel chains.” Freed was a franchisee for
ComputerLand, Entre, and Microage in the United States, and therefore had
considerable knowledge of the franchise business and the computer market.
His hope was to bring his experience and skills to Hungary where there was
a significant need for infrastructure building.
The HAEF was established during the Bush administration as an invest-
ment fund to help build enterprises in Hungary. Duna Elektronika was the
first HAEF project, “but it took a long time to put it together.” HAEF’s
initial commitment was to provide 50% of the cash needed to finance the
set up. Freed brought the other 50% from personal sources and outside in-
vestors. Duna Elektronika’s initial capitalization was Ft185 million in 1991,
equivalent to approximately $2.7 million. Of the Ft185 million only Ft60
million (equivalent to $1 million) was cash which, in retrospect, Freed did
not think was enough to start a very capital-intensive business.
In 1991 Duna Elektronika was founded with the following ownership
structure: 15%, Hungarian American Enterprise Fund (HAEF); 51%, Dona-
sphere Limited in USA (Freed’s company set up in USA); 7.5%, Microage;
6.5%, Kia Intertrade (a South Korean conglomerate); 7%, Szki (Hungarian);
13%, Szu (Hungarian).
Since its beginning Duna Elektronika sales revenues have grown rapidly:
1991, Ft150 million; 1992, Ft500 million; 1993, Ft700 million; 1994, Ft900
million; 1995, Ft500 million.
When Duna Elektronika started its business the initial focus was on
the retail market. Its main business was to import brand-name personal
computers, such as IBM, Compaq, and Digital, and to distribute them in
the wholesale market. It had 55 employees, 3 offices in Hungary and 1 in
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Warsaw, and a distribution center in Hungary at the time of the restructure.
Duna Elektronika had a network of 22 stores through which computers were
distributed. As part of its sales effort Duna Elektronika trained over 200
sales people in 4 months. Soon into its operation Freed realized that he had
made a wrong assumption about the Hungarian personal computer market.
His past experience in the computer business taught him that American
consumers linked brand names to quality and were willing to pay a premium
for quality products. Therefore, brand name was important in the computer
business. He thought that Hungarian consumers would be as brand loyal as
American consumers. “This is where I missed the boat,” Freed stated. He
did not realize that in Hungary people were looking at the clones because
they were cheap, even though they are of lower quality.
The problem was two-tiered. On the one hand, consumers did not know
better and tended to buy whichever product was cheaper. On the other
hand, and more importantly, the sales people whom Freed spent time and
effort to train, did not push the products. As a result, inventory piled up.
Noticing that the the sluggish sales were due to a lack of effort by the sales
people, Freed started a direct-sale division. He even hired an American
expatriate to train sales people. Suddenly, the business became successful.
As Freed put it, “It has to do with how for the last 40 years people were not
taught to sell, sell, and sell, and unfortunately you cannot change the world
overnight.”
Although Freed found direct-sales profitable, he eventually decided to
shift away from retail business in general and go into corporate accounts for
two main reasons. In retail business all inventory must be purchased first
and resold, requiring very difficult inventory management. Also, business
becomes very vulnerable to currency devaluations when buying with one
currency (dollars) and selling in another (forints). Duna Elektronika faced
a huge problem regarding forint devaluation, and this is one reason why the
company faced bankruptcy in March 1995. The other problem with the retail
business, Freed found, was that his company could not offer some products
that were popular to its customers, because someone else had an exclusive
license agreement with the manufacturers. Freed learned as he went along,
and after restructuring, discontinued all distribution activities and wholesale
business, and focused more on the large corporate accounts.
In 1995 Duna Elektronika began providing corporations with computer
installation services. Its main customers include big American corporations
that have offices in Hungary, Poland, Russia, and other East European coun-
tries. Among them are Philip Morris, Readers Digest, and Young & Rubi-
cam. Other customers include the Hungarian and Slovakian parliaments. In
1994 its sales were about Ft900 million, and in 1995 sales were about Ft500
million. (In March 1995, Duna Elektronika went out of business and it had
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to be restructured. The decrease in sales represents discontinuation of some
of its activities.) Corporate account business was the only remaining activity
at Duna Elektronika as of March 1995, with 17 employees.
In March 1995, Duna Elektronika was cash strapped, even though it
achieved its highest sales in 1994. It had $2 million in bank debt, of which
half was from Inter Europa Bank, backed by HAEF. The loan expired, and
it needed to be extended. HAEF, the guarantor of the loan, decided not to
extend its guarantee. Freed and HAEF tried to turn the short-term debt
into long-term equity-type convertible bonds transaction, but by the time
it was negotiated another round of devaluation hit. At this point, HAEF
decided to pull out its investment from Duna, forcing Duna into liquidation.
The liquidation process called for automatic application of 50% of Duna’s re-
ceipts against the debt and sale of Duna Elektronika’s assets. With $200,000
from personal sources, Freed set up another limited company by buying the
operating assets of Duna Elektronika and the rights to the Duna Elektron-
ika name and logo. He also took leases and financial responsibilities such as
warranty and services, so the customers were not affected by the liquidation.
The new limited liability company operated out of a portion of the previous
office space, servicing corporate accounts.
“Hungary became a tough market,” Freed stated. International business
brings a bowl of new challenges, some of which can be managed yet most are
unpredictable. Many problems were ignited externally, and it is important
for a company to be flexible enough to adjust quickly. Among the problems
were a 23% devaluation of the forint in less than a year and an 8% import
duty imposed in the government’s austerity package in March 1995.
1. Forint Devaluation. The average forint-to-dollar exchange rate was 60
to 1 in 1991. By June 1995 it was at 125. Given that most of the forint
devaluations were not too severe until 1994, Duna Elektronika ignored
them until it woke up with approximately $400,000 foreign exchange
losses. As an importer Duna buys inventory from the United States and
sells domestically. This means that Duna receives forints from its sales
and it pays in dollars. In addition, customers were late in paying their
bills, and the uncollected receivables piled up.
If this weren’t enough, forint devaluations hurt Duna Elektronika in
yet another way – in its foreign currency loan. Duna had $2 million in
foreign currency debt by March 1995. “When the company was small
and operated out of its own money, it was manageable, but once it had
foreign currency debt, it started having problems.”
2. The March Austerity Package. On 15 March 1995, in an effort to control
high inflation and to discourage imports, the Hungarian finance minister,
Lajos Bokros, imposed an austerity package, and imposed an 8% duty
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on all imported goods. This action hurt many importers who were faced
with an overnight cost hike. Importers could raise prices on their goods,
but at the risk of turning away customers. This hurt Duna Elektronika
even further which was already struggling with forint devaluations.
3. Foreign Suppliers. Duna Elektronika also faced a problem with its sup-
pliers. Freed had to deal not only with logistical problems but also with
the competition from his own suppliers. Duna Elektronika had direct
contracts with four or five manufacturers in the United States includ-
ing IBM, Compaq, and Digital. A problem arose when Freed needed a
product which the manufacturer has already given an exclusive license
to another company; therefore, he could not sell that product. When
asked whether this type of issues could have been researched, Freed said,
“Yes, but I just didn’t, because I got caught up in putting the company
together and thought I’d work out the details later.”
Supplier problems did not end here for Freed, or actually for the
whole PC industry in Hungary. When Freed first started business in the
PC market, competition was low. Some manufacturers, such as IBM,
had presence in Hungary but their concentration was in bigger main-
frame computers, not in the PC market. In 1991 IBM sold only about
700 PCs, where Duna sold 1,500 at twice the price with a smaller staff
than IBM. Freed even has a trophy to prove that it was the largest
seller of IBM machines. However, Duna Elektronika could not enjoy its
market position for long before IBM started to eat away Duna’s market
share by giving more licenses to other companies and starting up its
own direct-sales team. Unfortunately because IBM does not license ex-
clusively, there was nothing that Freed could do to keep the competitors
away. This hurt Freed. “It was a crazy market. Everyone was running
scared. Price wars were dramatic.”
4. Human Side of Business. Often it is too easy to ignore the cultural side
of doing business, and Freed found that one should never make an as-
sumption without testing it. Freed found it more difficult to train people
in Hungary than in the USA, because of the difference in culture. He
faced high turnover in his trainees who would come to take the training
course and then go somewhere else. Although Duna Elektronika had an
incentive system tied to sales, it was not well received by the employees.
“Hungarians aren’t used to incentive programs. They like structure, and
not taking risk. Incentive system is a risk-taking program. Nevertheless
it is getting better.”
Having learned a painful lesson, Duna Elektronika is taking a different
approach. Duna Elektronika is focusing on selling computers directly to
commercial accounts. However, switching to bigger volume has not relieved
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Duna Elektronika from all problems, but some can now be managed better.
Bigger sales are actually more price sensitive, because business is based on
competitive bidding. It is just as competitive, if not more, as the retail
business. One big difference is that there are not many inventory problems
because Freed deals with the customers on an as-you-go basis. He gets sales
first and then orders the inventory. Regarding the devaluation problems,
Duna Elektronika has watched its customers significantly closer than before
by making them sign a contract stating that, if they don’t pay within a
certain period, they are responsible for possible devaluations. Normal terms
range from 8 normal bank-transaction days to a maximum of 30 days.
Freed plans to remain fairly small and to undertake only profitable
projects. “We grew too big, too fast, too diverse. The lesson learned was
that a company needs to live within the limit of its capital. It outgrew
the limit of its capital and later had to get outside sources. It just was a
disaster.”
Duna Elektronika Exhibit 1. Management profile.
Peter Freed, President, American of Hungarian descent, 45. Freed is a CPA
and has worked for an accounting firm. In 1977 he entered the computer
industry and was appointed CFO in a computer company. In 1979 he started
his own computer distribution company. As President of Duna Elektronika
he is in charge of business development and vendor negotiations. He is
married to Joyce Freed.
Joyce Freed, Vice-President, American. She has worked with Freed since
1981 and is responsible for internal administration. B.S. from Auburn Uni-
versity and an EED from George Mason University. She taught high school
for 10 years, and has worked in the computer industry since 1984.
Bela Huebert, General Manager, Hungarian, 55. Huebert has an engineer-
ing background, and has been with Duna Elektronika since 1991. Prior to
joining Duna, he was Chief Engineer and Head of the Department of the
Computer Research Institute in Budapest for 15 years. He is in charge of
administration, legal and tax matters, finance, and human resources.
Mark Vadi, Sales Manager, English, 31. After high school he studied banking
for three years. Four years ago he moved to Budapest, and worked for Walton
Network, a Novell distributor in client relations. He joined Duna Elektronika
three years ago as Sales Manager. His main responsibilities are creating sales
and managing sales teams. He speaks Hungarian and English.
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Ganz-Ansaldo, Hungary
Ganz Electric Works was founded in 1844 by Abraham Ganz, a Swiss. The
main factory, built in 1897, is located in central Budapest. It was a private
company until the Communist takeover after World War II, at which time
it became a state-owned enterprise. In 1991, Ganz and Ansaldo (of Italy)
formed a joint venture; Ansaldo, at the time, held 51% of the company.
By 1995, Ansaldo controlled 82% of the company. Ansaldo belongs to the
Italian state-owned Finmeccanica conglomerate, which, in turn, is owned by
Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), Italy’s biggest state-holding
company.
For Ganz, the 1991 joint venture was essential. Ganz’s plant, equipment,
and technology were obsolete, and the government owner had no capital to
invest. Ganz was also operating at a loss and the government, burdened as
it was with a sizable budget deficit, was eager to be rid of this loss-making
enterprises.
Ganz-Ansaldo is a major manufacturer of power station equipment used
by electric utilities and transport industries. Among other products, it pro-
duces power generators, transformers, electric motors, and switch gears.
About 30% of sales in 1994 were from generators, about 25% from trans-
formers, with the rest divided between switch gears and electric motors.
Ansaldo is the head of 20 companies of the IRI-Finmeccanica Group.
Ansaldo designs and supplies systems, plants, machines, and electrical and
electronic equipment to the energy, transport, and manufacturing industries.
It is headquartered in Genoa, Italy, with 1994 annual sales of $1.4 billion
and 20,000 employees. Ansaldo – at times in collaboration with Ganz and
at times on its own – has sizable contracts in Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Egypt, Korea, Costa Rica, China, Belgium, Hungary and Italy. No profit
data are available for Ansaldo; however, its parent company, Finmeccanica,
was profitable in 1991 and 1992, the last years for which these data were
available. Ansaldo “was expected to pass ‘positive results’ at the parent
level for the year to 31-12-95 that will be better than 1994’s” (Financial
Times, 1995).
According to a Ganz manager, “There was no company strategy in the
old days” (Personal interview, 1995, Budapest). It was a state-owned com-
pany, and it depended on orders from domestic sources, the Soviet Union,
and other East European company sources.
The joint-venture company decided to move from its central Budapest
location to Tapioszel, some 90 kilometers (55 miles) from the present site.
This case was written from public sources with some cooperation with Ganz-Ansaldo
executives who wish to remain anonymous. It does not have the official approval of the
company.
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(Because of the poor road conditions the distance of 90 kilometers takes much
longer to travel in Hungary than it does in Western Europe or the United
States.) This move would, ostensibly, cut costs as the pre-1995 facilities
were antiquated. A more serious issue in 1995 was to generate orders for
Ganz-Ansaldo. Between 1991 and 1995, output dropped by about 50%, the
number of employees decreased from 2,600 to 1,600, and, in 1995, capacity
utilization stood at about 50%. The large decline in output is attributed to
both the collapse of the ex-Soviet bloc market, including the domestic market
in Hungary, and the lack of commercial orientation and lack of familiarity
with the East European markets by the Italian-Ansaldo management.
Before 1989, Ganz had a monopoly position in Hungary and a favored
position in the ex-Soviet bloc. After 1989, these advantages disappeared as
markets became increasingly more open. Noting the plight of many of its
state-owned companies, in 1994 the Hungarian parliament passed a law re-
quiring state companies to purchase at least 30% of their large investments
from domestic sources – provided that quality requirements were met and
that the price did not exceed more than 15% of the price quoted by a compa-
rable bid. Since December 1994, Ganz-Ansaldo has adhered to ISO-9001, the
West European quality standard. The difficulty is that given the very poor
budgetary situation of the Hungarian government virtually no investments
have been made to improve utilities, railroads, and street cars, which are all
state owned. These conditions are expected to improve and it is hoped that
orders will begin to come in, though it is not certain that Ganz-Ansaldo
will receive these orders. Exports as a percentage of total sales increased
between 1989 and 1995 (from 40% to 67%) not because exports increased
significantly but because the domestic demand collapsed.
Exports were (and are) done indirectly through Ansaldo, and it is unclear
whether the joint venture is benefiting from this arrangement. As Ansaldo
owns 82% of the joint venture – the management is almost completely in Ital-
ian hands – a reasonable assumption is that management will keep Ansaldo’s
interests in mind. Ansaldo did pass some low value-added subcontracting
work to its joint-venture partner. The fact is that Ganz’s higher value-added
product lines were de-emphasized. Moreover, Ansaldo’s management’s lack
of interest in the Hungarian and ex-Soviet bloc markets exacerbated this
joint-venture situation over and above what might have been expected in
these countries due to the poor macroeconomic situations (Csermely, 1996).
Ganz-Ansaldo Exhibit 1 provides highlights of the company in 1989, 1994,
and 1995.
The joint venture has posted losses every year since its formation in
1991. The losses were made up by Ansaldo by acquiring more equity in the
company thus raising Ansaldo’s stake from the original 51% to 82% by mid-
1995. A profit was predicted for 1997 in a strategic plan formulated in 1992,
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Ganz-Ansaldo Exhibit 1. Financial highlights (in billion Hungarian
forints).
1989 1994 1995
Sales/Turnover 3.0 4.7 10.0
Loss 0.6 0.7 minimal profit
(1.6 in 1993) (the first since 1991)
but this is unlikely to occur (Personal interview, 1995, Budapest). Running
a deficit is in Ansaldo’s interest as it is a smooth way to acquire full owner-
ship and eliminate the minority Hungarian partner. Furthermore, Ansaldo
itself is state owned and, therefore, its profit motive is not as strong as it
would be for a private company. Finally, the joint venture’s true profitability
is difficult to establish because of transfer pricing between Ansaldo and the
joint venture. At the parent level Ansaldo was, as indicated earlier, prof-
itable. The joint venture’s total assets were about Ft2 billion. Outstanding
debt was between Ft2 and Ft3 billion. About 50% of the debt was made up
of loans from Hungarian banks and the other 50% was from Italian banks
with Ansaldo’s guarantees.
By mid-1995, all the top executives were from Ansaldo: the General
Manager, the commercial, financial, and production managers. This would
facilitate a transfer-pricing system that would indeed benefit Ansaldo. The
president was Hungarian but the position was a part-time and representa-
tional one. In an interview he said: “While president sounds very nice, this
is not my main job. I kept my own enterprises – trade in Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, and the Baltic States. At Ganz-Ansaldo the management is Ital-
ian, I am ‘the Hungarian’ ” (Heti Vilaggazdasag, 1995).
On the one hand, the joint venture had some positive results:
The joint venture saved jobs . . . . All these [Ganz-Ansaldo] people would be
out of a job if it were not for the joint venture . . . . Some foreign investors
[Siemens] shut down their Hungarian manufacturing operations after they
acquired a domestic company [and Ansaldo did not] . . . . Workers are being
paid higher than average salaries.” In the last four years managers salaries
doubled in real terms. [Personal Interview, 1995]
On the other hand, a 150-year-old Hungarian flagship company was, by
1995, virtually an Italian-owned company.
In forming the joint venture, Ganz expected to increase sales and to re-
turn to profitability. At the time of the joint-venture agreement, Ganz had
no other alternative than to find a joint-venture partner but, obviously, its
expectations were not met. Ganz, or rather the government owner, did not
shop around for the most suitable partner. The joint-venture agreement was
part of a government-to-government deal concluded during the Hungarian
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prime minister’s visit to Italy in 1990. For Ansaldo, Ganz was a strategic
partner, a reputable (and broke) firm in the same industry. While wage
rates were lower in Hungary than in Italy, this was not a major considera-
tion as the company is very capital intensive. Ansaldo received in the joint
venture Ganz’s underutilized plant and equipment, i.e., inexpensive spare ca-
pacity. Ansaldo’s share of the joint venture was capital infusion, though it is
not clear how much investment was committed by Ansaldo over and above
making up losses in exchange for increasing its share of ownership. The
main attraction of Ganz to Ansaldo was the former’s contacts in Hungary,
other East European countries, and the ex-Soviet Union states. While these
economies have, to varying extents, been recovering since 1993–1994, this
joint venture has not benefited from greater volume of orders. Yet it is the
continued low level of orders, together with the corresponding low capacity
utilization, which is at the crux of Ganz-Ansaldo’s financial problems.
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Graboplast Rt., Hungary
In February 1990 a group of foreign financial investors represented by
Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Vienna, purchased 30% of Graboplast Textile and
Artificial Leather Manufacturing Co., a company formerly owned by Hun-
gary. Since then, Graboplast Rt., the newly formed company, has success-
fully integrated itself into the world economy without a joint-venture part-
ner or foreign strategic owner. The transformation took place because of
increased efficiency throughout the company and its strategic response to
changing market demand – something unheard of during the Communist
rule. As easy as it may have appeared, Graboplast would not have suc-
ceeded without a strong management team that supported this painful and
long process. The most crucial factor in its success was the attitude of CEO
Pe´ter Jancso´, who “admit[ted] that he had a problem, and that he did not
know everything about running a company.”
Gyo¨r, 120 kilometers west of Budapest, is the fifth largest city in Hun-
gary, with a population of 131,000 in 1994. Graboplast was founded in Gyo¨r
over 70 years ago. Graboplast is Hungary’s largest manufacturer of home-
improvement and artificial leather products, but it was founded as a textile
company. The company later went into coated textiles used in artificial
leather, which the company still makes, and into polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
floor coverings. It was nationalized after World War II, and for the next 45
years it was a “typical Hungarian company.” As Steve Kopits, consultant
to the company from one of the Big Six American accounting firms, notes:
A typical Hungarian company under Communism tended to be very het-
erogeneous in terms of products and activities. For example, in addition
to artificial leather, Graboplast had an incinerator with the third largest
capacity in Hungary, a service company, a canvas-making company, and a
maintenance company. This is different from the West where companies
are specialized. Companies were given incentives simply to make some-
thing – just make anything. Many of the subsidiaries did not perform well
given the lack of professional management and undercapitalization.
In 1989, the Hungarian State Property Agency (SPA), looking to pri-
vatize Graboplast, contacted a local trade representative in Vienna who
introduced them to Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Vienna, an Austrian invest-
ment banking group. In 1990, Creditanstalt purchased 30% of Graboplast
at 125% of nominal value (the actual purchase price has not been disclosed).
The state still owned the remaining 70%. “It was an act of good faith,”
stated Klaus Requat of Creditanstalt, referring to the purchase price in
excess of nominal value. Creditanstalt resold 25% of its shares to other
financial investors in pieces. “We valued the company with a projection
under COMECON market assumptions, which was a big gamble, and did a
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prospectus and printing over a weekend and took it to London,” said Re-
quat. Creditanstalt was to act as representative for the shareholders. With
the purchase, Graboplast received a 100% tax holiday for five years and a
60% tax holiday for an additional five years. (At the time of purchase the
Hungarian tax rate was 44%, and was reduced to 36% in 1993. The tax rate
was further reduced to 18% in 1995, but a dividend tax of 23% was intro-
duced.) By 1994, the privatization of the company was complete, with all
shares in private ownership. On July 27, 1994, Ft2,282.5 million of Grabo-
plast’s stock began trading on the Budapest Stock Exchange. Graboplast
Exhibit 1 shows the ownership structure in 1994.
In 1994, Graboplast manufactured over ten different products through
two divisions – artificial leather and home improvement. Total sales for
Graboplast in that year totaled over Ft4.8 billion, a 20% increase from
1992. Some of its main products are PVC floor covering, wallpaper, artifi-
cial leather tablecloths, and bookbinding. Since 1990, Graboplast has been
shifting its business away from its traditional product lines such as artificial
leather toward more profitable lines, such as home-improvement products,
because the market demands shifted and foreign competition in the domestic
market increased when Hungary liberalized imports. Graboplast Exhibit 2
shows the product lines and sales breakdown. The divisional sales breakdown
in Graboplast Exhibit 3 shows that the percentage of total sales attributed
to the artificial leather division decreased, while home-improvement product
sales grew.
In domestic markets, Graboplast has been a market leader with a 70%
share of the artificial leather market and a 45% of the floor-coverings and
wallpaper market. Its main domestic competitor in the PVC market is Pan-
non Flax Rt. While over 50% of its total sales consisted of domestic sales,
Graboplast recognized that growth is in the East European market.
One of the problems of typically East European heterogeneous manufac-
turers surfaced in the privatization. Strategic investors are usually interested
in specialized businesses. For example, a Western PVC manufacturer would
only be interested in PVC, and not artificial leather. Yet the Graboplast fac-
tory had its PVCmanufacturing line literally next to its artificial leather line,
so that it was very hard to separate them. Shutting down a line would mean
losing a large portion of business. Furthermore, a company’s assets may be
so mixed together that they are virtually impossible to separate. For these
reasons, Graboplast had difficulty getting a strategic investor. However, for
a financial investor such as Creditanstalt, Graboplast was good candidate
for stock market flotation. In addition, even though the SPA owned 70% of
the company, it was an “absentee owner.” This situation enabled Credit-
anstalt to take a more active role in the company’s management than did
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the majority owners. As Requat stated, “You can be weak on paper but
tough in reality.”
The condition of the company at the time of the purchase was about the
same as most other Hungarian companies. The company had been making
artificial leather for a “supply-short” Hungarian economy and for the ruble-
based CMEA market. Manufacturers sold everything that they produced,
and they rationed what they sold, so not all the customers got what they
wanted. Creditanstalt immediately brought in Czipin, an Austrian produc-
tivity consulting firm, to find ways to make the company more efficient – a
new concept to the former Soviet bloc companies.
One of the keys to Graboplast’s future success would be lowering costs
and improving product quality. The company introduced an inventory man-
agement system and reduced the number of employees from 2,284 to 1,383.
A new cost-accounting system studied various costs such as material usage,
energy usage, and allocation of indirect costs. New and young management
teams have entered the company lowering the average age of the managers to
around 40. Key in East European countries is getting an organization to re-
act. “There is always strategy, and strategy is great; but if your organization
can’t implement your strategy it’s useless. So the first thing is to get cost
down and efficiency straight, and your system to react to changing market,”
said Kopits. The increase in sales revenue per employee per year, which was
Ft2.69 million in 1990 and Ft4 million in 1993, demonstrates Graboplast’s
increase in productivity.
Bringing in consultants was an expensive new undertaking, yet CEO
Jancso´ fully supported the program. While the consultants cost Graboplast
$1.6 million, the billing period was six months, and the project built the
solid base of a modern company. Consultants could not have implemented
any changes in Graboplast without the support from its management, as
Kopits explains:
The most important element which made this company turn around is
the attitude of the CEO. It was the fact that he admitted that he had a
problem, and that he did not know everything about running a company
and looked for outside help. This is contrary to other companies where they
“don’t have any problems.” Without the manager’s support to bring in
outside consultants to cut the fat around the company, Graboplast would
not be where it is today. This is unlike managers at other companies, who
do not ask for help and who are not willing to change since they believe
they know everything and that they can solve any problems on their own.
Besides the CEO, Miklo´s Patko´s, SPA’s representative to the company
and Deputy President of Graboplast, supported the changes. With the man-
agement’s full support, Graboplast made its first steps toward the world
market. Graboplast Exhibit 5 presents the company’s management profile.
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Graboplast’s efforts to integrate into the world market were still not
problem-free, despite its newly implemented systems. The rapidly declin-
ing economic conditions in Hungary between 1991 and 1993, the maturing
artificial leather and PVC industries, and entry of foreign competitors were
some hurdles which Graboplast continued to encounter.
Two major economic developments in Hungary took place around 1991.
First, liberalization opened up the entire market to Western imports, and
the world collapsed for domestic companies that had been coddled and pro-
tected from free-market competition for more than four decades. Second,
the Hungarian economy contracted by 4% in 1991, 12% in 1992, and 4% in
1993, for a total 20% contraction in four years. (For comparative purposes,
during the Great Depression the US economy contracted 30%, and George
Bush lost the 1992 election after a 2% contraction of the economy.) The
free-falling economic conditions undoubtedly hurt Graboplast. Its output
fell by about one-third during this period, which was typical of many Hun-
garian companies. Businesses saw rapidly falling sales, and their attempts to
hold on to their customers by providing them with attractive payment terms
resulted in a pileup of accounts receivables. Graboplast, however, instituted
a tight credit policy by 1993. With many customers, it went to a cash-only
basis.
Graboplast faced further challenges in both the domestic and foreign
markets. Graboplast Exhibit 6 lists the major competitors. Foreign com-
panies tended to be bigger, more sophisticated, cleaner, and have a better
product selection. With centralized purchasing and more volume, larger for-
eign manufacturers could price products lower than Hungarian companies.
Graboplast also found its products tough to sell abroad, because environmen-
tal concerns about PVC are widespread in Western Europe. The company,
however, no longer believed that foreign importers were a big threat in its
domestic market:
Imports arriving mainly from Italy and Germany account for 5–10% of the
market, and these imports primarily fill unsatisfied niches in the market
with high-fashion goods. The business policy of Graboplast is to insure its
role as a cost leader and maintain its competitive advantage in price and
service. [Graboplast Annual Report, 1994]
The Company made a fundamental marketing decision to stay in East-
ern Europe’s markets. The PVC industry in the Western market is very
mature and concentrated. There are five big companies that produce PVC
in Western Europe, two in Hungary, four in Poland, and two in the Czech
Republic. Graboplast opened offices in East European cities such as Prague,
Bratislava, Moscow, and Warsaw to push its products.
They were aggressive in efficiency yet cautious in strategy because they did
not know how things were going to turn out in 1992–1993. Things were in
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a death spiral during this time in Hungary. The economy was free-falling,
and Graboplast decided that in this environment they would just wait, and
not commit too early.
The artificial leather sales by Graboplast accounted for between 70 and
75% of the domestic market in 1994, but Graboplast was still losing mar-
ket shares to importers. Graboplast Exhibit 7 gives a breakdown of market
shares by product and region. Sales of artificial leather were low except
for plastic tablecloths, so the company decided to shift its line of business
toward more profitable home-improvement lines, such as wallpaper and car-
peting. Between 1992 and 1993 Graboplast bought a wallpaper machine for
$1.5 million. The planned strategy was to migrate out of artificial leather
into household do-it-yourself products. Since Graboplast had a PVC line,
management thought that wallpaper would be complementary.
Graboplast followed conservative measures to finance itself in an envi-
ronment with high inflation and interest rates. The base rate of the National
Bank of Hungary was 25% at the end of 1994, whereas commercial bank in-
terest rates reached 30.5%, compared with year-end rates of 25% in 1993.
The company financed working capital with short-term loans.
Looking to the future, Graboplast’s strategic goals include:
• To focus on activities in its home-improvement division.
• To grow substantially in Eastern Europe.
• To become increasingly cost-driven.
The company plans to stay predominately in the domestic market. To
compete against imported goods in the domestic market, it plans to continue
its cost-leading strategies, while increasing both production efficiency and
the quality of products. The company plans to continue increasing its market
shares in Eastern Europe. It is expected that sales will increase by 75% in
Eastern Europe by the end of 1995.
To further shift its product lines toward home-improvement products,
where it sees high potential for growth, the company has been negotiating
for the acquisition of a majority ownership of a Hungarian carpet factory.
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Graboplast Exhibit 1. Breakdown of share-
holders (in percent).
Foreign investors 48.0
Management 30.5
Domestic investors 10.0
Bills, asset management, and trading 7.8
Local municipalities 3.4
Repurchased shares 0.3
Source: Graboplast Prospectus, 1994.
Graboplast Exhibit 2. Products groups and production status.
PVC floor covering Actual production was 3.46 million m2 in 1993 and 5.94
million m2 in 1994. At the beginning of 1995, the an-
nual capacity of 7.6 million m2 was increased to 9.5 million
m2. Additional investments of Ft200 million in machin-
ery and Ft130 million in working capital implemented by
fourth quarter of 1995 will expand capacity from 5.5 mil-
lion m2 to 15 million m2. All proposed expansions are for
2-meter-wide production lines. Investing in a 4-meter-wide
production line for the type of product popular in Western
Europe will be considered by management.
Wallpaper The two production lines have a nominal capacity of 3 mil-
lion rolls per year on a seven-day week format. The pro-
duction of wallpaper increased by 18.2% from an average
of 10.4 million m2 in 1993 to 12.3 million m2 in 1994.
Artificial leather The division produces materials for both further process-
ing (artificial leather for bags, belts, cases, writing pads,
clothing and shoes, auto-upholstery, etc.) and direct use
by households (tablecloths). Production shrank by 13.7%
in 1994 from 10.1 million m2 to 8.75 millionm2. Raw mate-
rials for production of artificial leather are partly provided
by Grabotext.
Fleece This product represents the primary external output of
Grabotext and is mainly sold to West European companies.
Other Products of lesser significance – bookbinding materials used
for lexicons, national passports, etc., and roofing insulation.
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Graboplast Exhibit 3. Breakdown of sales.
1993 1994
Division/product line (in mill.Ft) % of total (in mill.Ft) % of total
Artificial leather division
Fancy leather 651 15 595 11
Products for clothing industry 237 5 226 4
Shoes 226 5 244 5
Auto upholstery 454 10 391 7
Tablecloths 144 3 247 5
Home-improvement division
Floor covering 1,220 28 1,913 36
Wallpaper 448 10 619 12
Insulating materials 32 1 37 1
Bookbinding 110 3 159 3
Fleeces 850 19 854 16
Total 4,372 100 5,285 100
Source: Creditanstalt Analyst Report.
Graboplast Exhibit 4. Net sales from basic activities in 1994.
Breakdown by division (in mill.Ft) Domestic Export Total
Artificial leather 929.4 772.8 1,702.2
Home improvement 1,150.2 1,249.2 2,399.4
Book binding 119.1 39.7 158.8
Total 2,198.7 2,061.7 4,260.4
Breakdown of net sales (%) 1992 1993 1994
Domestic sales 62 58 52
Eastern Europe 9 16 26
Traditional Western sales 29 26 22
Total 100 100 100
Source: Graboplast Annual Report, 1994.
Graboplast Exhibit 5. Management profile.
Pe´ter Jancso´, President, 44.
Education: Technical University of Budapest, Textile Mechanical Engineering,
1975; Industrial Economics, 1983.
1975: Employed by Ra´batext Textile Company, Gyo¨r.
1979: Plant director at Graboplast Cotton Weaving and Artificial Leather
Factory of Gyo¨r.
1988: Chief Executive Officer.
1990: President-Chief Executive Officer of Graboplast Rt.
1991: Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the “Na´ndor Jankovich” Fund.
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1992: Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the “Josef Varga” Foundation,
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Masterfil Cotton Weaving Co.
Ltd., member of the Board of Directors of Gracia Co. Ltd. and North
Transdanubian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Foreign language: German.
Miklo´s Patko´s, Deputy President, 42.
Technical University of Budapest Faculty of Chemical Engineering, Organizer, 1976;
Industrial Economics, 1985.
1976: Employed by Graboplast Cotton Weaving and Artificial Leather Fac-
tory of Gyo¨r.
1980: Assistant Plant Manager.
1984: Plant Manager.
1988: Head of Administration Department.
1990: Director of Grabocenter and member of the Board of Directors.
Foreign language: German.
Tibor Bori, Financial Director, 37.
University of Economics Wroclav, Faculty of Chemical Industry Organization and
Economics, 1983; University of Economics in Budapest, Faculty of Complex Com-
pany Planning and Analysis, 1989.
1983: Employed by Pe´t Nitrogen works, Head of Department, 1984.
1987: Chief Accountant of Graboplast Cotton Weaving and Artificial Leather
Factory of Gyo¨r.
1990: Member of the Board of Directors of Graboplast.
Foreign language: English, Polish.
Sa´ndor Nagy, Sales Director, 41.
University of Pecs, Faculty of Economics, Market Organization Economist, 1975;
University of Economics in Budapest, Market Organization Economist, 1981.
1975: Employed by Graboplast Cotton Weaving and Artificial Leather Fac-
tory of Gyo¨r.
1982: Head of Sales Department.
1988: Sales Director.
1990: Member of the Board of Directors of Graboplast.
Foreign language: English.
Imre Fekete, Production Director, 49.
Ba´nki Dona´t Technical College of Mechanical Engineering, Machine Production
Technology Production Engineer, 1974.
1964: Employed by Graboplast Cotton Weaving and Artificial Leather Fac-
tory of Gyo¨r.
1971: Plant Manager.
1975: Head of Inspection Department.
1982: Head of Production Unit.
1991: Member of the Board of Directors of Graboplast.
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Graboplast Exhibit 6. Major competitors.
Artificial leather
Fancy leather goods, Stab. Brandizzo Italy
tablecloths Freundenberg, Hornschuh Germany
Vinylplex P.P.H. TEXSPUR
Zaklad Skor Synt. ERG ZTS. Poland
Zaklad Tworzyn Sztucznych
Clothing Akzo Netherlands
Plocquet Germany
Porvair Great Britain
Goretex USA
Shoes B Crespi, Synt. 3SPA, Duplotex Italy
SRI
Benecke Germany
SANWIL Zaklady Wyrobow Poland
Powlekanych, DAMATEX
Upholstery, Benecke-Kalido, Hornschuh, Germany
auto industry ERA
Wardle Storeys Great Britain
Wulcaflex Italy
Kazimierz Parol z.P.U., Poland
Vinylplex P.P.H
Home-improvement materials
Floor coverings Pannon-Lucky Hungary
Fatra, Technoplast, Chernicke´ Czech Republic and Slovakia
Zabody, Nova´aky Czech Republic and Slovakia
ERG Olawa, Lentex, Gamrat Poland
Takett Pefulan, Deutsche Germany
Linoleum Werke
Forbo Switzerland
Sommer Allibert, Gerland France
BNI The Netherlands
Wallpaper Keszta-Dunawall Hungary
Brecke Papirovy, Gnasyyn Czech Republic and Slovakia
Papierny, Prazke Papiernz Czech Republic and Slovakia
Tarcianske Papierny
ERG Olawa Poland
AS Creation, Marburg Germany
Forbo Switzerland
Decofrance France
Sanders, BNI Netherlands
Source: Graboplast Prospectus, 1994.
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Graboplast Exhibit 7. Market share (in percent).
Domestic Eastern Europe Western Europe
Artificial leather 70–75 8–10 2–3
Floor coverings 60–65 5–6 2–3
Wallpaper 40–45 3–4 3–4
Bookbinding 30–35 0–1 0
Graboplast Exhibit 8. Main financial indicators in 1994.
1993 1994
Equity/debt 3.85 3.57
Interest cover 5.0 10.0
Liquidity ratio (%) 204.8 218.9
Quick ratio (%) 139.8 136.3
Inventory turnover 7.8 7.2
Average collection period (days) 81 64
Return on assets (%) 4.2 9.6
Return on equity (%) 5.9 12.8
Source: Graboplast Annual Report, 1994.
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Graboplast Exhibit 9. Profit and loss statements (in million Hungarian
forints).
1991 1992 1993 1994
Net sales 4,564 4,235 4,372 5,285
Operating expenses
Goods sold 3,417 3,164 3,006 3,675
Sales and administration 816 949 1,075 1,131
Operating profit 331 122 291 479
Other income and expenses
Interest income 79 77 10
Interest expense (283) (213) (74) (50)
VAT penalties and
related costs (39)
Restructuring costs (25) (45)
Other 45 77 (13) (31)
Income before unusual item 147 (21) 214 398
Discharge (repayment) of bill of exchange 34 (32)
Gross profit 147 13 182 398
Tax 3
Net profit 147 13 182 395
Assets
Cash at bank 102 151 75 133
Trade debtors 1,126 887 800 949
Prepayments and other assets 161 52 177 187
Inventory 795 700 682 981
Deferred income tax benefit 7
Total current assets 2,184 1,790 1,734 2,257
Fixed assets and other tangible
fixed assets 1,321 1,267 1,740 1,892
Intangible assets 11 94 74 51
Investments 18 15 20 30
Total fixed assets and other 1,350 1,376 1,834 1,973
Total assets 3,534 3,166 3,568 4,230
Liabilities and owners’ equity
Current liabilities
Trade creditors and accrued expenses 776 623 460 845
Short-term loans and other 496 445 413 302
Total current liabilities 1,272 1,068 873 1,147
Long-term loans 16 8 10
Owners’ equity
Share capital 2,000 1,997 2,328 2,324
Share premium 111 111 111 111
Retained earning 135 82 256 638
Total owners’ equity 2,246 2,190 2,695 3,073
3,518 3,258 3,568 4,220
Source: Graboplast Annual Report and Prospectus, 1994.
103
High-Tech Consulting, Ltd., Hungary
To be known and to know whom to know!
High-Tech Business Plan
In the summer of 1995, Miklos Illovszky was the managing partner of High-
Tech Consulting, Ltd., a consulting firm based in Budapest. The firm had
been formed in 1993, when three former executives of Mu¨szertechnika formed
a partnership to advise foreign companies seeking entrance into the Hungar-
ian market. (Mu¨szertechnika is a computer supplier. Established in 1981 it
was the first, post-1950, private company in Hungary.) The advice was orig-
inally on how to set up successful affiliates and subsidiaries, but by mid-1994
High-Tech was supplying information on dealing with financial, managerial,
and marketing crisis management. The early 1990s gold-rush mentality of
foreigners in Hungary had changed; they were no longer satisfied with merely
a presence in Hungary. The work of advising the established foreign com-
panies on adapting to the Hungarian ways of doing business was the next
booming market for locally based consultants.
Illovszky provided some information on the challenges that the changing
business climate held for High-Tech, as well as some insights on the charac-
teristics of Hungarian companies that have successfully integrated into the
world economy. In his former position at Mu¨szertechnika, Illovszky became
knowledgeable about the efforts of Hungarian high-technology companies
that were entering the world marketplace.
High-Tech originally had five main business goals: advise owners and
operators of domestic firms on how to “Westernize” their organizations; as-
sist potential foreign and domestic investors in their attempts to begin new
ventures in Hungary; prepare long- and short-term strategic plans; perform
system integration and technological system development; provide special
services such as market studies and surveys. The partners tried to focus
their efforts on the high-technology industry, particularly telecommunica-
tions, computers, and electronics. They saw this field as the most com-
petitive and fastest changing industry and felt that their experience in the
Hungarian high-technology arena would provide them with the best func-
tional match. The pharmaceutical, insurance, and utilities industries were
also seen as areas with strong business potential for High-Tech.
High-Tech regarded three factors as keys to success: competence, credi-
bility, and active involvement.
Competence was defined as the ability to perform “locally,” meaning
with a full understanding of the domestic culture and business practices,
as well as the ability to perform “globally,” meaning use of internationally
proven and accepted standards. With this knowledge, High-Tech would be
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able to perform the cultural integration that was perceived as key to their
activities.
Credibility and active involvement were seen as complementary success
factors. Both were considered necessary to deliver the competence described
above to the client and the market. High-Tech felt that the prime factor
in building credibility was a willingness to focus on implementation rather
than theory. This tied into High-Tech’s belief that there was far too much
emphasis placed upon theoretical “strategy” work; companies in the Hun-
garian market were demanding basic solutions to their operating problems.
High-Tech wanted to take advantage of this market gap.
High-Tech evaluated competition in the Hungarian consulting industry
on two main issues: “locality” and pricing. There were four categories of
competitors that they evaluated on these criteria: multinationals with local
subsidiaries; multinationals covering Hungary from a West European office;
small foreign companies; and domestic companies.
High-Tech saw multinationals with local subsidiaries as being primarily
affiliated with the consulting arms of the Big Six accounting firms. Having
established a strong base from their accounting and auditing practices, these
companies were the best-positioned international firms to transfer their ef-
forts to management consulting. The Big Six firms addressed the “locality”
issue by hiring Hungarian expatriates, although this strategy was initially
limited by the relatively small pool of qualified individuals. The pricing level
for this type of competitor’s services was considered fairly high, and the seg-
ment of the market that they focused on was primarily made up of clients
that were developed through the audit practice.
Multinationals operating in Hungary from their West European office
were represented by the traditional Western management consulting firms
(McKinsey, BCG, and Roland Berger). They primarily positioned them-
selves using consultants from convenient West European offices (primarily
Germany). The projects that these companies worked on were primarily
government activities or major joint ventures. For these projects, “locality”
was not a necessity, and the payment ability of the clients was high enough
that pricing was not an issue.
Small foreign companies were primarily based in neighboring West Euro-
pean countries (Austria was a prominent source). They generally had better
“locality” than the main strategy consulting firms due to their willingness
to hire Hungarians on a free-lance basis. They also had low pricing proce-
dures because of their practice of using a tiered salary structure: salaries for
West European employees were higher than salaries for Hungarian free-lance
consultants. These firms typically concentrated on the “top 100” domestic
companies in Hungary. High-Tech saw these competitors as having an opti-
mum trade-off between lower prices and proven references.
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Fully domestic companies were typically “one-man-show” operations –
basing their competitive advantage upon individual talent and personal con-
tacts. They were generally strong in the “locality” dimension, and were
fairly price attractive. However, due to their limited track records, they
were generally forced to concentrate on second-tier firms.
High-Tech saw itself positioned in the fully domestic category, but with
several key differences. Due to the high level of credibility of each of the three
founding partners, High-Tech was accepted early on by foreign companies
and joint ventures. In fact, the initial operating results of High-Tech showed
that its revenues were from foreign companies in the form of hard currency.
In addition, High-Tech had a strategy for entering the more profitable
market areas that were dominated by the foreign firms. High-Tech estab-
lished an early strategic goal of finding a well-known foreign strategic part-
ner. With this partnership, High-Tech hoped to acquire the credibility neces-
sary to compete for the largest and most lucrative engagements. High-Tech
felt that it had a proven track record of profitability, along with local refer-
ences and full “locality,” and none of the risks related to the fixed costs of
setting up a local subsidiary.
Local companies were anxious to meet potential international business
partners; Illovszky and High-Tech were often able to provide these introduc-
tions. For example, the relationship between a Viennese bank and trading
company (VT Corp.) and the Hungarian market leader (more than 50% of
the market) for point-of-sales terminals and cash registers (S Corp.) began
through a personal relationship between a senior VT Corp. executive and
the owner/managing director of S Corp. Even though S Corp.’s owner was
a “one-man-show-type leader” and spoke only Hungarian, the early years of
this relationship were characterized as successful. VT Corp. managed all of
the foreign activities of S Corp., and also provided financing. S Corp. had
access to all of these services through telephone or telefax contacts, and the
language used for all business directives was Hungarian, a fairly substantial
advantage for S Corp. The primary negative factor in this relationship from
S Corp.’s perspective was that it had to pay significant charges and interest
in return for this “easy business.”
The relationship was extremely profitable in 1992 and 1993. However, in
1994 VT Corp. began to notice a lack of consistency on the part of S Corp.
for repayment of financing. Personal contacts between executives of both
companies were ineffective due to a deterioration in the level of trust between
the key individuals. At this point VT Corp. contacted High-Tech and asked
it to contact S Corp. and offer the company its services. By the summer of
1994, S Corp. and High-Tech had a contract.
High-Tech found some serious problems in S Corp.’s situation. The pri-
mary problem was that there were no management control systems in place
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to monitor either the day-to-day or long-term decisions of company em-
ployees. Since the owner/managing director had no technical background,
many of his executive decisions were made on the basis of “feelings.” Fur-
thermore, although the R&D division, customer support teams, and service
groups were all seen as company strengths, they were not being effectively
managed because of the owner/managing director’s lack of technical knowl-
edge. This lack of management control systems was best evidenced by the
fact that S Corp. did not create financial statements or projections of any
kind.
High-Tech proceeded to identify all of the tasks that S Corp. had to
accomplish over the following year: financial statements of the previous two
years; creation of a mission statement; division of S Corp. into strategic
business units (SBUs) with real decision-making power at the SBU level;
down-sizing; short- and long-term R&D planning; liquidation of obsolete
inventory; improvements in marketing; tapping alternative financing sources;
renegotiation of existing liabilities between S Corp. and VT Corp., and a
search for new foreign vendors and partners. High-Tech also focused its
efforts on finding reasons for recent operating losses.
High-Tech was able to accomplish this list of tasks in a five-month time
frame, and satisfactorily resolved the conflict between S Corp. and VT Corp.
However, Illovszky saw the key point of this engagement as one of cultural
facilitation, as opposed to pure technical engineering. Illovszky believed the
core problem was a lack of international business knowledge on the part
of S Corp., and a lack of knowledge of local circumstances on the part of
VT Corp. With its knowledge in both areas (as well as its skills in technical
business), High-Tech successfully resolved the conflict.
Illovszky was acquainted with three companies in the high-technology
field that had gone abroad and achieved some measure of success. These
companies were Graphisoft, a designer of CAD software used in building de-
sign and room layout; Recognita, a leader in the optical character recognition
industry; and Procomp, a producer of computer hardware, specifically SCSI
controller boards. Procomp had been part of Mu¨szertechnika, and until 1993
Illovszky had been a Vice-President of Mu¨szertechnika.
According to Illovszky, Procomp’s integration into the international mar-
ketplace was due to an unusual set of circumstances that will probably not
be repeated in the near future. The basis for this unique opportunity was
the 1981 introduction of private companies into the still centrally planned
Hungarian economy. Mu¨szertechnika was the first company to take advan-
tage of this opportunity; it entered the computer business. Because of a
huge demand for and limited supply of computers, Mu¨szertechnika was able
to sell computers at an enormous profit. In fact, Mu¨szertechnika sold its
computers with a lead time of three years.
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Starting in 1981, and until 1988, Mu¨szertechnika was able to stockpile
a sizable war chest. Mu¨szertechnika was able to invest this capital in sev-
eral different R&D projects over the 1981–1988 period. By 1987, about 15
different products had been developed.
In 1987, Mu¨szertechnika introduced these products at the Novell-
sponsored NetWorld industry trade shows in Boston and Dallas. Only one
of the products was up to international standards. That product was the
SCSI controller that became the base product for Procomp.
Mu¨szertechnika made an initial investment of approximately $400,000
and introduced Procomp operations in the United States; these opera-
tions employed US citizens and appointed a second-generation American
of Hungarian descent (previously employed by Ernst and Young) as Chief
Executive.
Initially this turned out to be a very successful move, with Procomp
(USA) Americanizing the product through packaging and advertising and
ironing out the “wrinkles.” Procomp also benefited from a great deal of luck,
because companies like Novell were just starting out and were developing
both hardware and software. Novell decided to concentrate on software and
to leave Procomp with the hardware SCSI niche.
This successful relationship between the American Manager and
Mu¨szertechnika management in Hungary had rapidly deteriorated by 1991,
basically because of the huge differences in culture. The American Manager
was seen as an individualist and a power grabber, and it was soon apparent
that he would have to leave. His successor was not nearly as successful. The
new Chief Executive had no industry knowledge and lacked international
experience. The second Chief Executive was fired in 1993.
Meanwhile, there were problems for Mu¨szertechnika in Hungary as well.
The environment had changed dramatically. Between 1989 and 1990, the do-
mestic computer market had opened up, and the pre-1989 computer prices,
which had been artificially inflated by import controls, had declined to in-
ternational levels and the company’s profits were squeezed. With the reduc-
tion in cash flow, the investment capability of Mu¨szertechnika deteriorated.
Eventually the R&D staff was slashed from 22 world-class engineers to 1.
Procomp (USA), in the meantime, went from slow growth to no growth be-
cause of a lack of investment and the above-mentioned managerial problems.
By 1994, Procomp (USA) had no market value.
Illovszky saw the greatest difference between the eventual failure of Pro-
comp and the modest international success of a company like Recognita and
Graphisoft (see below) as being primarily due to the fact that the successful
companies allowed foreign capital investments.
Recognita, an optical character recognition company, sold a minority
interest to an American management team. This was enough to keep the
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local management interested, and as of 1995 Recognita was maintaining a
presence in the United States.
Graphisoft, a CAD for building- and room-design use, initially followed
the same path as Procomp. The directors of the company were leery of
foreign investment, and avoided it as long as possible. When CAD users
started shifting to Windows from Macintosh operating systems, Graphisoft
was forced to develop new CAD software based upon the Windows operating
system. To finance this shift, it had to sell part of the company (a distribu-
tion network) to a Munich-based German firm. Graphisoft had to give up
some control to the German investors. By the summer of 1995, Graphisoft
had a niche in CAD in Europe; in fact, the bulk of the software production
was for markets outside Hungary. In March 1996, the Japanese computer
toy company, Sega, invested $7.5 million to purchase a minority share. Sega
announced that it planned to use Graphisoft as a platform for further soft-
ware activities in Hungary (HVG, 1996). In 1995 Graphisoft had a net profit
of $4.5 million on revenues of $15 million and employed 40 programmers in
Hungary and another 60 in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Japan
(Central European Business Review, 1996).
Illovszky has found the structure of foreign companies in Hungary has
gradually been changing. In the early 1990s, foreign companies at the top
had been staffed entirely by expatriates. By 1995 there was an expatriate
Managing Director, along with one or two Vice-Presidents who were Hun-
garians; it was expected that one of these Vice-Presidents would become
the Managing Director. Foreign companies in Hungary are increasingly be-
coming local in nature, especially as the local talent pool raises its business
standards to international levels. Another reason for this localization is
that expatriate salaries are considerably higher than local salaries. In 1994,
expatriates could expect to make between Ft2,000,000 and Ft10,000,000 an-
nually; these salaries, at the time, were several times higher than local salary
levels.
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Hungarian Telecommunications Company
Janos Toth, 32, arrived in Hungary in the summer of 1995. He was to become
a consultant to the Director of Strategy at the Hungarian Telecommunica-
tions Company (MATA´V). His boss at Deutsche Telecom recommended him
for this position. Toth was of Hungarian ancestry and had finished his MBA
in the United States. He was the perfect candidate for a job that would
involve interaction with the German, American, and Hungarian owners of
the company and the staff.
The position of the Director of Strategy was created in 1992, but was
vacant for a long time because of political infighting within the company
and between the company and the Hungarian state owner. This infighting
resulted in the dismissal of the CEO in 1995. The new CEO, Elek Straub,
the former General Manager of IBM’s operations in Hungary, took office in
July 1995. Straub realized the importance of creating a long-term strategy
for the firm and revitalized the Strategy Department. The company’s goal
was to become the best communications provider in Central and Eastern
Europe. Toth, and the department he was going to help, was to come up
with the plan on how to achieve this goal.
MATA´V was established on 1 January 1990 when it was separated from
the Hungarian PTT. Even after the separation the company was Hungary’s
third largest company employing 18,000 people. The company’s sales rev-
enues in 1994 were Ft91 billion (at the end of 1994 $1 equaled Ft100). The
company was the main telecommunications service provider and owned most
of the telecommunications infrastructure. The company had five regional di-
rectorates (the actual service-providing units) and 14 general directorates for
different centralized services. Until the end of 1991 the company was owned
by the state.
The privatization of MATA´V was the first of the telecommunications pri-
vatization procedures carried out in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1991
the company was transformed into a shareholding company, with the State
Asset Handling Company (AVRT) holding all the shares. Over the next two
years the company prepared for privatization. In 1993 a tender was issued to
search for a strategic investor for 30% of MATA´V’s shares. (AVRT planned
to keep 67% of the shares, and 3% were given to the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Financial Corpora-
tion.) AVRT and the management of MATA´V thought a big international
operator would not only provide the necessary funds for future investments,
but also have a long-term perspective regarding investments in the com-
pany and bring in technology, management, and strategy expertise to turn
MATA´V into a first-class communications service provider. The winner of
the contract received concession rights for long-distance and international
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service throughout Hungary and for local telephone service for designated
areas. After privatization the company enjoyed a five-year tax holiday, and
60% tax holiday during the second five years of operation.
The tender was won by MagyarCom, a 50–50 consortium of Ameritech
International and Deutsche Telecom. Besides paying for the equity interest
in the company, MagyarCom agreed to guarantee a 15.5% per year access line
growth, to eliminate the waiting list for telephones by 1997, and to create an
international hub switch. Management believed that the American-German
consortium would be the optimal investor. The American side would repre-
sent the market focal point, and its experience in operating in a competitive
market would help MATA´V to adapt to new market conditions. The Ger-
man expertise would help the company to comply with European standards
and become part of the European telecommunications system.
MATA´V was in many ways a typical East European state-owned,
technology-oriented company. The state ownership and monopoly position
on the Hungarian market resulted in a company culture where business was
driven not by market forces, but rather by technology and politics. Although
the company was investing heavily in high-quality technology, there was a
complete lack of customer focus. Efficiency of investments and operations
were low, and there was a general lack of understanding and use of ratios
such as return on assets, return on investment, or return on operations to
measure performance. The company did not concentrate on its core busi-
ness. The company had more than 60 subsidiaries, most of which performed
services for MATA´V at a high cost.
The staff was very well prepared technically, but there was no sense
of financial management. The company was overstaffed, and the employees
considered their positions safe until retirement. Company objectives and the
concept of motivation was missing. Responsibilities were rarely defined, and
if they were defined, they were not enforced. There was no appraisal system.
There was a lack of communication between management and employees, and
even between levels of management. Information was regarded as a power
tool, and people were trying to retain for themselves every item of news that
they thought might make them indispensable.
The company was heavily in debt. Most of the investments of the previ-
ous years were made from loans from international organizations: the World
Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the EBRD. The com-
pany’s capital structure seemed to make MATA´V vulnerable to any major
changes in the value of the local currency, the forint vis-a`-vis the dollar or
the Deutsche mark.
During 1994 MagyarCom assessed the state of the company and decided
which areas should be restructured. The investors identified the following
critical factors for the successful transformation of MATA´V:
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• Development of an effective marketing unit.
• Development of an integrated planning system.
• Development of a management control system and an investment ap-
praisal process.
• Installation of a management information system that improves man-
agement effectiveness of revenue production, expense control, and uti-
lization of capital.
• Creation of a company culture directed toward customer satisfaction.
The foreign investors, jointly with management, set out to transform
the company. During the fall of 1994, Ameritech and Deutsche Telecom
brought in experts from their own companies to help in the transformation.
Consultants were assigned to the most important areas to assist the Hun-
garian managers and staff in adopting new concepts and techniques. Some
consultants were based at the regional directorates to help the staff adjust
to the new requirements of headquarters. The company’s training center
had its own consultant so that it could prepare for the emerging training
needs of restructuring. The consultants had to work closely with Hungarian
managers, and were instructed to guide and educate them, and to develop
solutions together with the Hungarian staff.
The restructuring of the company was started on several fronts. One was
the financial area. As MATA´V became part of two big foreign companies, it
had to transform many of its accounting and reporting practices to comply
with international standards. A controlling and planning department was
set up. A major task of the planning unit was to establish a new, integrated
planning process. A difficult problem for the company was dealing with
high costs relative to revenues. The new planning process was to become a
tool that managers could use to better estimate and control their costs and
revenues, comparing budget and actual data and examining the variances.
Management could also use the planning system as a tool for a new incentive
compensation system.
Other changes involved marketing. The company had no separate mar-
keting department. Marketing functions were distributed between several
offices, which assisted other company groups in providing statistical data
regarding demand trends and providing customer service. A marketing de-
partment was needed to centralize these functions and to handle other mar-
keting tasks (such as pricing, market research, generation of new projects,
business cases for these projects, and revenue forecasting). A sales force had
to be created, and marketing processes had to be established. Management
hoped that the new marketing unit would help to introduce more services
which would make the customer the focal point of the company.
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On the technical side, changes were aimed mostly at the introduction of
new concepts. The technical side did not pay much attention to how effec-
tively resources were being used. Although the engineers had great expertise
in network planning, they concentrated solely on getting state-of-the-art
technology built into the network. For instance, during network develop-
ment, relatively new and properly operating network parts were scrapped
and redeveloped unnecessarily just because they included copper cables in-
stead of fiber-optic cables. Spending on development projects was consid-
erably higher than necessary. The consultants worked together with the
Hungarian project- and contract-approving officers to enforce a more eco-
nomical approach to network development.
A separate division was created for logistics. Before privatization each
directorate had separate support units that were responsible for information
technology services, warehousing, transportation, etc. The activities of these
separate units were not co-ordinated, resulting in major problems especially
in the warehouse. The company kept a high level of stocks; generally there
was a 12-month supply of almost all parts and materials. The company was
the largest buyer of telecommunications equipment in Hungary, and many
vendors took advantage of the underdeveloped negotiating skills of MATA´V
representatives. This was also the case for subcontractors, some of which
became sole contractors with the company, reaping high profits by charging
above market fees for their services. With worsening macroeconomic condi-
tions, it was urgent to introduce methods that would make operations more
economical. Business support areas, such as warehousing, billing, and real-
estate management, were reorganized and centralized to reach economies
of scale. Most of the main purchasing and leasing contracts were signed
centrally so that more favorable terms could be reached.
The company also needed to revise and analyze the performance of sub-
sidiaries. The number of subsidiaries was cut in half based on company syn-
ergies. Management decided that only subsidiaries that create value should
remain with the company. The others should be either sold or consolidated
into the corporation.
By mid-1995 some of the reorganization efforts started to show results.
The best and most visible results came from the introduction of the cen-
tral Operational Support System (OSS) which handled billing for the entire
country. Changes in the financial field also started to show some results,
especially regarding accounting and reporting procedures. In the capital
expenditures (CAPEX) field, the centralized department seemed to have es-
tablished control over planning, purchases, and contracting. The CAPEX
people were already working on the second phase: to enforce the new meth-
ods and to establish a system of follow-ups. Special task forces worked on
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the logistics of the structural changes. The first structural change was in-
troduced in 1995 when the new marketing and logistics offices were set up.
Some officials within and outside the company were not satisfied with
the pace of the transformation. The slow pace was due to several reasons.
First, the company was under financial pressure. Owing to concessionary
obligations considerable attention had to be devoted to basic infrastructure
development. This kept the company from meeting customer needs in other
areas and from instituting changes in operations. Besides, commitments in
a number of old, long-term contracts had tied the managers’ hands when
they had to make business decisions.
The foreign investors faced several surprises between 1993 and 1995. A
big shock was the behavior of the Hungarian government toward the com-
pany. The government still controlled more than 60% of the shares, and
wanted to be actively involved in company matters. But the three govern-
ment agencies (Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Telecommunications, and
State Asset Handling Company) that oversaw the company’s operations had
different interests and conflicting views regarding the management of the
company. These conflicts frequently delayed many decisions. The govern-
ment agencies also had strong views and influence on personnel issues. For
example, after the election of 1994, the government forced the company to
look for a new General Manager as the existing one had ties to the former
government. It took almost a year to find a candidate who satisfied the ex-
pectations of all the parties. During that year the company basically came
to a standstill as both managers and employees waited for a new General
Manager to set the direction for the company. Decisions were postponed,
and all projects, including the ones on restructuring, slowed down.
Cultural differences were major obstacles to changes. It took a long time
for the investors to understand the power structure within the company,
which often differed from the hierarchical structure. There were large gaps
between what was legally correct and what could be practically implemented,
especially regarding personnel issues. The cultural differences also resulted
in tensions within management, as the three sides (American, German, and
Hungarian) did not always agree on issues. Management could not determine
a unified strategy for the company. The German managers preferred making
MATA´V a traditional telephone company, whereas the American managers
insisted on diversifying the company into businesses that would bring in
high revenues. Very often management could not take a unified stand on
operations-related issues, making employees believe that only the foreign
managers and advisers were pushing for changes. This resulted in hostilities
and resistance toWestern methods. As for the new methods, the Hungarians
were disappointed because they felt that the foreign advisers were pushing
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for the methods they were using in the United States or in Germany without
considering adapting these methods to the Hungarian circumstances.
The Operating Committee (OC) was regarded as another major obstacle
to quick changes. The OC was created after privatization at the request
of the foreign investors. The OC consisted of one representative of both
foreign investors and two representatives of the Hungarian owner. The idea
was that through the OC the foreign owners would be able to exercise their
power despite minority shares in the company. All major decisions were to
be approved by the OC before implementation. Without a fully operating
information system and without delegation of responsibilities the OC was
forced to deal with everyday operational issues, and lost track of the main
issues to be resolved. The company was operating the OC instead of the OC
operating the company.
The macroeconomic environment did not help the transformation either.
In March 1995 the government introduced a new austerity program to get
the Hungarian budget deficit under control. The Hungarian currency was
devalued by 20% inMarch. To make it easier to plan for further devaluations,
the government introduced the crawling peg method for exchange rates of
the forint, projecting an approximate 1% devaluation each month. The
government also imposed an 8% import duty and increased the value-added
tax. Due to these measures inflation increased; the inflation rate for 1995
increased to 28 from 20% in 1994. Interest rates increased from 25 to 33%.
These macroeconomic changes imposed a strain on the company. As
most of the network developments of the past two years were financed with
foreign debt, the March devaluation resulted in a huge loss in financial ac-
tivities; this loss had to be made up by stricter cash control during the rest
of the year. The company tried to reduce operating costs and accelerate
the network expansion program to increase revenues as much as possible.
Unfortunately the worsening of the macroeconomic situation put a cap on
the amount of revenues the company could realize. Telephone usage is a
price-sensitive service; the tariff increase to compensate the effects of the
increased inflation rate somewhat reduced usage. The company managed
to push through a Ministry of Transport decree on higher telephone instal-
lation fees, hoping that the accelerated network extension program would
bring in enough revenues from the new connections to compensate for the
losses the company suffered from lower usage and devaluation. Management
held that with more discipline the company could remain in the black despite
the devaluation’s impact on the income statement.
Toth arrived a week before the meeting of the Operating Committee on
the corporate budget for 1996. Management decided to execute top down
planning for the upcoming year. The company needed to show a profit of
about Ft7 billion under the International Accounting Standards in order to
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meet debt obligations. Management expected to barely break-even in 1995,
so it was important to determine on the company’s strategies to achieve the
profit target by the end of 1996.
The question to be answered was: Should the company continue to
serve its core business based only on the concession agreement or should it
try to diversify into fields that could prove to be profitable in a few years?
The answer to this question was vital. The monopoly position of MATA´V
will expire in 2002, and a number of companies are currently getting ready
to break into the lucrative long-distance and international service markets.
Among the possible competitors are Antenna Hungaria, the former Hun-
garian Broadcasting Company, and utility companies. These competitors
are already active in nonconcessionary areas (leased lines, data transfer,
VSAT communications) and are investing in upgrading and extending their
networks.
Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 1. Balance sheets
(in million Hungarian forints).
1994 1993 1992
Assets
Liquid assetsa 23,128 49,992 3,255
Receivables 27,095 16,089 9,709
Inventories 3,291 4,259 5,059
Securities 11 1,327 171
Intangible assets 4,361 2,351 1,805
PP&E 227,475 185,014 153,881
Financial investmentsb 13,042 10,844 9,138
Accrued and deferred assets 5,532 1,069 801
Total assets 303,935 270,945 183,819
Liabilities and owners equity
Short-term loans 8,770 2,066 2,157
Accounts payable 14,795 9,340 8,380
Other current liabilitiesc 30,890 37,395 12,371
Long-term liabilities 52,296 35,987 34,093
Provisionsd 634 347 58
Deferred and accrued liabilities 12,072 4,590 4,100
Shareholders’ equity 184,478 181,220 122,660
Total liabilities 303,935 270,945 183,819
aLiquid assets include cash and cash equivalents and bank deposits.
bFinancial investments include shares, securities, loans granted, and long-term bank
deposits.
cOther current liabilities include prepayments from customers, bill of exchange debts,
short-term credits, and other current liabilities.
dProvisions are set up for expected losses and expected liabilities.
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Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 2. Income state-
ments (in million Hungarian forints).
1994 1993 1992
Sales revenues 89,935 67,559 53,008
Other income 2,170 901 990
Capitalized own performance 2,426 2,810 3,609
Total operating revenues 94,531 71,270 57,607
Expenses of material nature 13,310 10,624 8,453
Personnel costs 18,732 15,274 12,788
Depreciation 18,299 12,958 12,925
Fees and charges 31,756 19,462 13,970
Other expenses 8,207 4,345 2,289
Total operating expenses 90,304 62,663 50,425
Operating profit 4,227 8,607 7,182
Balance of financial transactionsa –4,016 –8,171 –5,658
Extraordinary profitb –38 1,168 –290
Taxes 0 4 0
Net profit 173 1,600 1,234
aBalance of income from financial transactions (interest receivables and interest income,
dividends and income from investments, and other income from financial transactions) and
expenses on financial transactions (interest payables and interest expense, depreciation on
investments, and other expenses of financial transactions).
bBalance of extraordinary income and expenditure.
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Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 3. Chronolgy of
events.
1990. The Hungarian PTT is divided into three individual companies: Hungarian
Telecommunications Company, the Hungarian Postal Service, and the Hungarian
Broadcasting Company. MATA´V remains the monopoly telecommunications ser-
vice provider and the owner of the telecommunications network in Hungary.
November 1992. After two years of delay and debates the Law on Telecommu-
nications is passed by parliament. The new law specifies that all public switched
telecommunications activities are to be performed exclusively by concession com-
panies. The law allows the development of local telephone companies (local con-
cessions), but MATA´V retains the monopoly right to provide long-distance and
international public-switched services (national concession). The law also creates
areas of limited and full competition. In areas of limited competition, the number
of players is determined (mobile communications, paging). In areas of full competi-
tion, services may be performed by any party, including concession companies (e.g.,
data transmission, leased lines, dedicated networks). The law creates competition
for MATA´V in all fields except national concession services.
April 1993. The tender for the sale of 30% of MATA´V’s shares is opened to
strategic investors. The consortium of Ameritech and Deutsche Bundespost Tele-
com wins in the bidding process. The consortium pays $875 million for the shares
and for the national concession rights of MATA´V. As a result of the sale, the owner-
ship of MATA´V changes to the following: State Assets Holding Company, 66.74%;
MagyarCom Consortium, 30.29%; EBRD, 1.98%; and International Finance Cor-
poration, 0.99%.
October 1993. A tender is called for regional concession rights in 25 rural districts.
Companies that win regional concessions are granted the right to upgrade and
operate local public telephone networks that were previously operated by MATA´V.
MATA´V competes for some of these districts. In the process 7 companies gain
rights to provide local telecom services in 15 primary areas of Hungary. MATA´V
wins 8 local concessions. The company remains the local operator in 39 primary
areas out of the 54 primary areas of Hungary. The concession contract stipulates
that local concession companies must grant a 15.5% capacity growth annually and
that the telephone waiting list must be eliminated by 1997.
End of 1994. The government determines that MATA´V should be introduced to
the stock exchange in Hungary and abroad. A date for the introduction has not
been picked at the time this case was written.
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Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 4. Miscellaneous
data.
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Investment data (in million Hungarian forints)
Telecommunications 33,099 36,700 31,145
Plant development 1,716 1,674 1,867
Training 203 138 358
Reconstruction under Ft20,000 399 2,941 2,410
Total 35,417 41,453 35,780
Penetration indicators
Main lines (in thousands) 1,732 1,498 1,291 1,128 996
Extension lines (in thousands) n/a 619 757 826 876
Connected main linesa 17.40 14.57 12.52 10.92 9.62
Connected telephonesa 23.10 20.59 19.86 18.92 18.08
Public telephone stationa
Budapest n/a 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.49
Countryside n/a 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.19
Waiting list for telephones 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Residential
Budapest 190,372 224,621 221,815 208,947 226,147
Countryside 429,833 478,751 455,853 398,945 345,190
Business
Budapest 59,645 54,663 64,166 42,359 26,340
Countryside 12,500 13,178 9,974 6,713 8,145
Public
Budapest 450 489 705 449 413
Countryside 190 271 566 383 335
Total 692,990 771,973 753,079 657,796 606,570
Quality indicators (%)
Telephone seizure efficiency rate 51.00 47.82 45.40 44.92
Customer service operators
answering rate 76.00 74.19 78.21 68.50
Rate of faulty main lines per month 4.24 5.00 5.25 6.30
Availability of public payphones 94.00 89.10 85.24 78.39
aPer 100 population.
Source: Telecommunications Statistical Yearbook, 1993; Statistical Pocketbook, 1994.
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Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 5. Number of
employees.
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990
Full-time employees
Blue collar 8,806 8,986 10,075 10,843 11,176
White collar 9,888 9,553 9,601 10,055 9,845
Part-time employees
Blue collar 271 271 266 252 229
White collar 122 122 135 144 121
Total 19,087 18,932 20,077 21,294 21,371
Source: Telecommunications Statistical Yearbook, 1993; Statistical Pocketbook, 1994.
Hungarian Telecommunications Company Exhibit 6. Development
(in million Hungarian forints).
1995 1996 1997
CAPEX program 1995–1997
National concession 43,785 51,218 29,176
Local concession 10,248 13,015 3,120
Nonbasic telephony service 1,197 1,669 1,674
Business service development 4,088 5,608 5,260
Transit network 6,466 5,796 6,049
Operation management development 4,600 5,500 5,000
Technical development 500 973 994
Corporate infrastructure 4,548 5,071 5,540
Other developments 950 1,300 1,300
Total 76,382 90,150 58,113
Telephony development 1995–1997
National concession growth rate (%) 23 19 9
Total growth rate 25 20 10
New connected lines
National concession 297,701 311,003 177,317
Local concession 84,227 76,147 40,612
Source: MATA´V’s Business Plan, 1995.
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International Management Center, Hungary
In a 1993 report the International Management Center (IMC) was described
as “the lynchpin program and, in terms of orientation, curriculum, and
pedagogy, probably the only ‘Western-type’ business school in Hungary”
(Grayson, 1993). Founded in 1988, and heavily financed externally, IMC
was affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh, Tulane University, Emory
University, and Temple University, and offered MBA, executive MBA, and
executive education courses. Between 1993 and 1996, IMC became even
more integrated into the world economy via its students, faculty, graduates,
the firms that used its executive programs, and so on. By 1996 Vanderbilt
University, the University of South Carolina, and George Washington Uni-
versity in the USA, Manchester Business School in the UK and Nijenrade
in the Netherlands had joined as cooperating institutions. Then in 1996,
IMC and Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, implemented
a joint MBA degree program – accredited by the American Association of
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB).
The Dean and CEO of IMC, Peter Bartha, viewed graduate business
education as a competitive industry; he is a Hungarian-born Canadian cit-
izen (he has spent most of his adult life in Canada), a former oil company
executive, and, upon taking early retirement, an academician. Management
education started in Central East European countries after the collapse of
the centrally planned regimes in 1989. IMC was the first institution in CEE
countries to ally itself with a US MBA program, at the University of Pitts-
burgh. Pittsburgh provided curriculum, some faculty, and scholarships for
IMC students to continue their studies in the United States. Funds came
from Western sources including USAID, the UK’s Know-How Fund, and EU
assistance programs.
IMC graduates were hired, first, by multinationals that were entering the
CEE markets. In fact, demand exceeded MBA-type supply by a consider-
able margin. Seeing attractive business opportunities (and fear of being left
behind) precipitated a score of new competitors to IMC. They included the
established universities’ economics and industrial engineering departments,
entrepreneurial national schools, and independent consultants. Regional
competitors included the Czech Management Center, Warsaw University,
and the International Executive Development Centre in Slovenia. INSEAD
(France) began offering scholarships to students from CEE countries.
The new entrants may create an excess of MBA programs, but they must
also face some serious constraints. The first constraint is that it is difficult
to maintain a well-qualified CEE faculty. Everyone in the permanent IMC
faculty has had experience working and teaching in the West. IMC faculty
members are well paid by CEE standards, but they receive less than visiting
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American faculty. Keeping faculty at IMC is a problem as compensation in
the business sector is higher than what the Center is able to offer. The faculty
includes professors from Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and
the USA. Generally, there is a Fulbright scholar on the faculty every year.
Another constraint is the entrance examination. Applicants to IMC
must pass the Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) and the Test
of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Unfamiliarity with multiple-
choice questions (GMAT), a sort of testing not used in CEE countries, and,
of course, English-language barriers, severely limit the pool of qualified appli-
cants. Those who successfully pass both tests form an elite group of students.
The Soros Foundation annually awards 20 scholarships to students hailing
from CEE countries. Additional scholarships are also available.
The ratio of applications to acceptance is 8:1. Particularly large numbers
of applicants come from Romania, the Baltic states, and the CIS. More than
70% of the 1996–1997 class was non-Hungarian. In recent years, there has
been steady growth in the number of students from the West. With the new
joint international MBA program with Case Western Reserve, the number
of American students is expected to continue to increase. The high entrance
standards provide reasonable assurance that those who are ultimately ac-
cepted are also likely to succeed in the program. Indeed, admissions officers
and deans of IMC’s American partner universities report that transfer stu-
dents from IMC invariable graduate in the top third of their class.
IMC is international not only in its name but also in the composition of
its student body, faculty, and the companies that hire its graduates or have
contracts with IMC for executive programs. As of early 1996, 40% of grad-
uates were with international joint ventures and more than 20% had been
hired by multinationals. According to a study by Hay Management Consul-
tants (1995), IMC graduates with MBAs “typically triple or quadruple their
salaries within two years” after joining a company.
In terms of IMC’s financial situation, 1996 was a watershed year. IMC
had no endowment and, hence, needed contributions and self-generated rev-
enues to cover expenses. In 1996, three major contributors, who funded
about 25% of the budget, did not renew their support: the Hungarian-
American Enterprise Fund, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the East–
West Management Institute. To offset the loss of these contributors, IMC
launched a fund-raising campaign and, more significantly, it began to of-
fer additional executive programs. Clients for executive programs include,
among others, General Electric, Coca-Cola, United Technologies, Hilton,
Cyanamid, Ernst & Young, Ford, Johnson & Johnson, Daewoo, SKF, Novo-
tel, Shell, Siemens, and Unilever.
IMC further strengthened its capacity to develop general management
training programs by winning a $1.8 million contract from PHARE to train
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some 500 Hungarian middle manager. The project comprises five modules
over three days of training, plus individual consultations for companies that
employ participants. IMC faculty has participated in executive program
activities in Prague, Moscow, and Bucharest.
IMC’s budget had a slight surplus in 1995 and a surplus is also expected
for 1996. As of 1996, IMC was able to cover about 75% of its expenses. IMC
is faced with the challenge of offering more executive programs, taxing an
already burdened teaching faculty.
International Management Center Exhibit 1. Financial statements
between 1993 and 1995 and budget estimates for 1996. (For confidentiality,
data are in percentages.)
1993 1994 1995 1996
Ratio of earned revenues to expenditures 53 54 71 73
MBA programs 20 28 30 23
Executive programs 27 27 40 49
Contributions 47 44 30 28
Personnel expenditures 48 44 38 34
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Mu¨szertechnika, Hungary
I learned that growth can be dangerous if it is not managed properly.
Da´niel Ba´rdossy
Vice-President, Investment, Strategic Planning
By 1995, after undergoing a painful restructuring, Mu¨szertechnika had en-
tered a growth phase. The company at this time was better positioned to
adapt to the changing conditions than in 1992, when it suffered from trying
to grow too big, too fast. Mu¨szertechnika recognized that integration into
the world’s markets must start with its internal management.
Mu¨szertechnika’s main business lines consisted of computer hardware
and telecommunication, but it also manufactured and distributed office au-
tomation products, electronic visual displays, and frequency converters. In
1994, its total sales revenues were Ft4.5 billion with approximately 45% of
total revenues coming from computer-related sales. The breakdown of the
total sales in 1994 was as follows: computers, Ft2.0 billion; telecom, Ft0.5
billion; electronics, Ft1.0–1.5 billion; and finance, Ft0.5–1.0 billion.
Telecommunications, a relatively new venture, was starting to give re-
turns on Mu¨szertechnika’s investment. The company believed in the high
growth potential of the telecommunications sector in Central and Eastern
Europe.
In 1981, Hungarian law began to allow the formation of private com-
panies. That same year, Ga´bor Sze´les, an electrical engineer, formed
Mu¨szertechnika in a Budapest apartment with $500 of capital. The com-
pany, which started as a manufacturer and distributor of personal computers
in Hungary, grew and became quite profitable throughout the 1980s. Soon,
it had diversified its production by moving into other technology-related ar-
eas, such as telecommunications, office automation products, and electronic
visual displays, and gained access to global markets by teaming up with
foreign partners.
But the story would have been too simple had Mu¨szertechnika contin-
ued growing into the 1990s. As the company entered a new decade, it faced
many problems, including rising competition in both domestic and external
markets, a rapidly changing computer industry, and financial mismanage-
ment. These problems combined with highly vulnerable economic condi-
tions in Hungary in 1991 and 1992 to significantly hurt the company’s sales
and profits. Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 show Mu¨szertechnika’s
consolidated sales and net profits.
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Mu¨szertechnika’s attempt to overcome these difficulties was the true test
for a company seeking to integrate into the world economy. The manage-
ment’s recognition of a problem before it surfaced and its commitment to
change saved Mu¨szertechnika from bankruptcy.
Mu¨szertechnika grew steadily into the early 1990s as the demand for per-
sonal computers increased. Da´niel Ba´rdossy, Vice-President of Investment
and Strategic Planning, recalled that the company focused on sales growth,
and only sales growth: “If you could sell twice as much, that was twice as
good, and bank loans were easy to get, because banks saw this company as
a rapidly growing, profitable company, and everyone wanted to finance this
company. Banks were also very inexperienced.” Emphasizing sales growth
without looking at the other half of a formula – expenses – Mu¨szertechnika
did not see that the company was about to face serious problems.
At the root of the financial problems was Mu¨szertechnika’s organiza-
tional structure. Because the company started small and was essentially
entrepreneurial, its internal system could not support a rapidly growing busi-
ness. Mu¨szertechnika became a huge company with many subsidiaries under
one umbrella, yet with no separate profit centers. One of the problems was
the poor cost-accounting system. “The rough, Communist-type accounting
did not reflect the true picture of the company,” Ba´rdossy stated. Rather
than allocating sales and expenses to different subsidiaries for different ac-
tivities, accounting allocated everything to the parent company. Cash flow
generated by one subsidiary went to support another that needed it. This
presented two problems. First, it was difficult to sort out which activities
were truly profitable and which were losing money. Second, there was no
sense of responsibility for profits and losses at the subsidiary level, since the
end results showed up only at the parent level.
Management did not pay attention to such problems as long as sales
were up. It did not realize that though the company was profitable, it was
also very vulnerable to any changes. Before too long, unanticipated changes
took place in Hungary. In 1990, trade was liberalized and more foreign
competitors entered the computer market. As a result, the margins of 50% or
higher, which Mu¨szertechnika had enjoyed in the past, were squeezed down.
In addition, Hungary faced high interest rates. By this time Mu¨szertechnika
was already approximately $10 million in debt, and new financing would be
very expensive.
These problems were not unique to Mu¨szertechnika. Its other three
major domestic competitors – Kontract, Mikrosystem, and Control – had
virtually identical problems. “Everyone had big bank loans and was growing
too rapidly,” Ba´rdossy recalled. “By 1992, everyone had cash-flow problems.
Everyone also had big projects in unrelated areas, such as real estate. By
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the end of 1990, many companies realized that they were doing something
wrong.”
To survive, companies looked for equity financing, such as public of-
ferings or foreign investors. Mikrosystem and Control could not raise the
necessary money and quickly went bankrupt. Kontract and Mu¨szertechnika
each managed to raise $10 million from private investors. According to
Ba´rdossy, Robert Maxwell had said, “At least one of the investments should
survive.”
“Everyone learned a lesson from the past,” said Ba´rdossy, “but not too
much, because the companies who were able to raise money once again de-
cided to start big projects, sometimes returning to unrelated areas.” Finally
Kontract joined Mikrosystem and Control in bankruptcy.
Mu¨szertechnika’s salvation was that its management recognized prob-
lems a little bit earlier than the others and was committed to change.
Ba´rdossy stated:
Ga´bor Sze´les was very committed to change the company and take any
confrontation that went with it. We were ready to fire people, sell assets,
and reorganize to a structure that is more suitable to economic change.
We also needed some time to get our act together. Luckily or not, we
bought some time due to Robert Maxwell’s death, because there was no
longer immediate pressure from the “sleeping shareholder.”
In the short run, Mu¨szertechnika generated needed cash flow by selling
inventories at a loss. Much of its built-up inventory was quickly becoming
obsolete, and it was better to sell and recognize the loss right away rather
than hold on to outdated inventories. In the long run, it decided to focus its
activities on selling off companies that did not fit its electronics profile or that
were losing money. For example, the unprofitable Procomp subsidiary was
sold. (Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 3 provides a brief description of Procomp.)
Unlike its competitors, Mu¨szertechnika decided to diversify the company’s
activities yet still stay in the electronics field.
Another important decision Mu¨szertechnika made was to reorganize the
company. The company was too big and too diversified to function as a
single operation, and it needed a flexible organizational structure that could
be adjusted as it went into different activities. The end result was a holding
structure. Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 4 shows the new organizational chart.
The various activities of Mu¨szertechnika were structured as independent
profit centers under the coordination and control of MT Holding. At the end
of 1994, MT Holding had an interest in over 30 enterprises worldwide, which
include limited companies, stock companies, and wholly owned subsidiaries
founded by Mu¨szertechnika.
There were two main reasons why reorganization was necessary. First, it
became essential to have a good accounting system that accurately reflected
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the operations of the company. Second, by setting up a holding company
and independent subsidiaries, each subsidiary was responsible for its own
profits. The old organizational structure did not make sense for a company
with so many different activities, and the in-house accounting was not strong
enough, Ba´rdossy said: “There were arguments about expense allocations.
Some activities were profit makers for the long term and others were loss
makers, but we could not explain which were good and which were bad.”
Under the new organizational structure, the subsidiaries were responsible
for making their own operational decisions, leaving the holding company
to deal with the macro decisions, such as strategic and financing issues.
For these reasons, MT Holding kept all bank loans and real estate, and
real estate was leased to the subsidiaries. All other assets were distributed
among the subsidiaries. The idea was that smaller groups would be more
entrepreneurial, and each subsidiary could find its own place in the market.
It also gave the subsidiaries tighter control in their operations. “In the
new structure, it is clear to see which sub is doing well, and which is not,”
Ba´rdossy claimed.
It took about one year to organize this structure. The holding company’s
responsibilities included business development of new projects, control, and
personnel management such as salary determination and contract negoti-
ations. Mu¨szertechnika paid more attention to the importance of financial
management and began using new accounting methods, such as weekly finan-
cial reports for each subsidiary, comparing its projected performance with
its actual performance.
In trimming the company, the holding company also cut down its em-
ployee size from 100 to 20. MT Holding sold assets such as real estate in the
more pricy Buda part of Budapest and, to cut down operating costs dramat-
ically, moved out of its expensive downtown office. Ba´rdossy recollected:
We [the management] could not afford this. We did not change our old
cars. When traveling abroad, we did it by car, and if air, then coach. The
smallest things were controlled. There was no salary increase, not even for
the management and board members. Sze´les was very supportive of this
downsizing.
This holding structure and control system was very new in Hungary and
had been adapted from a Western concept. When asked how this type of
organizational structure came about, Ba´rdossy explained, “Reading many
books, like the Harvard Business Journal, about how other people are doing
and being exposed to foreign investors with very good education, I learned
a lot about how other people do business.” This specific idea came from
talking with foreign investment bankers, who gave the company free advice
on what they thought of the problems at Mu¨szertechnika and recommended a
holding structure. Ba´rdossy also noted that “attending Harvard in 1991 was
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very important, because I understood that our problem was not unique to
us, and that there was a solution. It also opened my eyes (and Sze´les’s) that
growth can be a very dangerous thing if you cannot manage it.” Harvard
further taught him the importance of financial management. One of the
actions he took upon his return was replacing bank loans with commercial
paper. Mu¨szertechnika was the first company in Hungary to do such a thing,
as commercial paper was a new concept in Hungary. At that time the gap
between treasury rates and bank interest rates was very big, sometimes 6–
7%, so they saved a good deal of money.
Another way in which Mu¨szertechnika positioned itself to integrate into
the market economy was through teaming up with foreign partners. Even
from the early 1980s Mu¨szertechnika realized that it needed foreign partners
to provide source markets and suppliers. Therefore, Mu¨szertechnika had al-
ways encouraged its employees to learn foreign languages and to look for an
opportunity with foreign companies. Mu¨szertechnika signed exclusive agree-
ments with L.M. Ericsson of Sweden, Alcatel of Austria, and IBM andWord-
Perfect of the United States. Foreign partnerships enabled Mu¨szertechnika
to diversify its product line and expand its markets. Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit
5 lists the strategic partners of Mu¨szertechnika in 1994.
Many of its foreign partners had started as suppliers to Mu¨szertechnika
and later signed on to joint-venture projects. Joint projects were initiated by
many foreign companies as often as Mu¨szertechnika initiated them, primarily
because Mu¨szertechnika provided the local knowledge that was often very
difficult for a foreigner to gain in Hungary. This included not only expertise
in the computer and telecommunications fields, but also familiarity with the
business culture, including the ability to deal with the government and, of
course, knowledge of the language. Foreign partners brought the technical
know-how and money. A successful joint venture normally lasted about five
to six years, after which time Mu¨szertechnika, having been paid a lucrative
premium, gained much technical knowledge and the ability to stand on its
own, while the foreign partner gained a market presence. However, the
former foreign partner, now with the local knowledge and the market share,
could become a competitor after such a project. Ba´rdossy responded, “That
is the way of doing business; five years is a long time, and we get paid a lot
for it.”
Mu¨szertechnika, however, did not jump on each opportunity that arose.
It was highly selective of its partners and of the activity it would enter into
in the joint venture. There were some activities that Mu¨szertechnika wanted
to keep to itself, such as MT Visual. When asked why, Ba´rdossy responded,
“We want to keep the market.”
Cost trimming, joint ventures, crisis management – everything boiled
down to the strength of management. Without solid people, Mu¨szertechnika
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would not have survived the turmoil in 1992 and 1993. At Mu¨szertechnika,
decisions were made at several levels, with executive activities and strategic
planning led by the Board of Directors. (Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 6 contains
information on the managing board of Mu¨szertechnika, and Mu¨szertechnika
Exhibit 7 shows the consolidated balance sheet.) The managing board con-
sisted of five members and all of them have been with the company since its
early stage in the 1980s. Four out of five have degrees in electrical engineer-
ing, and everyone speak English fluently.
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Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 1. Consolidated sales between 1985 and 1994
(in million Hungarian forints).
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Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 2. Gross profits (in million Hungarian forints).
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Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 3. Details on Procomp, a Mu¨szertechnika
subsidiary.
Mu¨szertechnika’s poor accounting operations extended into its subsidiaries, such
as Procomp. For example, all the cash flow generated by Procomp-Hungary went
back into Procomp-Switzerland to fund the marketing for a project being developed
by Procomp-Germany. Thus the money left research and development, but never
made it back to Mu¨szertechnika, the holding company. MT lost nearly $1 million
in 1993.
As a result of losses such as these, the holding company began selling sub-
sidiaries: Procomp-Germany and Procomp-Bratislava. The company sold off
Procomp-Taiwan, and then sold Procomp-USA to another Hungarian company for
an undisclosed sum. Mu¨szertechnika elected to keep Procomp-Switzerland, mainly
for financial transactions.
Procomp’s difficulties emerged from three different problems:
1. There as an overall computer-industry recession.
2. Procomp was a single-product company. It produced excellent products, but
it could not add more lines to the original before becoming outdated.
3. The liberalization of trade in Hungary resulted in more direct international
trade. The subsidiary’s most substantial profits had previously been generated
when Procomp-USA bought components from Taiwan and exported them to
Hungary. Procomp-Taiwan would not accept the Hungarian letters of credit,
but did accept letters from Switzerland, bringing in Procomp-Switzerland.
With more direct trade, such roundabout transactions became less necessary.
In 1993, Procomp’s bank debt to MT was around $10 million, on consolidated
terms.
Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 4. Organizational chart.
Mu¨szertechnika holdings
Computers Telecom Electronics Finance
MT Computer MT Telecom MT Office MT Invest
MT Budapest MT Datanet MT Visual MT Liz
MT Nationwide Network Hungaro Digitel MT Automatika MT Libra
MT Hostware Local Tecos
MT Training
Procomp
PC World
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Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 5. Strategic partners.
Line of MT Strategic
business participation partner Country Project/Product
Computers MT Computer Siemens Germany Computers
MT Computer Hewlett Packard USA Computers
MT Computer Fujitsu Japan Printers and peripherals
MT Computer WordPerfect USA Software
MT Computer Novell & 3COM USA Network products
Tele- MT Telecom Alcatel, UTS Austria, Engineering, Local
communi- USA telco operation
cations Ericsson LM Ericsson Sweden Radio communication
Technika systems, Manufacturing
of digital exchanges
Hungaro Digitel Radio Italy VSAT operation
Marconi
Office MT Office Canon Japan Copy machines
automation Ricoh Japan
MT Office Panasonic Japan Fax machines
Electronics Control Control UK Frequency converters
Technika Techniques
131
Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 6. Management profile.
Ga´bor Sze´les, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Founder.
Sze´les, 49, has over 20 years of experience in the technical industry. He serves as
President of Association of Hungarian Industrialists and is also a member of numer-
ous Hungarian economic and business organizations. Sze´les is also the Chairman
and CEO of Videoton, the largest electronic manufacturing company in Hungary.
Sze´les graduated from the Budapest Technical University as an electrical engineer.
He also attended Harvard University’s postgraduate Executive Management Pro-
gram. He is married, has two children, and is fluent in Hungarian and English.
Da´niel Ba´rdossy, Vice-President, Investments, Strategic Planning.
Ba´rdossy, 40, has been with Mu¨szertechnika since 1985. He serves as the Strat-
egy Group Chairman at MT and is also an advisory board member for several
commercial and economic associations in Hungary. He is a frequent lecturer, both
domestically and abroad, on the subject of corporate strategy. Ba´rdossy is an
electrical engineer and earned both his undergraduate and Ph.D. degrees from the
Budapest Technical University. He has completed Harvard University’s Executive
Management Program. He is married, has two children, and is fluent in Hungarian,
English, German, and French.
Zolta´n Ta´nko´, Vice-President, Communications.
Ta´nko´, 37, has been with MT since 1984 and currently serves as the project spe-
cialist for large-scale long-term ventures. He is a member of the Presidential Board
for the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry and is also active in several
telecommunication organizations. Ta´nko´ graduated with an electrical engineer de-
gree from the Budapest Technical University. He is married, has two children, and
is fluent in Hungarian and English.
Ma´ria Vissi, Vice-President, Finance, Accounting.
Vissi, 46, has been with MT since 1987 and her current responsibilities entail the
coordination of finance and accounting for MT’s domestic and foreign interests. She
is an active member in several domestic and international economic and finance
council symposiums. Vissi received her Ph.D. from the Budapest University of
Economics. She is married, has two children, and is fluent in Hungarian, English,
German, and Russian.
Pe´ter Lakatos, Vice-President, Trade and Privatization.
Lakatos, 33, has been with MT since 1986. As an international trade and commerce
specialist, Lakatos has an active role in MT’s involvement in trade and privatiza-
tion as well as the coordination of Soviet market activities and domestic office
automation operations. He graduated from the Budapest Technical University with
a degree in electrical engineering. He is married, has two children, and is fluent in
Hungarian, English, German, French, and Russian.
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Mu¨szertechnika Exhibit 7. Balance sheet, 1994 (in million Hungarian
forints).
Assets
Current assets
Cash and securities 423
Accounts receivable 955
Bills of exchange 56
Inventory 362
Total current assets 1,796
Noncurrent assets
Land and premises 647
Machinery 103
Financial investments 96
Intangible investments 69
Total noncurrent assets 915
Prepaid expense 12
Total assets 2,723
Liabilities and equity
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 412
Other short-term
liabilities 430
Short-term credits and loans 20
Total current liabilities 862
Total long-term liabilities 5
Owners’ equity
Share capital 840
Capital reserve 515
Retained earnings 462
Total owners’ equity 1,817
Accrued expenses 39
Total liabilities and equity 2,723
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New World Publishing: Budapest Business
Journal, Warsaw Business Journal,
Prague Business Journal
The Budapest Business Journal has a simple editorial philosophy.
We seek to peel back the abstractions which, in most
business publications, pile up more quickly than blankets
on a cold winter evening. We try to remember that an economy
is not a mound of numbers, but an assembly of human decisions;
that a business is not a concrete structure, but a fabric
woven of human relationships. Our reporters push to strip
every story back to its human core.
Henry Copeland
Editor
The Budapest Business Journal (BBJ ) was founded in 1992 in Hungary
by Mike Stone, an American who had been an editor for several regional
business journals, including the Orange County Business Journal in Cali-
fornia. Stone originally came to Hungary to work for the Budapest Post,
an English-language newspaper that provided general local news for expa-
triates. After working there for a month he determined that there was a
market for an English-language paper in Budapest that had a business fo-
cus. Based on this premise, the Budapest Business Journal was created. By
October of 1993, Stone, an entrepreneur at heart, decided to move on to
greener pastures. (Stone went on to start the Mexico City Business Journal
right after the peso devaluation in 1994 and, as of 1995, was planning to start
up a business journal in Vietnam.) The company was purchased by three
young Americans with the backing of a group of primarily US investors. The
two controlling partners were Steve O’Connor and Thom Barnhardt, with a
smaller interest held by Douglas Wheeler. Both O’Connor and Wheeler had
been employees of Stone and were responsible for much of the modest success
that had occurred up to the point of purchase. Barnhardt, who received an
MBA from the University of Virginia’s Darden Graduate School of Business
in 1992, first joined the paper, in the summer of 1994 as a consultant for one
of the Journal’s special publications, Taking Stock: An Investor’s Guide to
the Budapest Stock Exchange.
The partners’ vision for the company was to replicate the success of
the American City Business Journals. The founders of the American City
Business Journals held that a market existed for business news that was
locally focused. This idea spawned a string of successful business journals
throughout the United States (these journals had the city or area name first,
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followed by the words “Business Journal,” for example, Charlotte Business
Journal ). O’Connor, Barnhardt, and Wheeler saw an opportunity for devel-
oping a similar series of papers throughout Eastern Europe. These papers
would emphasize business news, as the American City Business Journals
did, and would be published weekly. The new approach was that these East
European journals would be written in English, rather than in the language
of the country in which they were located.
The decision to publish the business journals in English meant that the
product would be necessarily targeted at a relatively narrow segment of the
population. However, the partners viewed this a positive factor and made it
one of the cornerstones of their corporate strategy. They saw that the rapid
influx of English-speaking foreign managers after the collapse of Communism
in 1989 had created a demand for a publication that provided insights into
conducting business in the rapidly changing environment. Furthermore, in a
part of the world where government had customarily maintained a tight rein
over the content of published information, there was a great demand for local
news that was unbiased and independent of the state-run news organizations.
Finally, the partners felt that there was a large enough segment of the local
population that was either fluent in English or wanted to be fluent in English
that would purchase the paper, and that the segment would grow.
After establishing a strong base in Hungary with the Budapest Business
Journal, the partners aspired to expand into other major cities across the
former East bloc. This strategy called for rapid growth.
When the three partners acquired the Budapest Business Journal in
1993, there were three or four other English-language newspapers in Bu-
dapest. However, all but one failed, missing the mark in fulfilling consumer
needs in this market. The one English-language publication that did succeed
was the Budapest Sun, a newspaper whose editorial content emphasized gen-
eral local news and that was targeted mainly toward tourists and foreigners
living in Budapest. The only English-language competitor that provided
business news was Business Central Europe, which was published by the
Economist and addressed issues germane to all of Eastern and Central Eu-
rope. While this monthly magazine did provide English-speaking executives
with comprehensive regional news coverage, it did not report and elucidate
day-to-day business happenings within Hungary.
The BBJ was a unique selling proposition to those fluent in English but
not in Hungarian; however, Budapest also had a more comprehensive busi-
ness newspaper, titled HVG, that was published in Hungarian. Since HVG
had a loyal Hungarian customer base, and was considerably less expensive
than the BBJ, it was viewed by those at the BBJ as a potential stumbling
block in acquiring a strong Hungarian national readership.
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The key driving forces for profitability in the Journal revolved around
advertising sales and paid subscriptions. These two components had a sym-
biotic relationship; as the number of paid subscribers increased, advertising
revenues also increased. As advertising revenues increased, the Journal was
able to afford a larger quantity of editorial content. With the increase in edi-
torial content, new subscribers were acquired. The Journal had to somehow
establish itself in this circle of events.
The partners’ original focal point had been on increasing the subscriber
base through the use of direct sales. This focus stemmed from O’Connor’s
previous strength as sales manager for the paper under Stone. As O’Connor
pursued direct sales, he was also educating the local market on what exactly
a business journal was. This strategy was initially effective and established
the name of the Budapest Business Journal in the expatriate community, but
the partners decided that direct sales were too slow and inefficient for their
growth plans. They rapidly shifted emphasis from a direct-sales method to
a direct-mailing system. This new marketing effort was headed by a young
Canadian, Eric Presley.
Presley was given the task of substantially expanding circulation. Many
of his efforts concentrated on direct-mail promotions targeted at English-
speaking business executives. This was a challenge since good mailing lists
were not readily available in Hungary in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, consider-
able time was spent on prospecting for lists and checking them for accuracy.
Finding good mailing lists required some level of creativity as well. For in-
stance, obtaining a list of leads from a foreign embassy often required trading
a subscription to the Journal for a one-time use of the list.
Another facet of Presley’s marketing efforts was geared toward market-
ing to business travelers in Hungary. This involved forging alliances with a
variety of businesses. For example, Presley built relationships with managers
at upscale hotels who would purchase BBJ subscriptions to offer free copies
of the Journal at the front desk or in hotel rooms. Similarly, several major
airlines agreed to purchase subscriptions for passengers on flights into and
out of Budapest.
Early in 1995, the marketing department established a telemarketing
unit to make sales calls to potential subscribers and existing ones whose
subscriptions were lapsing. These calls were primarily follow-up calls to
direct-mail solicitations. A major obstacle to this effort was finding reliable
lists of leads with accurate telephone numbers. Telemarketing time had to be
allocated beyond making sales calls to check the lists for accuracy. Gradually
the telemarketing unit contributed to sales, in addition to slowly compiling
a more reliable internal list of leads.
The one segment that was initially neglected as a primary recipient of
the BBJ’s marketing efforts was the potentially lucrative English-speaking
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Hungarian management population. While this group was generally more
price sensitive than expatriates working for wealthy multinationals, it was
obviously less transient than the primary target market, and therefore pos-
sessed more potential as a long-term loyal customer base. As increasing
numbers of Hungarian managers began subscribing to the BBJ, it became
apparent that they should be targeted more aggressively. To reach this
audience, Presley mailed special-price promotions to lists of subscribers to
HVG, and conducted more local promotions, such as a special deal for stock-
brokers to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Budapest Stock Exchange.
By 1995 the Budapest Business Journal had established a moderate level
of brand awareness among Hungarian managers as a high-quality business
publication, and boasted that Hungarian managers comprised 40% of their
circulation.
By the fall of 1994, the partners began looking to expand into a second
market in Eastern Europe. Although uncertain about the success of BBJ,
they felt that the relative risk of expansion was outweighed by the need
to grow rapidly. Prague and Warsaw were regarded as the best options
mainly because of their rapid growth and their efficacy in attracting foreign
investment. Since Poland seemed to possess a larger market and lacked direct
competition from the other newspapers, it was selected as the location for
New World Publishing’s second major publication, the Warsaw Business
Journal. Another advantage to launching a product in Poland was that
the country was just beginning to hit its stride in economic growth and the
partners felt that they could gain an early advantage in this market. The
Czech Republic had already reached a much higher level of development, and
a business journal might be perceived as a latecomer rather than a novelty.
The first step the partners took to enter the Warsaw market in December
1994 was to find a Polish-American who was familiar with the local business
environment. He owned a business in Warsaw and seemed to possess the
initiative and market acumen to help them establish their new enterprise.
They entered into a management agreement with him that stated that during
the initial three months he would find office space, hire a staff, establish a
circulation system, and produce a pilot issue. For this work, he would be
issued a 5% ownership interest in the company. To cement this alliance, the
BBJ would get 10% of his original company.
Soon after beginning to perform some of the agreed-upon tasks, the Pol-
ish partner demanded that he receive 50% of the entire company. Refusing
to comply, the partners paid him a termination fee, and he signed a non-
competition agreement. He immediately set up a competing paper, using
the partnership’s mailing list, format, and early advertising base. Polish law
was not yet developed enough to protect against the contractual breach.
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In December 1995, the company opened its third publication, the Prague
Business Journal. Although the partners had earlier passed over the Czech
Republic for a new product launch, in late 1995 they felt that industry con-
ditions were now opportune for a New World Publishing business journal
and that their East European business journal concept was well honed to
compete in Pargue’s developed market. In addition to launching a third
business journal, by February 1996 New World Publishing had purchased a
share in EPS, a software company, and was preparing to make its publica-
tions available on-line. Meanwhile, the partners continued to search for new
markets.
The partners attribute their success in these early years to three factors:
• Editorial Content: The principal strategic business focus throughout
New World Publishing’s history has been on developing editorial quality
and integrity and delivering it in creative ways. This focus allowed the
company to position its publications as premium products and to develop
a positive image reflecting the quality and integrity of the product.
• Well-targeted Marketing: The company used its positive image among
consumers to market its products not only to foreign expatriates, but to
the respective country’s nationals as well. The success in this effort was
reflected in reader surveys that revealed that 40% of the readers in both
Budapest and Warsaw were local national.
• Strong Advertising Sales Force: Advertising sales was an area of weak-
ness of many local competitors. The partners recognized that they could
excel in this area; by committing resources to advertising sales early on,
the BBJ was able to develop a strong advertising base. When expand-
ing into new markets, the solid relationships built up with advertisers,
combined with the editorial quality displayed in each new paper, allowed
the company to offer regional deals to advertisers. One regional adver-
tising contract in 1996 was with Scala International, a company that sell
accounting systems.
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Pick Szeged, Hungary
Pick Szeged’s ability to learn quickly has helped the salami company make its
transition from a planned Communist economy to the free market. Forced to
adapt to capital markets in Hungary, it learned to listen to market demand
and how to promote its products. In short, it became a capitalist enterprise.
Pick has worked to build a strong market position in both the domestic and
export markets. Pick’s future growth, however, could be constrained by the
decreasing number of livestock in Hungary, and its real challenge lies in its
ability to manage growth through efficiency.
Pick Szeged celebrated its 125th anniversary in 1994. In 1869, Mark
Pick started salami production in Szeged on the banks of the Tisza River
in the southern part of Hungary. Its product is often called winter salami,
because the production of salami was limited to the winter months until the
introduction of a cooling system in 1920. After World War II, Pick, along
with all the companies in Hungary, was nationalized. In 1992, Pick became
a public company with its shares listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange. In
1994, Pick acquired the Herz Salami Factory, which was its main competitor
in Hungary.
Pick is Hungary’s leading meat processor and salami producer. Its main
activities are divided into two categories – red-meat and dry-meat produc-
tion. In 1994, Pick processed approximately 42,000 pigs and 10,000 cows.
Its products range from red meat and ham to various sausages and salamis.
Pick is best known for its winter salami, which is the most profitable line,
accounting for approximately half of its turnover. Pick is the largest pro-
ducer of salami (12,000 tons in 1994) in Hungary. The next biggest salami
producer was Herz (4,000 tons), which is now owned by Pick.
Until 1987, Pick belonged to the Animal Trading and Meat Industrial
Trust, which was composed of the 21 largest Hungarian meat-processing en-
terprises. Each company distributed meats to an assigned region throughout
Hungary, and the Trust allocated all profits generated by meat companies.
The company had no control over its operation and production level, as the
Trust dictated everything. The market was not a real market, because the
Trust told the companies where they could sell products. Consequently Pick,
even though it had originally been only a salami company, under Commu-
nism added other meat-processing activities. Export was also dictated by
the Trust and was heavily subsidized, so that the meat prices paid by the
CMEA trading partners were artificially low.
The Hungarian meat industry has been facing difficulties due to decreas-
ing quantities of domestic livestock. In 1994, because of lack of raw mate-
rials, Pick had to reduce slaughtering from two shifts to one. Pick Szeged
Exhibit 1 shows that the supply of livestock has been drastically decreasing
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in Hungary. As supplies of raw materials have been decreasing prices have
been increasing. The increase in the price of pigs is shown in Pick Szeged
Exhibit 2. This is a serious problem because meat companies must increase
prices in a market where the consumers are already price sensitive.
In 1994, Pick’s total turnover was Ft17.5 billion (a 35% increase over
the prior year), and profit before tax was Ft1.4 billion (a 27% increase). The
overall breakdown of sales is shown in Pick Szeged Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4.
Over half of sales comes from dried-meat products. In the Hungarian market,
Pick operates eight outlets of its own and supplies other food retailers and
wholesalers. Pick dominates the Hungarian dried-meat sector, as it accounts
for about 95% of total salami production. In the raw-meat market, Pick’s
main competitors are Gyulai Huskombinat and Bacshus Rt. in the Szeged
region and Zalahus and Papai Huskombinat in the Budapest area.
Exports constitute 36% of Pick’s total sales, and over 80% of exports are
dried-meat products, such as salami. Germany is the major export market,
accounting for 76% of total exports of dried-meat products in 1994. Prior
to 1994, all exports were handled by Terimpex which had also been a state-
owned company, so Pick had no knowledge of its exports. “We had no idea
who we sold our products to and how much [they bought],” said Zolta´nMasa,
Assistant Manager of Exports. Pick set up its own export department to
handle every aspect of exports, from seeking out markets to shipping.
As the company sees little growth potential in the domestic market, it
is looking to increase its export, especially of more profitable products like
salami. The management sees EU countries as a big potential market, but
is also exploring a new market – the Far East – with a major Japanese food
distributor.
The Hungarian State Property Agency initiated the privatization of
state-owned companies in 1989. Pick was faced with different privatization
options. The first possibility was to find a strategic investor who could bring
in cash and business knowledge to help the company become competitive.
However, the SPA rejected this idea because it felt that Pick’s trademark
should remain Hungarian. The second option was a management or em-
ployee buy-out, but the SPA thought that the company was too valuable
for such a choice. “Also we did not have money in our pockets to buy a
company like this,” stated Luka´cs Va´mosi, the Financial Director. Instead,
the SPA suggested that Pick, a healthy, sizable business, become a public
company. Pick was one of the very few Hungarian companies that the SPA
viewed as a good candidate for a public offering.
The management agreed to the SPA’s plan, even though it felt it needed
one or two years to clean out the company before going to the public market.
“The stock exchange was a new thing, and we were thrown into the water
and had to learn to swim,” Va´mosi stated. To attract investors, especially
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foreign investors, it was important to create a good image of the company.
To begin, Pick formed a new company structure to reflect a more market-
oriented approach. The company split into two strategic business lines –
meat producing and dry meat – because they were in different markets.
New marketing and export departments were set up, and the former struc-
ture, with many different activities under one umbrella, was reorganized.
Management divided various activities into independent units, including a
trucking company, livestock-fattening companies, and butcher and process-
ing companies. A public listing also meant that Pick needed to change its
accounting system in accordance with international accounting standards,
and the company needed to be valued. “These were all important to pre-
pare the company for the big change,” Va´mosi stated.
A year later, in 1992, Pick became a public company with an initial
capitalization of Ft2.724 billion. Hungary granted Pick a five-year 100% tax
holiday and a 60% tax holiday for another five years. At least 30% of Pick’s
shares had to be sold to foreign investors to qualify for the tax holidays.
Since privatization, Pick has been successful in building the foundations
of a modern company – the first necessary step to integrate into the world
economy. An important step was the development of a marketing strategy,
which did not exist in a centrally planned economy. Pick’s strategy included
heavy marketing of the trademark to associate it with quality. Since the meat
business generates very low margins, Pick has recognized that its profit must
come from higher margin products such as salami.
Pick first designed a new company logo, because previously there had
been no brand name for it products. Whereas two years ago no one at Pick
understood marketing, now everyone has seen its value. Va´mosi admitted,
“When the marketing manager is in the room with us [other managers], we
complain about how much money is spent on marketing, but when he is
not in the room we talk about how successful the marketing investment has
been and how we should spend more money on it.” As part of the campaign
for brand-name recognition, Pick opened its own retail shops to sell and
promote Pick products. These shops are not only good for marketing: they
also help to attract foreign investors.
Pick spent over Ft700 million to develop and improve its competitive-
ness in 1994, purchasing modern machines for meat processing, storing, and
packaging. In addition, three of Pick’s company stores began using the bar-
code system. With the foreign investors in mind, these investments are an
important part of constantly upgrading the company.
In 1994, Pick purchased the Herz Salami Factory, the other important
Hungarian salami producer, which had gone bankrupt. To Pick, this was
an opportunity not only to increase its production capacity, but also to
improve its competitive position in sausage production. Pick bought 96.4%
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of Herz for Ft918 million; the remaining shares are held by the State Property
Agency. Pick plans to upgrade the plant, improve product quality, and sell
goods under a separate brand name.
Pick also acquired a majority interest in Iliker, a retail chain with 20
shops based in Szeged. Through such acquisitions, the company hopes to
meet its objective of increasing its presence in the domestic market.
“As a share company we are expected to grow,” notes Va´mosi. Pick
recognizes the need to expand its market presence through heavy market-
ing. Building brand recognition and acquiring businesses have been part of
Pick’s plan to grow, in both the domestic and international markets. In the
export market, Pick is gearing up for Hungary’s future entrance in the EU.
Hungary’s participation in the EU will mean both bigger market opportu-
nities and more fierce competition as more firms enter the meat industry.
In anticipation of this, Pick has been preparing itself to be more competi-
tive, believing that the path to competitiveness is through increased size and
brand-name recognition. This is another reason why Pick acquired Herz and
is looking for more acquisition opportunities. The Pick trademark is now
known in other West European countries, and its standard of quality must
conform to those markets. But Pick realizes that it is a small company when
compared with the international companies with whom it will soon compete.
Pick Szeged Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7 show recent financial statements and
Pick Szeged Exhibit 8 gives the background of senior managers.
Pick will face two main challenges in the future. In the domestic market,
Pick must deal with the decreasing numbers of livestock. Because of the
decrease, meat prices in Hungary have increased recently, and are expected
to rise further. Pick Szeged Exhibit 2 indicates that in 1994 alone, pig
prices almost doubled. Clearly, the company’s growth is limited by the raw
materials available to it. The problem of decreasing livestock production is
said to be due to inefficient pig and cattle raising and production techniques
introduced under Communism. So far, the company has met the demand for
its product by engaging in long-term contracts with suppliers and by helping
suppliers raise livestock. Yet the question remains, How can the company
manage to grow when the number of livestock is simply shrinking and price
is rising? The same problem exists in the export market, even though the
salami prices are still relatively low compared with West European products.
Although Pick recognizes that it needs to grow through exports, this
strategy also presents challenges. Products with a very distinct flavor are
even more difficult to export. Masa explains that “export is difficult, be-
cause the taste of meat differs from country to country, even from region to
region. Some countries are not familiar with salami.” By joining up with
foreign partners, Pick hopes to gain access to new and unexplored markets.
For example, Pick has found a Japanese food distributor that will import
142
salamis and distribute them through its network. Masa further emphasizes
the importance of having the right foreign partners. He indicated that a
company such as Pick knows all the ins and outs of its domestic market,
but it has to rely heavily on its foreign partners’ expertise with regard to
exports.
Pick now has control over its export sales, but maintaining control will
be a big challenge for Pick because it is at the beginning of its learning curve.
To prepare itself for world integration it must learn quickly. Pick has been
negotiating a joint venture with a long-time import partner in Germany,
believing that joint ventures will improve its penetration of export markets.
Pick Szeged Exhibit 1. Livestock in Hungary between 1990 and 1994 (in
thousands).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Pigs 8,000 5,993 5,364 5,001 4,356
Cattle 1,571 1,420 1,159 999 910
Source: Presentations at the Annual General Meeting of Pick Szeged, 1995.
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Pick Szeged Exhibit 2. Average price of pigs in in Hungary 1994. Source:
Pick Szeged Annual Report, 1995.
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Pick Szeged Exhibit 3. Breakdown of net turnover and sales, between
1992 and 1994 (in million Hungarian forints).
1992 1993 1994 1994–1993
Domestic 6,916 7,722 11,178 144.8%
Export 4,008 5,291 6,286 118.8%
Total 10,924 13,013 17,464 134.2%
Sources: Presentations at the Annual General Meeting of Pick Szeged, 1995; Pick Szeged
Annual Report, 1995.
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Pick Szeged Exhibit 4. Breakdown of sales. Sources: Presentations at the
Annual General Meeting of Pick Szeged, 1995; Pick Szeged Annual Report,
1995.
Pick Szeged Exhibit 5. The Pick Group.
Pick Transport Ltd. (100%)
Pick Farm Pig Fattening Ltd. (100%)
Pick Central Pig Fattening Ltd. (100%)
Herz Meat Products and Dried Meat Products Ltd. (100%)
Szegedi Eliker (96.40%)
Herz Co. (55.10%)
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Pick Szeged Exhibit 6. Balance sheets (in thousand Hungarian forints).
1994 1993 1992a
Current assets
Cash 429,583 121,462 55,846
Accounts receivables 1,337,330 1,511,481 1,092,850
Inventories 3,067,753 2,440,066 1,792,674
Other current assets 343,917 412,841 183,281
Total current assets 5,178,583 4,485,850 3,124,651
Fixed assets
Long-term receivables 119,869 8,820 12,798
Investments 40,303 43,238 40,293
Property, plant,
and equipment 4,932,604 3,818,212 3,177,232
Intangible assets 575,783 19,909 8,888
Total fixed assets 5,668,559 3,890,179 3,239,211
Total assets 10,847,142 8,376,029 6,363,862
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 872,576 803,639 487,974
Short-term debt 508,473 1,272,884 644,569
Current maturities of long-term debt 154,900 305,821 159,772
Other current liabilities 671,928 559,044 351,824
Total current liabilities 2,207,877 2,941,388 1,644,139
Long-term debt, less current portion 25,900 328,465 607,410
Minority interest 208,707
Shareholders’ equity
Share capital 2,657,000 2,270,000 2,270,000
Capital reserve 3,138,934 1,197,338 1,061,345
Treasury shares -48,154 -11,707 -2,450
Retained earnings 2,656,878 1,650,545 783,418
Total liabilities and equity 10,847,142 8,376,029 6,363,862
aFigures are for the six-month period ending 31 December 1992.
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Pick Szeged Exhibit 7. Income statements (in thousand Hungarian
forints).
1994 1993 1992a
Net sales 16,877,001 12,948,654 5,994,229
Cost of goods sold 12,398,375 9,326,582 4,165,113
Gross profit 4,478,626 3,622,072 1,829,116
Selling and administrative expense 3,352,233 2,564,900 1,318,457
Export subsidies 288,074 274,942 108,230
Other operating income 311,531 199,796 190,426
2,752,628 2,090,162 1,019,801
Income from operations 1,725,998 1,531,910 809,315
Net interest expense 407,680 426,545 273,438
Income before income taxes 1,318,318 1,105,365 533,877
Provision for income taxes 18,242 11,791 229,543
Income after taxes 1,300,076 1,093,574 304,334
Dividend declared 291,516 226,447 226,447
Minority interest 2,227
To retained earnings 1,006,333 867,127 77,887
aFigures are for the six-month period ending 31 December 1992.
Pick Szeged Exhibit 8.
Ja´nos Taka´cs, Director of Corporate Development, engineer, 55.
Taka´cs received his GCE and diploma as technician in 1958. He obtained a diploma
in mechanical engineering from the Miskolc Technical University and became a
design engineer in 1964. After holding various positions with previous employers,
he joined Pick as Chief Engineer in 1986. In 1990, he was promoted to Technical
Director and on 30 June 1991 to his present position. In 1992, he received a diploma
in marketing management.
Luka´cs Va´mosi, Director of Economic Planning, economist, 44.
Va´mosi graduated from the University of Economics in Pe´cs in 1976 and received
a diploma as a chartered accountant in 1984. He joined Pick in 1987 and was later
appointed Accounting and Financial Manager and External Finance Director before
he attained his current position.
Andra´s Ku¨hn, Director of Meat, engineer, 49.
Ku¨hn joined Pick in 1963. While working at the company he graduated from the
Szeged Special Technical School for the Food Industry in 1967 and received his
engineering diploma in 1973 from the College of Food Industry. In 1969, he was
appointed Chief Technologist. He was promoted to Head of the Abattoir in 1975,
to Production Manager in 1988, and to his current position in 1991. In 1992, he
received a diploma in marketing management.
Karoly Pataki, Director of meat products, economist, 60.
Pataki graduated from the Faculty of Industry of the University of Economics in
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Budapest in 1957. He joined Pick in 1963. His positions with Pick have included
Deputy Head of the Commercial Department, Head of the Economics Department,
Director of Economic Planning, and Director of Production and Sales. In 1991, he
was appointed Director of Meat Products.
Vilmos Bihari, Executive Director, 48.
Bihari obtained a degree at the Finance Faculty of the University of Economics,
Budapest, in 1969. In 1980, he was awarded the chartered accountancy diploma.
Bihari joined Pick in 1969 where he has held various positions in the finance depart-
ment. He held the post of Director of Economic Planning prior to his appointment
as General Manager in 1990.
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Price Waterhouse/Hungary
By the summer of 1995, Price Waterhouse was involved in a consulting
partnership with 23 firms globally. The two largest firms were the European
firm and the US firm. Price Waterhouse has maintained an office in Hungary
since 1989, and has advised corporations in both the public and private
sectors as well as multinational companies.
Price Waterhouse/Hungary divides its practice groups into three distinct
services: Audit and Business Advisory Services, Tax and Legal Services, and
Corporate Finance and Recovery.
The Audit and Business Advisory Services group provides many of the
accounting services that are related to accounting. These services are broken
down into Audit and Accounting Services, Due Diligence Reviews, Opera-
tional and Working Capital Reviews, Internal Audit Services, and Computer
Information Services. In 1995 there were five partners in Audit and Busi-
ness Advisory Services; one is a Hungarian speaker, one was from the United
States and had extensive auditing experience, another partner was fluent in
Hungarian, and the last two were from Britain and the United States.
Tax and Legal Services was broken down into two divisions: Taxation
Services and Legal Services. Some members of the Taxation Services team
had served with the Hungarian Tax Office and the Ministry of Finance, and
others have extensive international experience. The Legal Services group
was responsible for advising multinational and Hungarian corporations on
a wide range of legal and technical questions, which included joint-venture
agreements, incorporation, intellectual property, leases, registration, licens-
ing, and interpretation of legislation. The managing partner of Price Water-
house/Budapest was a lawyer by training, but none of the three partners in
Tax and Legal Services were lawyers; two of these partners spoke Hungarian.
Corporate Finance and Recovery assisted in transforming Hungary from
a state-run economy to a market-governed economy. Corporate Finance and
Recovery was divided into the following activities: Acquisitions, Disposals,
and Finance Raising; Privatization Advice; Corporate Recovery; Asset and
Business Valuations; Real Estate Services; and Human Resources Consult-
ing. There were two partners in Corporate Finance and Recovery. The
partner in charge of this department was Andrew Terner.
Terner had extensive experience in crisis and recovery management,
some of it in bankruptcy work in the United States. Terner once owned
a consulting firm in Beverly Hills, California. An American citizen, Terner
was born in Hungary and speaks fluent Hungarian.
Price Waterhouse has actually been in Hungary since 1987, when the
Canadian Partnership of Price Waterhouse won a bid for a World Bank
project to design an executive information system for a major utility. This
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initial presence was followed up by the establishment of a permanent office
in Budapest in 1989. This office, which was established by the European
Partnership of Price Waterhouse, was the first permanent, foreign consulting
firm in Hungary. The office initially had three consultants. Terner has
been with Price Waterhouse in Budapest since 1990, when the firm had 50
employees. By 1990, KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen, and Coopers
& Lybrand were established in Hungary. Deloitte & Touche, the remaining
Big Six firm, entered the market a short time later.
Early on, Price Waterhouse established a policy of hiring as many young
Hungarians as possible. By 1990, however, only half of the employees were
Hungarian. Most consulting work at Price Waterhouse was done by en-
gagement teams flown in from other Price Waterhouse partnerships on a
case-by-case basis.
By the summer of 1995, this was no longer the case. Less than 10% of
the employees at the Budapest office held foreign passports. Although this
transformation has been rapid at the low levels of the organization (mid-level
consultants and support staff), it is not as evident at the partnership level,
where only one of the partners is a Hungarian national. However, five of the
partners speak fluent Hungarian.
The key employment challenge for Price Waterhouse/Hungary has been
balancing “local skills” with “technical skills.” Hungarians generally have
the local skills, such as knowledge of Hungarian processes and customs. In
addition, Hungarians have the language advantage. Foreigners generally
have more proficient technical skills: one acquires these skills through ex-
perience and formal education. Price Waterhouse/Hungary appears to have
made the assumption that it is easier to teach Hungarians technical skills
than to teach foreign consultants local skills.
Price Waterhouse has a policy of training and promoting staff internally.
In the Corporate Finance and Recovery area this policy is evidenced by
the fact that by the summer of 1995 50% of the local consulting staff had
MBAs (most of the foreign consultants had MBAs). The average age of the
consulting staff is under 30.
The period between 1989 and 1991 was a gold-rush period in Hungary,
especially in Budapest. Large multinationals would often have their annual
meetings in Budapest to check Hungarian opportunities firsthand. Hungar-
ian expatriates and foreign “prospectors” were arriving by the planeload.
There were many get-rich-quick schemes, and there were more business op-
portunities than could be taken advantage of. By 1995, the Hungarian mar-
ket for consulting had come full circle. This maturing process was character-
ized by increased competition from local consulting firms and savvy on the
part of clients of what can and cannot be expected from a consulting firm.
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Price Waterhouse’s major competitors in 1995 were the remaining five of
the Big Six accounting/consulting firms. In addition, local consulting firms,
investment banks, law firms, and other international management consulting
firms were becoming competitive.
Another challenge was to maintain a balanced portfolio of clients. Large
multinational companies were initially the most desirable clients, and would
always constitute a significant part of Price Waterhouse/Hungary’s business.
However, it was expected that most future growth would come from adding
large Hungarian companies to the client list (MATA´V, MOL, MALEV,
and so on). Price Waterhouse/Hungary was trying to increase its business
through local contacts and a strong Hungarian presence in its Budapest of-
fice. International business would continue to be developed and enhanced
by the established position that Price Waterhouse had with the home offices
of major international companies that conduct business in Hungary.
Hungary is very network oriented, with considerable emphasis placed on
personal contacts. Many national leaders have known each other since their
student days. When Terner first returned to Hungary he asked a friend from
the apartment complex where he used to live as a boy to set up meetings
with some influential Hungarians. His friend arranged 170 meetings with
the newly established “movers and shakers” in Hungary.
Terner emphasized the necessity of keeping close contact with a wide
variety of influential people. Business executives make up the core of this
group, but the group also includes a strong contingent of politically powerful
individuals. These political contacts are (and will continue to be) especially
vital given the government’s strong influence in the Hungarian business world
during the mid-1990s.
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SBG&K Patent and Law Offices, Hungary
Founded in 1969 as an independent law/patent office, SBG&K was originally
known as Law Office 16 under the Communist regime. In 1989 it became
an international law office and changed its name to SBG&K (after the first
letter of each principle’s last name).
By the summer of 1995, SBG&K had grown substantially. Whereas 30
people would be a fairly large law firm in Hungary, SBG&K employed 104
people – 14 partners, 11 associates, and 79 support staff. This growth was
aided by the fact that SBG&K was both a general law office and a patent law
office. In Hungary there is a distinction between lawyers and patent attor-
neys, and a firm combining both is rare. Eight of the partners were patent
attorneys and six were lawyers. Primary specializations included business
law, competition, and intellectual property. SBG&K was responsible for 25%
of the 2,340 patent applications sought in Hungary in 1994. In addition, of
the 1,900 trademarks registered and published in Hungary during that same
time period, SBG&K was responsible for 22%
Some 90% of SBG&K’s clients were large multinationals with offices in
Budapest. SBG&K has direct client contact with multinationals, and it did
not maintain exclusive relationships with any foreign law firms.
SBG&K Law Office was governed by a five-member Board of Directors.
Three of the members were lawyers, and the remaining two members were
patent attorneys.
Katalin Szamosi was a member of the board, and has extensive experi-
ence in Hungarian and international law. Her interest in law stems from the
influence of her father, who was a famous Hungarian lawyer. She attended
the University of Law in Budapest, then started working at SBG&K. After
three years as an associate, she was selected to become a partner. After a
further three years, Szamosi was selected to join the five-person board that
governed SBG&K. Szamosi was the only woman on the board. Her prac-
tice has focused on business establishments of primarily German and Swiss
corporations in Hungary.
Using a competitive analysis, the different layers of SBG&K’s competi-
tive advantage can be divided into bargaining power of suppliers (prospec-
tive employees), threat of substitutes and new entrants (other law firms),
and bargaining power of buyers (clients). Szamosi discussed each of these
layers in-depth.
In most law firms in Hungary in 1995, a patent attorney could not
become a partner. However, at SBG&K patent attorneys made up over 50%
of the partners. This situation increased the talent pool of SBG&K and
differentiated it from its closest competitors.
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In addition, SBG&K had a reputation as the leading domestic law firm,
increasing its ability to recruit the most promising legal minds in Hungary.
This advantage, along with the size advantage mentioned previously, resulted
in SBG&K having a significant power advantage over its prospective employ-
ees. According to Szamosi, competitors to SBG&K fell into two categories:
patent and trademark firms, which tend to be local; and business law firms,
which tend to be from the United States.
Since the large companies that SBG&K targeted as clients tended to
want a one-stop solution to all of their Hungarian legal problems, SBG&K’s
use of both patent attorneys and lawyers gave it a significant competitive
advantage over pure patent and trademark firms. There was only one other
large patent and trademark firm in Budapest, and it did not have any spe-
cialists in other forms of law. Therefore, it could not provide the full range
of services that large international corporations have come to expect.
Given their superior resources and international expertise, large US law
firms such as Baker & Mackenzie andWeil & Gotshall presented serious long-
term challenges to SBG&K. However, SBG&K possessed three competitive
advantages over these firms. SBG&K had more experience in Hungarian
legal procedures than the large US firms; it had a highly recognized presence
among clients in Hungary; and language was not an obstacle as 85% of the
partners and associates were fluent in English or German or both.
The clients of SBG&K were divided into two primary groups: compa-
nies interested in “industrial property protection” (intellectual property) and
companies interested in obtaining the legal assistance necessary to found an
affiliate company in Hungary. Clients that engaged SBG&K for industrial
property protection tended to be large foreign manufacturing concerns, such
as pharmaceutical companies from the United States and Western Europe,
and producers of industrial and technical products from East Asia (primarily
Japan and South Korea). These companies considered only law firms that
had high levels of local and international exposure and expertise. Compa-
nies that were interested in establishing a business tended to have had prior
contact with SBG&K, primarily through the industrial property protection
practice. In addition to the pharmaceutical companies and companies in-
terested in industrial and technical products that the industrial property
protection business introduced, the business foundation practice tended to
have clients from the food and chemical industries.
SBG&K’s strong customer focus was due to the highly competitive na-
ture of the legal service industry in Hungary. However, the relative bar-
gaining power of clients was fairly low during the time period directly after
the fall of Communism in 1989. Established law firms with a presence in
Hungary were relatively rare, and there was a huge demand for accurate
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legal and business advice during this gold-rush period. By the summer of
1995, the overall influx of new clients had slowed down, and SBG&K had
begun to focus on the key factors that differentiated the firm from its main
competitors.
Another important key to SBG&K’s success was its international name
recognition. The firm had spent considerable time in promotional activities
since as far back as the 1960s. These activities included attendance at all
important conferences and lectures involving intellectual property and mem-
bership in all international intellectual property organizations. For exam-
ple, SBG&K was a member of INTA, the International Trademark Associa-
tion, the largest organization for trademarks and patents. Representatives of
SBG&K regularly attended the organization’s annual meetings, even though
they were held in the United States. Another example is the firm’s member-
ship in the International Bar Association. Finally, client exchange programs
with firms overseas were other ways that SBG&K continued to maintain its
leading presence in the Hungarian market.
SBG&K has faced many of the same challenges that most service firms
in Eastern Europe have faced. The firm has had to divide resources between
acquiring international clients, who paid in convertible currencies, and con-
tinuing to perform legal work. This activity was particularly apparent at
the partner level.
Travel time depended upon the partner involved. Language ability and
personal preference were important factors. For example, one partner was
fluent in English, German, and French, but he was afraid of air travel. This
obviously reduced his overall travel opportunities. However, on average,
partners traveled approximately 10 weeks each year.
Associates progressed to the partnership level through a petition process.
After three years, the petition can be answered in one of three ways: yes,
no, or continuation of the associates program for another three years.
SBG&K was originally located on Dalszinhaz Street, near the Budapest
Opera. As the staff grew, it was necessary to move into a larger office. In
December 1994, the firm moved to offices located in a renovated turn-of-the-
century villa, located on Andrassy Avenue, near Heroes Square. SBG&K
placed a great deal of emphasis on keeping the exterior of the office build-
ing true to the original intent of the architects, while designing a modern
interior; the offices had direct access to the Hungarian Ministry of Justice
computer databases and internet access has been hardwired into the build-
ing. SBG&K uses the location, appearance, and functionality of its offices as
an opportunity for conveying its success, especially to international clients.
From 1980 to 1995, there were significant changes in the types of clients
that SBG&K served. Obviously, after the changes in 1989 the foreign pres-
ence increased and client work shifted to an international focus. The type of
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work that SBG&K performed for these international clients changed as well.
The year 1990 was the high point of the boom in Hungary. Domestic and
foreign investors wanted to start companies or subsidiaries, and the possi-
bilities appeared to be unlimited. However, the Hungarian economy slowed
down between 1991 and 1994, and other markets with greater opportunities
emerged. Clients were now seeking legal solutions to established business
problems.
The future presents challenges to SBG&K, primarily in the form of for-
eign competition. Regulations of the Budapest Bar Association state that
although foreign firms can hire Hungarian lawyers, they cannot be a law firm
de jure. Foreign firms can only open representational offices, through which
they may work with Hungarian attorneys, creating a de facto law practice.
According to Szamosi, SBG&K has ambitions to become still larger in
the future. Its main needs included employing qualified lawyers, especially
those who can deal with the rapid technological changes and have the req-
uisite language skills. Szamosi expects revenue growth to be moderate over
the years from 1995 to the turn of the century.
A final interesting development was the establishment of a limited lia-
bility corporation, “Tarsulas Kft.,” to supervise the capital and other invest-
ments of SBG&K. The necessity of Tarsulas Kft., acting as a sort of financial
management company for SBG&K, demonstrates the difficulty of managing
all aspects of a service corporation. Tarsulas and its five employees were
placed under the direct supervision of the Managing Director of SBG&K:
the corporation was founded by the partners of SBG&K.
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Senior Vaci Ko¨to¨ttarugyar Rt., Hungary
Senior Vaci Ko¨to¨ttarugyar Rt. is a large, vertically integrated knitwear man-
ufacturing company, headquartered north of Budapest in Va´c, Hungary.
The company produces 100% cotton and cotton mix (cotton/lycra, cot-
ton/polyester) sportswear, leisurewear, and fitness clothes for adults and
children.
Founded in 1885 in Budapest by Beno Leichter, it is the first Hungar-
ian textile and knitwear company. In 1889 the company held a ceremonial
opening of its first manufacturing plant in Va´c. Over the following years
the company enjoyed an increase in capital and sales, and was noted for
its competitiveness and high quality. It was awarded a gold medal in the
Millennium Ceremony Competition in 1896. However, by 1918 the company
was facing severe difficulties due to the grave political and economic situa-
tion following World War I. In 1919 the Hungarian Soviet Republic workers
took over the factory.
During the decade following the Trianon Peace Accord of 1919 and the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the textile industry became
increasingly independent and emerged as the most important sector of in-
dustry in Hungary. The postwar boom allowed the company to modernize
the factory, but the economic crisis and the shrinking of markets during
the Great Depression of 1929–1933 forced management to decrease produc-
tion significantly. In 1934 management took steps to liquidate the company,
but the factory was able to continue to operate with a reduced work force
and assistance from county and city authorities. The following years and
through World War II the company enjoyed slight growth in production and
was again able to modernize. In 1944 the company was moved west to Linz,
Austria, by the retreating German army for a short time, but was moved
back to Va´c in 1948, at which time the factory was nationalized and was
brought under state control. Orders from the Soviet army contributed to
significant growth in production between 1948 and 1988.
In the 1980s, the Hungarian textile industry enjoyed strong financial
performance. Major players invested heavily in their operations, and came
to rely on the strong infrastructure that had grown up around the industry.
There were several very large mills that used 10 to 15 primary distributors
to allocate their products through well-organized channels.
Internal and external demand for textiles was strong. Domestically the
industry existed in a protected market; government-imposed import quotas
kept demand for textiles artificially high. Meanwhile, export demand was
heavily subsidized by the Soviet Union for its own large market.
The owner-government had long supported this industry with new in-
vestments, but in the early 1980s the textile industry was given more
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autonomy. This situation meant that new investments depended on indi-
vidual company profits and bank loans for capital, but it also implied that
textile companies were freer in areas such as annual planning, wage and in-
vestment policies, and diversification. It also meant liberalization of foreign
and domestic distribution, including the opportunity for some companies to
market their goods abroad directly, and not through the state-trading com-
panies as was customary under central planning. Therefore, not only did
textile companies enjoy artificially high demand; they were able to develop
some strength, autonomy from the government, and direct relationships with
Western companies.
By the end of the 1980s, Senior was one of the largest textile mills in
Hungary, and employed about 2,400 people. The company was consuming
about 3,000 tons of raw materials per year, and was producing to 4 million
pieces annually. Exports played a significant role in the company’s success;
half of the production was sold in the domestic market, and half was ex-
ported. In this way Senior was able to benefit from the Hungarian- and
Soviet-government-supported demand, while developing a healthy external
clientele.
The company attempted to balance its domestic and export sales at a
50–50 ratio because few of the raw materials necessary for production were
available domestically. During the 1980s, Hungary imported almost 95%
of its artificial fiber needs, 100% of its cotton requirements, and 60% of its
wool needs. Forced to import such a large proportion of raw materials, Senior
was subject to foreign exchange risk; as the Hungarian forint devalued, it
became increasingly expensive to purchase these raw materials from outside
the country. The company counterbalanced this risk by targeting half of
its sales in convertible currencies; although it did not have a competitive
advantage in raw materials costs, it did enjoy the advantage of low labor
costs.
During the late 1980s, Senior Rt. developed strong working relation-
ships with many important Western wholesalers and retailers as they began
to sell in the Hungarian market. Levis, for instance, became well established
in Hungary when it began producing jeans during the 1970s. While Levis
sold both jeans and knitwear within Hungary, it produced only jeans in its
factories. Levis outsourced its knitwear products because high-quality prod-
ucts were available locally. Furthermore, since Hungary is landlocked, lead
times were much lower from within Hungary than from East Asia, and it was
generally less risky to be supplied from within Hungary. Similarly, Adidas
began moving into Hungary on a large scale in the mid-1980s, and eventu-
ally opened its own shops there. Other Western clients included the German
firms Arena and Reusch. Senior benefited greatly from the relationships with
these large, global firms.
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In the early 1990s, the Hungarian textile industry practically collapsed.
Several major events nearly devastated the industry. First, the Soviet Union
completely stopped purchasing Hungarian textiles as that country’s econ-
omy collapsed; this situation eliminated a substantial portion of external
demand. Second, changes in the Hungarian government regulations in 1990
considerably altered domestic demand, when nearly all import barriers were
eliminated. The market was attacked by imports from the East Asian compa-
nies, which, by 1995, were the primary competitors. Imports from Western
Europe also provided stiff competition. Consequently, in addition to los-
ing much of their export market, the textile industry also lost much of the
domestic market, including many of its principal customers.
A third major change was in the system of domestic trade. Whole-
salers and retailers became decentralized and grew to number in the thou-
sands. The distances between clients were often substantial, and lines of
communication were poor, requiring heavy investment and coordination in
distribution by the main mills. Because of their weakened financial position,
however, these mills were unable to react quickly and lost many clients.
In 1990, almost within a year, Senior Rt. had lost most of its markets,
and was forced to eliminate much of its work force. Whereas at one time it
produced 3 to 4 million pieces, by the end of 1990 it was down to between
10% and 15% of that. Senior had lost virtually all of its domestic market to
foreign competitors. Senior’s export markets were in a similar state of havoc
since the Soviets could not afford to buy goods and the West European
clients did not wish to risk doing business with a weak Hungarian textile
company. By 1992 Senior was almost bankrupt. Although its sales began
to increase slowly as the Hungarian economy improved, the company had
to support substantial fixed costs, in addition to the payments on the debts
incurred from investments made during the 1980s. Finally the factory was
repossessed by the Budapest Bank, its major creditor bank.
During this time, most of Senior’s domestic competition went bankrupt.
The remaining domestic mills generally produced goods for markets other
than the ones in which Senior competed. For instance, one mill produced
items such as terry and pajamas (products which Senior Rt. does not sell)
that are generally of inferior quality. Another Hungarian mill was purchased
by an American company, and produced only T-shirts. Senior Rt.’s interna-
tional competition came mainly from East Asia. These products were less
expensive than the domestically produced ones, but they also tended to be
of lower quality.
In 1994 and 1995, Senior Rt., which was down to 700 employees, re-
organized its production and laid out a plan for regaining domestic and
international clients. The company’s goal was to achieve a 50–50 ratio of
domestic and export sales by 1997.
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Senior’s export strategy was to sell to former clients in small orders to
prove that it was again reliable enough to serve its Western customers. It
regularly attempted to increase order sizes as it made good on previous trial
lots. Senior first targeted the large, well-known clients that produced brand-
name products. These clients were seeking quality and were able to pay for
it. Furthermore, their satisfaction would lead to positive references about
the company for other customers, particularly those abroad.
This strategy seemed reasonable to executives at Senior Rt. since its
clients already had strong relationships with the company. Furthermore,
the company had very good designers and technicians and a tradition of
workmanship among factory workers. Senior Rt. had always purchased the
highest-quality raw materials, including yarns, chemicals, and dyes. There-
fore, the company was certainly capable of delivering high-quality goods.
In addition to selling brand-name products to major clients, in 1994 Se-
nior Rt. launched its own brand, Fibri. This brand, which was purchased
by many wholesalers and retailers, was less expensive than the other prod-
ucts it manufactured, but of the same quality. The brand offered a “basic
collection” of year-round clothing in standard colors.
During the early to mid-1990s, demand for clothing in Hungary changed
dramatically. Initially consumers were exposed to a wide range of imports.
Demand for these clothes was very high, since they were cheaper than do-
mestically produced items, and were appealing because they were foreign.
Consumers wanted to try many new things at that time. However, economics
served to segment the market more definitively. Unemployment, which was
unheard of before 1989 during the 40-year-old Communist regime, rose sub-
stantially during the early 1990s. Inflation increased to 30% per annum;
there was virtually no inflation before 1989 because prices were controlled.
During the transition from central planning to a market economy, many
Hungarians experienced a reduction in their standard of living; a small group
of entrepreneurs became very rich; and a sizable middle class emerged. The
very wealthy were willing to pay a high price for clothing and were consumers
of the latest fashions. They spent considerable amounts of money onWestern
brands such as Levis, but were also drawn toward haute couture. Those with
the lowest standard of living shopped mainly on price, and became strong
consumers of products imported from East Asia. It was difficult for Senior
Rt. to produce goods cheaply enough to serve this segment. The middle class
demanded a medium standard of quality and fashion at a reasonable price.
This was the segment that Senior Rt. targeted both with its own brand and
with its brand-name clients. The size of this segment dropped initially, but
then increased.
From 1992 through 1994 Senior Rt. was able to regain its reputation
domestically and turn toward recapturing the export business. Its strong
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relationships with brands like Adidas facilitated a move back into interna-
tional markets, such as Germany.
By the end of 1994 and into 1995, production was up to 1 million pieces,
and 90% of Senior’s sales were on the domestic market and 10% were on the
export market. Senior was one of the few surviving domestic mills, and it
had successfully identified a healthy consumer segment that demanded its
products. While a long road to recovery lies ahead for Senior Rt., several
factors can be attributed to the company’s success thus far.
The first is the company’s past strengths: its client base and its value-
added, high-quality products. Its strong client base and its tradition and
reputation for high-quality products enabled Senior to restore relationships
with its largest clients. Capitalizing on Senior’s strengths allowed the com-
pany to develop and execute a reasonable strategy for recovery.
A second important element in Senior Rt.’s recovery was timing. The
real collapse of the industry occurred in 1990 and 1991. However, Senior Rt.
was stronger than many mills at the time, and did not suffer as much until
the end of 1992. By that time many competing mills were already in the
process of liquidating. Since textiles production was a national industry, the
government could not conceive of liquidating one of the last surviving textile
mills when unemployment was high and rising. Therefore the government,
which then owned Budapest Bank, Senior’s primary creditor, was somewhat
lenient on the company and helped facilitate recovery.
A third major success criterion was ownership by the Budapest Bank
and the personality of Lajos Bokros, who was the CEO of the Budapest
Bank in the early to mid-1990s; Bokros went on to become Hungary’s Fi-
nance Minister in 1995. The Budapest Bank’s vision for Senior Rt., as
directed by Bokros, was not just to keep the company, but to nurture it and
slowly sell shares back to the company’s management. By the end of 1995,
the bank’s ownership decreased to about 25%. About 60% of the shares
were sold to management and the remainder stayed in the hands of other
shareholders. Bokros’s long-run perspective demonstrated his confidence in
Senior Rt.’s employees and managers, and its long tradition in the textile
industry. Rather than liquidating the company, Bokros allowed it to seek a
plan for recovery.
159
Zwack Unicum, Hungary
In 1990, Peter Zwack and Emil Gunderberg, a German drink distributor
and Zwack’s longtime family friend, formed Peter Zwack & Consorten AG.
This company was to own 50% plus one share of Zwack Unicum Rt. as part
of its privatization. In its effort to integrate into the world market, Zwack
Unicum recognized the importance of international business concepts, such
as marketing and quality control, and incorporated them into its domestic
business. In fact marketing has been one of the keys to success at Zwack, and
it is one of the main reasons that Zwack Unicum has been able to capture a
two-thirds share of the Hungarian spirits market.
Zwack Unicum Rt. began in 1840 when Jo´zsef Zwack founded the first
Hungarian liqueur factory. He introduced a unique drink from a secret family
recipe called Unicum, and quickly became the official supplier to the Habs-
burgs. After World War II, the Zwack family left the country with the secret
recipe when the family factory was expropriated. The distillery then oper-
ated as a state company, but without the original recipe. Peter Zwack, the
fifth generation in the family business, continued production outside Hun-
gary until 1989, when political and economic changes in Hungary enabled
him to buy back the company. Zwack and Gunderberg, owner of a Ger-
man spirit company, then formed Peter Zwack & Consorten AG (PZAG),
and the original Zwack Unicum was reintroduced to the Hungarian mar-
ket in 1990. In 1993, PZAG acquired Hungary’s largest producer of spirits,
the Budapesti Likoˆripari Va´llalat (Budapest Liqueur Factory). The current
company structure is given in Zwack Unicum Exhibit 1.
The Zwack Unicum Group integrated into the world economy in two
ways: its products were represented in markets outside Hungary, and it
represented foreign products in Hungary. As Hungary’s largest producer
and distributor of alcoholic beverages, with more than 80 products, Zwack
Unicum has dominated the Hungarian spirits market. Unicum, an aperitif
and digestif made from more than 40 herbs, is a historic product, and has sig-
nificant name recognition, especially in Hungary. Other alcoholic beverages,
such as c´ımeres barack pa´linka (apricot brandy) and vilmosko¨rte pa´linka
(pear brandy), have also been major products of Zwack Unicum.
Zwack Unicum also imports foreign products into Hungary. In 1993,
the company exchanged a 26% ownership interest for an exclusive license
with International Distillers and Vintners (IDV), a subsidiary of the Grand
Metropolitan PLC, giving Zwack the rights to distribute IDV products in
Hungary. IDV, one of the biggest producers of spirits in the world, wanted a
presence in Hungary, and Zwack Unicum was a natural partner. Among the
brand names that Zwack Unicum now distributes in Hungary are Smirnoff
Vodka, J&B Scotch, Baileys Irish Cream, Cinzano, and Gilbey’s Gin.
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The Hungarian domestic spirit market has been characterized by declin-
ing demand and increasing competition. Although per capita alcohol con-
sumption has declined, the trend toward higher-quality alcohol has height-
ened (Budapest Business Journal, 1993). Due to a lack of reliable statistics,
it is difficult to quantify the spirits market in Hungary. According to Man-
aging Director Imre Sivo´, however, Zwack Unicum has over a 50% market
share in Hungary. Zwack Unicum Exhibit 2 presents the market share esti-
mation provided by Zwack Unicum. Zwack’s main competitor is BUSZESZ,
which has been acquired by the Mautner Markhof Group of Austria. Besides
BUSZESZ, no other distillers are big enough to significantly threaten Zwack
Unicum, but another source of competition in the Hungarian spirit industry
is the black market. According to Sivo´, approximately 30% of alcohol con-
sumed in Hungary is distributed through the black market. Unfortunately,
Zwack cannot ignore the black market, but it cannot fight it either. Sivo´
reported, “As a company, there is not a lot you can do to control the black
market. You have to heavily rely on the State and lobby.”
In 1994, the total net turnover and profit for Zwack Unicum Co. were
Ft1.1 billion and Ft525 million, respectively (see financial statements in
Zwack Unicum Exhibit 3 ). The sales revenues represent a 10% increase from
1993. Domestic sales account for 95% of all sales. In the domestic market,
Zwack sells both brand and nonbrand products. Brand products, such as
Unicum, account for approximately half the total sales revenue. Unicum,
which is targeted toward the luxury market, by itself contributed 8% of
total sales in 1992.
The word “integration” has a different meaning in the Zwack case. As
of 1994, most of Zwack Unicum’s revenues came from domestic sales. It is
fundamentally a Hungarian company with Hungarian products that cater
to Hungarian tastes. Even though the company’s long-term plans call for
increased international exposure, it remains predominantly a domestic com-
pany. What makes this company’s integration interesting, however, is that
“it is a domestic company with international thinking,” as Sivo´ stated.
Zwack, for example, having lived abroad and conducted international busi-
ness, brought back and applied his business knowledge and experience to the
company. Zwack Unicum has proved the effectiveness of applying traditional
capitalistic business thinking in an economy that had been centrally planned.
Among the many international tools brought into Hungary, sales and mar-
keting efforts and quality management have been the most important and
have become the backbone of success at Zwack.
In 1992, Zwack Unicum established a new sales strategy to penetrate the
domestic market. According to Sivo´, the company has the biggest alcohol
distribution network in Hungary. By 1995, there were seven regional dis-
tribution centers and 60 salespeople. Through this network of distribution
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centers, Zwack Unicum services wholesalers and directly sells to retailers
such as restaurants and hotels.
Zwack Unicum was the first among the Hungarian distillers to establish
marketing as a separate function. Marketing did not exist under Commu-
nism because there was simply no competition. However, as Hungary shifted
toward free-market competition, marketing concepts became crucial to con-
tinued success. Through its own marketing department, Zwack Unicum
implemented a brand strategy, and emphasized brand image. It was impor-
tant to upgrade the image of Unicum because the Unicum produced by the
state-owned company did not resemble the real Unicum. The strategy has
helped to make brand products from commodity goods.
To draw on ideas and expertise in business, the company is constantly in
touch with international advisers. “This would be hard to do without foreign
help,” Sivo´ stated. Having two foreign arms, IDV and Gunderberg, which
are also major players in the spirits industry, makes it easier for Zwack to in-
tegrate marketing into the business. Regarding international marketing Sivo´
indicated that their “two international arms” help Zwack Unicum integrate
into the export market. With IDV’s coverage of English-speaking areas,
Gunderberg’s presence in German-speaking areas, and Zwack in Eastern
Europe, the company plans to expand its market with high-quality, unique
Hungarian products. IDV already distributes Unicum in the international
market, including the United States.
Zwack Unicum became the first Hungarian liquor company to be
awarded the ISO-9100 international quality standard certificate in 1995. To
receive this certificate a company must go through a series of tests to ensure
a high standard of quality and production process. The company believes in
the importance of quality regardless of where the products are sold. “Brand
image should live up to the high standard of quality,” Sivo´ indicated.
The combination of high-quality products and intensive marketing ef-
forts has been key to the successful restoration of Zwack Unicum as a leading
company in Hungary. Integration, however, has not been without difficulties
at Zwack, and the company believes in continuous improvement. The most
difficult challenge Zwack faces is in internal matters, particularly human re-
sources. Not surprisingly, this problem is found in many companies that
leap suddenly from state ownership to private enterprise. The transition of
the employee’s work mentality from that of a centrally planned economy to
that of a free market does not happen overnight. “It’s a matter of changing
the corporate culture. It takes a lot of management effort,” Sivo´ stated.
To integrate into today’s world market, workers should change their way of
thinking and working. The company deals with this problem by hiring and
training the “right” people. “Young, talented people are very important to
us,” said Sivo´.
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External integration presents further challenges to Zwack Unicum. Be-
cause Hungary is a small country with a limited domestic market, it is dif-
ficult to depend solely on domestic sales for the company’s growth. Fur-
thermore, it requires a great deal of long-term investment and effort to be
recognized in international markets among so many different products, espe-
cially with products very specific to the taste and culture of Hungary, such
as Unicum.
At the same time, the import business can often be vulnerable to cer-
tain economic or other changes. Factors such as import duties or currency
devaluation, for example, may help its exports but it simultaneously hurts
imports. Zwack Unicum must deal with these factors on both sides.
One of the keys to Zwack’s success lies in its staff members who can
apply their international business knowledge. Following the acquisition of
the company in 1989, the number of employees decreased from 1,400 to 740,
and currently the management is made up almost completely of people who
have been hired since privatization. It is important to the company to have
international owners such as Gunderberg and IDV, because they provide
the necessary know-how in integrating into the world market. “Hungarians
learn it and transfer the know-how from the Hungarian company to the
domestic market,” explained Sivo´. The profile of the company’s management
is included in Zwack Unicum Exhibit 4.
The long-term plan of Zwack Unicum is based on the theory that Unicum
should be present everywhere. As the company remains the dominant player
in the domestic market, with its brand products such as Unicum and various
brandies, it sees its growth potential in neighboring East European countries.
Unicum is also becoming more popular in the Far East for its curative effect.
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Zwack Unicum Exhibit 1. Ownership structure.
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Zwack Unicum Exhibit 2. Main segments of the Hungarian liquor market
in 1992.
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Zwack Unicum Exhibit 3. Financial statements (in thousand Hungarian
forints).
1993 1994
Balance sheet
Liquid assets 21,308 9,895
Prepayment and accrued income 123 928
Receivables 895,922 875,988
Inventories 111,577 222,900
Total current assets 1,028,930 1,109,711
Intangible assets 210 895
Tangible assets 234,994 262,717
Financial investment 1,970,500 1,971,333
Total fixed assets 2,205,704 2,234,945
Total assets 3,234,634 3,344,656
Liabilities and equity
Advance payment 8,953
Trade accounts payable 17,091 35,559
Short-term bank loan 89,701 111,215
Other short-term liabilities 215,181 172,619
Total current liabilities 330,926 319,393
Long-term liabilities 400,000 4,282
Total liabilities 730,926 323,675
Accruals and deferred income 3,988 10,148
Provisions for risk, liabilities, and charges 2,463 1,936
Equity 2,497,257 3,008,897
Total equity and liabilities 3,234,634 3,344,656
Profit and loss statement (for the year ending 31 December 1994)
Net turnover 1,032,662 1,136,864
Other operating income 56,163 71,882
Own work capitalized and work-in-process 25,083 71,321
Material and other external charges 447,309 610,777
Staff costs 83,670 117,743
Depreciation 12,771 17,812
Other costs 169,205 118,360
Other operating expenses 40,305 47,718
Trading profit 360,648 367,657
Financial income 126,370 255,332
Financial charges 10,308 16,707
Operating results before tax 476,710 606,282
Income tax 28,649 81,186
Profit after tax 448,061 525,096
165
Zwack Unicum Exhibit 4. Management profile.
The Board of Directors manages company business, handles company affairs, rep-
resents the company in court before authorities and third parties, and exercises
employer’s rights. Currently the Board of Directors of Zwack Unicum Rt. consists
of six members. Four members were elected upon transformation of the company
in September 1992 and the other two in March 1993 for a term of four years.
Peter Zwack, 66, Chairman of the Board. Studied in Budapest, Milan, and the
United States. Awarded degree in economics from New York University. Has been
managing the affairs of the Zwack family since 1970.
Rudolf Kobatsch, 52, economist and Deputy Chairman of the Board. Currently
Chief Executive Officer of Schlumber Ag where he has been employed since 1972.
Herman Matzer van Bloois, 52, marketing specialist, Director of IDV. Responsible
for developments since 1988. Between 1980 and 1987 Managing Director of Selviac
Nederland BV.
Ro´bert Horva´th, 31, Managing Director of IDV Hungaria since its foundation in
1991. Formerly Mr. Horvath was Deputy Head of the export department of Hun-
garovin for three years.
E´va Schleicher, 53, Deputy General Manager of Zwack Unicum Rt. since 1992.
Has been employed in the liqueur industry since graduating from university. Upon
establishment of Zwack Unicum Kft. she was appointed Managing Director.
Imre Sivo´, 39, chemical engineer. General Manager Zwack Unicum Rt. since May
1992. Formerly Deputy General Manager of Taurus Tire Works.
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